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Otherwise Than Our Knowledge:  
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This dissertation proposes to critique and reformulate the terminology used to discuss 
non-statist subjectivities, particularly regarding neoliberal Argentina and Chile. By 
putting into dialogue the ethical thought of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida and 
the autonomist Marxism of Paolo Virno and Antonio Negri, I articulate an anarchistic 
thinking of ethico-political subjectivity in the commons and propose a new mode of 
situated reading/writing opposed to the capitalist State’s ordering of language. I argue 
that a situated thought of solidarity without epistemic capture and friendship as a form of 
love allows us to think the persistence of radical subjectivities and avoid attributing 
failure to emergent movements. Further, it allows us to comprehend our own theoretical 
limitations concerning subjectivities emerging or already extant in modes otherwise than 
statist politics. I articulate a theory of the neoliberal State’s function and continued 
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relevance through an engagement with Nicos Poulantzas’s later works. I then think 
solidarity and friendship through readings of Nicanor Parra and Juan Gelman’s poetry, 
respectively. Afterwards, I explore radical persistence through a reading of post-saqueo 
independent video in Argentina and the current im-possibility of conceptualizing, within 
academic language, the relationship between the Mapuche and the Chilean state, through 
a reading of Elicura Chihuailaf Nahuelpán’s poetry and prose. I conclude that by learning 
to teach from and be taught by these texts, through what I term a paradoxical auto-
didact’s pedagogy, we may better situate ourselves and our work vis a vis the necessity of 
a radical, anti-capitalist relationality, beyond the State. 
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By Way of Beginning 
“I am an anarchist, a social anarchist.  
I am not a communist, because social anarchism is beyond communism.” 
-Louis Althusser 
“It is from the love of humanity that we are revolutionaries: 
it is not our fault if history has forced on us this distressing necessity” 
-Errico Malatesta 
 
 As I was initially planning this introduction, I intended to open with an 
apocryphal quote from Emma Goldman, one which I have always liked. The quote in 
question is always some variation on: “if I can’t dance, it’s not my revolution”. Turning, 
action, joy and persistence are all bundled up in the little quip, a retort to a young 
comrade who presumed chide her for dancing, as though her role as agitator forbade such 
expression. But more than vaguely apocryphal, it cannot be attributed to Goldman at all- 
it sprung from missed encounters and propagandizing in the seventies, if certain accounts 
from the 1990s can be believed.1 The actual sentiment, however, is perhaps a better 
beginning. As she says of the incident in her autobiography, “I did not believe that a 
Cause which stood for a beautiful ideal, for anarchism, for release and freedom from 
conventions and prejudice, should demand the denial of life and joy” (Goldman 56, 
emphasis mine). While this dissertation will not address explicitly anarchist movements- 
at least, not in the concrete historical sense of that within which Goldman agitated- I felt 
it appropriate to begin there, in the 1930s but really with the clarification made in the 
1990s of a misattribution from the 1970s. In a felicitous way, it lays out the time frame 
and problematics that guide my work- a work asking after the persistence of certain, 
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perhaps anarchist but certainly at least horizontal, tendencies in left organizations and 
works in Argentina and Chile throughout the 20th century and into the 21st, while also 
thinking the conceptual modulations and approaches we need to do our own work without 
denying life and joy, nor eliding persistence, failure, love and the imposition(s) of history.  
 That said, my aim in this dissertation is to explore concepts and approaches for an 
explicitly anarchist mode of reading, that the dissertation in turn enacts in exploration. A 
mode of reading that is also, thus, one of learning, writing and teaching, situated in and 
by the body of whomsoever enacts it- one not imposed nor universal, but emergent from 
the situations in which it is enacted and, thus, always conformed by them. Hence, given 
my academic role (if not to say, with Henri Lefebvre, type), the ethics and politics of 
reading and writing will here be given primacy and, while far from the only points of 
departure, will (over)determine my work and its milieu.2 For me, then, more than simply 
what texts I choose, the question is always how is that text a lesson to us? As a singular 
product, a text bears traces of a productive act functional to its existence, and so an 
anarchist mode of reading must learn to bring forward that act’s specter, to act again in 
common, carrying out its lesson(s). While any attempt at dogmatism would for this 
project be exceedingly contradictory and destabilizing, I do feel that there are a few core 
concepts that can be addressed as necessary to any anarchist approach, ones that arise 
time and again and deserve further exploration. I will return to these subjects below, but 
to mention them in passing, the following are central: solidarity, here as enacted in 
writing; friendship and love, wherein friendship-as-love teaches us to carry on in and out 
of solidarity; common action and singular persistence, over and above the strictures of 
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bourgeois historicity; the spectacularly imposed limits of any situated epistemic mode; 
and, of course, the State as a central organizing referent for capitalist being, knowledge 
and politics- all of which must be discarded. But, to begin at the end, I must here clarify 
what I mean by the State in Argentina and Chile in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, 
after the dictatorships but not post-dictatorship for reasons that will soon become clear. In 
this effort, I will also lay out my own, more general, understanding of the neoliberal State 
and its functioning in a system of global capital and atomized social relations, the 
conjunction of which I will come to refer to as ouroboros capital- capital in the process of 
consuming itself, coiled as it is around the world.  
The State During Ouroboros Capital 
 Beginning early in the emergence of what we now commonly refer to as 
neoliberalism, there was a significant shift away from a thought of the State in 
mainstream academic left discourses, where it had briefly flourished.3 While an 
exhaustive exploration of its decline would require reviewing the last forty years of social 
science research, a dizzying proposition, it suffices to note the seemingly common-sense 
idea that the role of the State has been diminishing. This is explained as symptomatic 
either of an outright subsumption or subservience to the economic, or of the increasing 
internationalization and perceived decentralization of politics, economics and culture- 
and at times, both together. Witness the popularity of the work of authors such as 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, amongst many currents, wherein the role of the state is 
elided almost to the point of non-existence.4 Yet, for as much as this move is justified on 
the basis of the supposed diminution of the State’s role and relevance, the case seems to 
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me more one of obfuscation and reorientation. Certainly not a measurable lessening of 
the State, define that as you may- thus, this turn away from it is entirely too hasty and, as 
is often the case, serves to reinforce, if not reify, its power and functionality. To 
understand why this is so, and what can be said of the State in recent years, I would like 
to begin by revisiting one of two thinkers whose interpersonal debate sparked a decade of 
larger Marxist debates about the State, and who has been recently somewhat revindicated 
for his prescience- Nicos Poulantzas.5 
 While Poulantzas wrote several texts dealing with this theme, his last work, State, 
Power, Socialism, is of most interest to me and, allowing for historically necessary re-
orientations, contributes the most to contemporary scholarship.6 While still centering the 
Marxist understanding of the State’s class nature, by dialoguing with (primarily) 
Foucault’s thought of power to elaborate what he called the then emergent Authoritarian 
Statism, his work gains a flexibility and acuity that assures its continued relevance. While 
I will spend more time exploring what remains useful and what not after commenting on 
the Chilean and Argentine states after their respective dictatorships, here I’ll review 
Poulantzas’s core insights on the general state form. Against the instrumentalist vision of 
the State as a thing (thus an object) and the social democratic vision of the State as 
Subject (thus historical subject), both of which he says reify the State and place it outside 
of class relations, Poulantzas asserts that the State is “rather a relationship of forces, or 
more precisely the material condensation of such a relationship among [dominant] 
classes and class fractions, such as this is expressed within the State in a necessarily 
specific form” (128-9 emphasis in original).7 He sees its materiality expressed in the 
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relations and functions of the various State institutions and their productions; including, 
to an extent, the oft referred Ideological Apparatuses. But while the inclusion of 
dominant in the citation was mine, it was to emphasize another key assertion. As 
Poulantzas says, “the dominated classes exist in the State not by means of apparatuses 
concentrating a power of their own, but essentially in the form of centres of opposition to 
the powers of the dominant class” and cannot hold power “without a radical 
transformation of the State”, their subordination and exclusion being inscribed in its 
institutional materiality (142 emphasis in original). While he asserts that the “State is not 
a monolithic bloc, but a strategic field”, he stridently emphasizes that the contradictions 
expressed in the shifting powers within the State do not express the dyad 
dominated/dominant but, rather, the conflicts between fractions of the dominant class 
(130). These fractions are contained by the hegemony of one, specific power bloc (then, 
Monopoly Capital), whose struggles shape the State’s institutional materiality to 
organize, in their condensation, these contradictions. For him, this explains why, even 
should the Left assume power, without said radical transformation the central organizing 
force can be shifted to other State institutions (and here he uses Salvador Allende and his 
struggles with the courts as his example).  
 While that should serve as segue to a discussion of my material cases, I would like 
to underscore another question. That is: what do I intend to do with this Marxist’s thought 
of the State? Or rather, does this text, often interpreted as having an optimistic view of 
certain reformist efforts, have any use for an actively anti-State stance?8 A path opens in 
his most concentrated engagement with the thought of power. For me, the key tension is 
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contained in the following: “popular struggles, and power in general, stretch far beyond 
the State: but insofar as they are genuinely political, they are not really external to the 
State” due what he calls their “long range” effects within it (141 emphasis in original). 
He’s walking a fine line: while, rightly, attempting to avoid what Ralph Miliband 
criticized as “structural superdeterminism”, he also takes explicit issue with the 
Foucauldian tendency to completely set aside the State’s role in centralizing and ordering 
power, in favor of an immanent, situational understanding. Within the latter discussion 
lays the kernel that any anarchistic reading of Poulantzas must address. While his critique 
of Foucault was left partial after his untimely death, it is nonetheless a fascinating gesture 
towards what he saw as a tendency to hypostasize power. He reads in Foucault a 
rhetorical and theoretical dependence on the slippages between a hypostatized idea of 
Power and the bipolar power/resistance dynamic, such that resistance is vacated of 
meaning. He insists instead on power’s existence as relational and always emergent from, 
without exhausting, struggles as inscribed in its materiality.9 Unfortunately, this is not the 
place to take up that debate anew. Of interest to me is his elaboration of popular struggles 
under the aegis of the idea that, given that power is not exhausted in the State, “it is 
impossible to remain external to power and escape its characteristic relations: one cannot 
avoid being trapped by power simply by remaining outside the State” (152). But by 
viewing the State as utilizing all power, whether of its institutions or not, he asserts that 
the aforementioned “long range” effects of popular and other struggles are amplified and 
made manifold in the State by virtue of contact with institutions established to distance 
them (the police, courts, etcetera) and in which they cannot be allowed presence.  
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 Yet, following this, he immediately re-affirms the necessity of a certain autonomy 
of popular struggles from the State. Here is the text’s only explicit reference to anarchism 
(unsurprisingly, while discussing strategy):  
…the attainment of such autonomy does not involve the political organizations in 
leaving the strategic field of the relationship of forces that is the power-State, any 
more than it involves other organizations […] in taking up a position outside the 
corresponding power mechanisms. To believe that this is even possible is an old 
illusion of anarchism (in the best sense of the term). (153 emphasis mine)  
 
While I believe this is a fair description of the strategic positionality often articulated by 
anarchism with regards the power-State dynamic, it seems to me an unfair transhistorical 
universalization of its (im)possibility, for a few reasons. First, to clarify, I do not think it 
accurate to claim anarchists pretend a complete escape from all power relations- in fact, 
by explicitly opposing them in their dominant form, it should be clear that there is no 
escape in their posture. Thus, in the particular case of the power-State relation(s), its 
immediate elimination (as opposed to its withering away) has other valences. The 
demand for its elimination is due to recognizing our interiority to its strategic field of 
power and power utilization- this is the negative valence. The positive is rather other, and 
I believe originates accusations of a utopian desire for exteriority to the State. Anarchism 
also demands generativity, in a call for distinct relations from those of the State to, in 
practice, produce in struggle an “outside” to State power, but one no longer “outside”, 
rather otherwise. To produce the very joy that Goldman writes of, above. For to postulate 
the impossibility of relations other than the State, as difficult as their generation may be, 
would be to fall back on a gesture similar to the hypostatization of power Poulantzas 
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critiques in Foucault, and would further undermine his own dual strategy of radical 
reformulation within and alternative constituent forces beyond the State.  
The question of possibility, though, must be approached historically. While 
Poulantzas may have been accurate saying this in 1978, we are not concerned with 1978. 
So, returning to Allende and Chile, I will reflect on the state of the State in Chile, and 
then Argentina, after their dictatorships and into the present day- effectively, allowing for 
late 80s turbulence in Argentina, beginning circa 1990. While both states differ in their 
particularities, having been proving grounds for neoliberalism’s forceful normalization 
techniques- both at the point of a gun and a pen- they can reveal to us much about the 
broader nature and role of the State in late 20th and early 21st century radical politics.  
Chile 
 While I in no way avail myself of the necessary space for an exhaustive 
exploration of the literature on the dictatorships in either country, nor on the transitions, I 
will attempt to sketch key points for understanding the State in each country as they 
moved into the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Beginning with Chile, we need to 
understand what seem to have been the dictatorships’ primary goals vis a vis politics, 
civil society, and the economy. Socio-politically, the Pinochet dictatorship opposed what 
it viewed as an “interventionist” state; a welfare state influenced by popular Marxism. 
Against this it posed an ultra-liberal tendency towards a politics of the free market, 
wherein was postulated a disarticulation of traditional civil society in favor of increasing 
social fragmentation and atomization of labor (although these goals moved slowly in 
popular sectors).10 This shift from a social defined more homogeneously to one 
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dominated by a heterogeneity of signifiers also permitted the political order enshrined in 
the dictatorship’s new constitution to re-articulate the left with a chaotic form of socio-
political organization. It encouraged, especially amongst younger generations, a self-
identification from marginality that destabilized prior left parliamentarism and animated 
depoliticization and distrust of representative politics, distancing left tendencies from 
State institutions.11 Accompanying this socio-political distancing, especially after the 
unrest of 1983-4, the dictatorship used prior economic reforms to stabilize its imposition 
of global finance-friendly, extractivist neoliberal policies that favored, and perhaps 
depended on, social fragmentation and depoliticization.12 Finally, coming out of the 
dictatorship, there was a shift wherein institutional relations were weakened by a 
concentration of executive power and a growing decentralization, although not lessening, 
of state functions- reminiscent of Poulantzas’s Authoritarian Statism. Social action’s 
efficacy at affecting State institutions was subordinated by a technocratized politics 
favoring global capital, resulting in a trend towards socio-political normalization and 
political apathy.13 
   After the dictatorship, properly speaking, this situation provoked a few major 
critical currents regarding the State. First, there’s an explicitly liberal reformist current 
that conceives of the separation of politics from economics as sufficient to restore the 
State’s political function, which they see as having been almost nullified.14 Second, there 
is a broadly Democratic Socialist tendency emphasizing social fragmentation, 
individualization and, as such, a fragmented Civil Society, as key to the current moment. 
Broadly Gramscian, their somewhat nostalgic/regressive advocacy for a return to an 
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instrumentalized, strong interventionist State ignores the complex interplay of forces 
altering the spatial practice in which the State/Civil Society relationship initially 
obtained.15  
 More than either of these, I find that the heterodox Marxist thought of Tomás 
Moulian and Gabriel Salazar most effectively comprehends the current State. Moulian 
centers what he refers to as “transformismo”, in which the dictatorship, principally but 
not exclusively with the 1980 constitution, legally restricted the Chilean state’s 
institutional flexibility to ensure the persistence of its economic and social policies. 
Summarizing this double gesture manifest in the current State, he refers to fusion and 
fission. Fusion is the centralization of decisional power in the State, and particularly the 
executive, dependent on a cleavage of the State from society whose root cause is the 
technification of politics, productive of the oft mentioned technocracy. While often 
confused for simple subordination of the political to the economic, this process is more 
an application of an economic-productive logic- specialization- to politics. With this, the 
dominant ideological tendencies can distinguish political and economic realms and, 
complementarily, excise the masses from politics for not having sufficient “technical” 
formation. Fission, then, refers to the decomposition of social forces concomitant with 
and necessary for the above fusion. Salazar attributes this to the dictatorship’s 
fragmentation of productive models, which in turn fragmented labor and the social 
sphere, facilitating post-Fordist forms of capital accumulation.16 Moulian underscores 
that, with financial capital’s entrance into Chile, credit became a disciplinary force 
reinforcing neoliberal isolation and atomization by increasing the risk for the individual 
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of collective action against capital. Yet, both emphasize that absent credible 
representative politics, there have been situated, bottom-up political reformulations 
availing themselves of constituent power otherwise than the traditional pairing State/Civil 
Society.17  
 This moves us beyond the Gramscian binomial State/Civil Society via its 
comprehension of a certain subsumption of Civil Society to the political, insofar as the 
capital interests the State serves have necessitated a restructuring of its institutional 
materiality. Thus, this model allows for alternative political forms exceeding the heavily 
circumscribed realm of politics as functional to the State, now extended to a Civil Society 
instrumentalized, or discarded, for and by global capital’s collaboration with state 
apparatuses. Understanding the absence of popular will in state institutions, we 
understand the exhaustion of a paradigm wherein Civil Society is a balance and 
complement to the State- concomitant with and productive of a withering functionality of 
traditional civic institutions in favor of consumerist models that better serve capital (and 
contribute to the illusion of a withering away of the State, insofar as our understanding 
has not kept pace with institutional shifts).18 The Chilean state, then, appears in many 
ways as robust as ever, despite modulations, and so a sense of its diminution can be 
understood as a misapprehension of its continuity due to the exclusion of the popular 
from decision making. However, this poses the following questions to Poulantzas’s 
model: when the masses cease to have “long range” effects in the State, what are the 
dominant class interests and fractional disputes that compose the contradictory unity 
projected by the State and to which this popular absence is due? How can one account for 
12 
 
the State’s utilization of non-state power when its traditional seat of power has been 
decentered, although not diminished? We will return to these questions after examining 
the Argentine situation, which will help focus them. 
Argentina  
 Argentina’s dictatorship shared many aspirations with the Pinochet regime, but 
was also unique to the Argentine situation- enough so that it’s worth indicating that direct 
comparison is not reasonable, although they did have some similarities. I will highlight, 
initially, though, that the above effects of political technification and the ensuing 
technocratic governance style do hold for Argentina and will here be presumed. Prior to 
the dictatorship, popular struggles and social actors had projected their influence into the 
State by unifying behind caudillo figures who controlled, “for” them, sectors of the state 
apparatus- effectively a form of corporativism, as opposed to representative democracy 
per se.19 One of the dictatorship’s main effects, if not goals, was the working class’s 
fragmentation and heterogenization, facilitating social disciplining by state apparatuses 
meant to produce individual citizen-subjects amenable to the imposition of new economic 
models.20 This all formed part of what José Nun has referred to as “atomization by 
multiplication”, principally directed at the Peronist unions, which retained significant 
political and economic power alongside, but not of, the State. And, though it failed to 
break the unions, it did succeed in more fully incorporating many elements of traditional 
Civil Society into the field of power struggles proper to state institutionality, forcing a 
cleavage between the masses and Civil Society- a situation similar, although not 
identical, to what I noted above regarding Chile.21  
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 Effectively, this fragmentary process of social disciplining produced unstable 
capital/labor relations and further exacerbated a growing sector of informal, non-
unionized labor, while the unions were more fully articulated with the State. This is 
somewhat ironic, given that Peron had originally encouraged movementist unionization 
as a way of quelling insurrectionary tendencies, although the irony does not become 
apparent until 2001. At the same time, as most histories of the 1980s implicitly project, 
there was a significant increase of executive power under Alfonsín during his struggles 
against a complete imposition of structural adjustment programs, again echoing what we 
see in Chile.22 This period effectively ends in the 1990s with the election of Carlos 
Menem, who moved to discreetly but completely advance the neoliberal structural 
adjustment plans using newly aggregated executive powers, as well as a weakened and 
coopted Civil Society, more and more removed from popular struggle. He also 
successfully delegated some of the central government’s traditional institutional authority 
and power to the governors, paradoxically increasing centralized executive power within 
the State by reinforcing corrupt clientelist networks across the country.23 Whereas in 
Chile, we see disillusionment with representative politics, in Argentina this produces a 
roiling rage around the period’s corruption and scandals- although the resultant lack of 
credibility was effectively the same.24 State politicking during the 1990s is essentially 
dominated by clientelist networks, elite factionalism and party politics that, collectively, 
have no immediate relation to popular struggles- again, animating the lack of  non-state 
powers’ “long range” effects in the State.25 After the anti-representative, anti-corruption 
mobilizations of 2001-2 in Argentina there were attempts by Nestor Kirchner to return to 
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a balanced State/Civil Society dyad by incorporating the moderate elements of piquetero, 
and other, groups to his government. Yet, there was no fundamental change in the 
depoliticization coetaneous with the overflowing of the social by the political produced as 
Peronism took refuge in the unions: said another way, the depoliticization produced by 
state politics’ saturation of Civil Society.26 As Laura Tedesco notes of Menem’s tenure as 
president, “the neoliberal state de-politicised the economy, ‘de-ideologised’ politics and 
turned social issues into economic ones” (169). But, and Argentina presents in many 
ways the best case for this, this only holds for the functions and politics delimited in the 
earlier system, wherein the welfare state was broadly responsive to a robust Civil Society. 
The social she mentions, referencing as it does older formulations, always implies a 
delimitation within and by Civil Society and cannot be taken to refer to socialization 
otherwise than that realm. Thus, with the sharp increase in informal labor and markets 
under and following the dictatorship, many Argentines fell outside the bounds of the 
social once articulated with Civil Society’s institutions- which, further, no longer 
function in any substantial way.27 And so, the desocupados were, predictably, excluded 
from Kirchner’s attempts at bringing some into the fold insofar as they were more radical 
than the capitalist State was willing to tolerate. They became an excess signaling an 
exhaustion, or at least complication, of extant conceptualizations of state power, the 
State, and power.  
 So, what can be said, succinctly, of the post-dictatorship Argentine state? 
Technocratic tendencies and corruption- manifest as a chauvinistic clientelism effectively 
isolating state beneficiaries- alongside a withering Civil Society have produced a State 
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that is responsive to concerns arising everywhere but from popular struggle. And thereby 
necessitating the same questions I asked above- concerning the State’s relationship with 
power and the efficacy of Civil Society. This is exacerbated in Argentina, historically, by 
the weakening of Civil Society effected by Peronism’s movementist tendencies, 
particularly after Peron’s exile. Moreover, following the Videla dictatorship, horizontally 
gestated human rights groups ironically strengthened state institutions responsible for 
atrocities by making claims upon them, further weakening Civil Society and buttressing 
extant non-traditional, horizontal social networks.28 Argentina is a State willing to use 
currently available legal and institutional methods to incorporate those it can and 
excoriate the growing number of those it cannot. This while offering positions to the 
loyal within institutions rapidly readjusting to global capital’s demands- now openly 
under Macri, but also discreetly under Nestor Kirchner-, veiling the extent of its 
integration into global capital flows from an already distrustful nation. As Bob Jessop 
says of neoliberal era state transformations, they tend towards a “denationalization of the 
state”, marked by a “hollowing out of the national state apparatus” and a “continuing 
movement of state power upward, downward, and sideways as attempts are made by state 
managers on different territorial scales to enhance their respective operational autonomies 
and strategic capacities” (206). Which is not, he emphasizes, a sign of a global or 
withering State, necessary for de-territorialization of the State’s centralized political 
authority. Rather, it signals the need to comprehend the State’s shift away from national 
concerns, breaking the long-standing conceptual hyphenation. Again, in the face of a 
withering and increasingly coopted Civil Society and a State pursuing bureaucratic 
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centralization while distancing itself from popular struggles- what can we say of the 
neoliberal State and its hold over us? How can we respond to Poulantzas’s assertion that 
there is no “outside the State” because of the State’s utilization of all forms power foreign 
to its own? As this ouroboros wraps ever more tightly around the world, what possibility 
is there of any alternative(s)? 
A Return to the Greek 
 Following the above brief sketches, how might I respond to Poulantzas’s 
accusation of anarchism’s untenable political positioning? The seed for that response lays 
in passing comments about State intervention in social reality- the problematic 
exacerbated to the point of near total subsumption that I highlighted above. As he 
underscores, while the State might increase interventions circumscribing power sectors 
and class powers, “ideological relations always have roots which go beyond the State 
apparatuses and which always consist in relations of power” (37). As a corrective to more 
Althusserian formulations of the State’s co-extensiveness with Ideology’s operational 
field, incorporating even non-hegemonic ideologies, this reminds us not so much that all 
Ideology is of the State, but that the State utilizes, to use Poulantzas’s terms, all power 
relations. To say it another way: power is not exhausted in nor by the State, although the 
State circumscribes the field of its relational effectivity as it emerges with(in) class 
divisions and, thereby, struggle.29 The question becomes- to what degree is that 
circumscription still functionally all encompassing (if it ever was)? Is there a possibility 
for alternative relational modes that, while not necessarily escaping the ideological, are 
emergent so as to be dis-functional to the State? Given the above increasingly structurally 
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necessitated alternative modes of production and living in both Argentina and Chile, now 
being articulated with the persistent and problematic relationship of indigenous 
populations with the State, I would say such a possibility exists. The neoliberal State’s 
delimiting circumscription has rigidified in its extension throughout Civil Society, 
formerly the field of its more flexible delimitations and ideological functioning, and 
we’ve begun to see the emergence, extension, and re-affirmation of alternative 
relationalities otherwise than the State’s delimitation of relational effectivity.   
 Nonetheless, we’ve seen the exacerbation, during this processual rigidification, of 
several State features key to Poulantzas’s formulation. Relevant to my own work, insofar 
as we’ve begun moving into a post-Fordist mode of production that extracts surplus value 
from even social relations, a key point for the Italian autonomists, the Intellectual/Manual 
Labor divide has been taken to such an extreme as to at times be moot- this being further 
evidenced by the decreasing functionality of the Ideological State Apparatus of 
modernity par excellence, the University.30 Interestingly, this corresponds to the masses’ 
exclusion from formal and their relegation to informal labor, an increasingly common 
condition, without that necessarily excluding them as a source of surplus value.31 Further, 
despite the crevices opening in the State’s structures, its emergent discourse as the 
consecration of a national language still holds, albeit less forcefully; bureaucratization, 
disperse as it may be, still furthers state power’s centralization (particularly as favors the 
Executive); and individualization as a structural necessity for both the State’s and 
capital’s functioning seems even more relevant than before. But how is this happening, 
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exactly? What institution’s materiality has secreted these conditions as it becomes more 
central to the State’s function?  
 To answer this question, I would highlight the modifications and re-orientations in 
Andreas Kalyvas’s reading of Poulantzas. While I do not necessarily endorse all his 
points, nor his complete discarding of Authoritarian Statism, I find his idea of “Liberal 
Authoritarian Legalism” to be an apt descriptor for the current modus operandi of the 
neoliberal State. Within this framework, the legal institutions- a major battleground in 
both Chile and Argentina, from Allende’s battle with the courts to new constitutions to 
Alphonsín’s late 80’s maneuverings- take on a central role in state institutional 
operativity.32 While this seems to bely increasing executive power, and Kalyvas insists on 
this somewhat, I think it’s important to center how the legal order’s re-articulations have 
facilitated executive machinations and reinforced the distancing of representative 
apparatuses from the masses, advancing bureaucratizing centralization. Kalyvas says the 
law’s new, supplementary functions are such that “the main function of the rule of law 
and legality is not to conceal state violence as it used to be; it is, rather, to provide the 
necessary semantic, normative, and institutional framework for its full expression and 
exercise” (128). While the roots of this are in each country’s dictatorship, the fullest 
expressions are more recent: Kirchner’s repression of the more autonomous piquetero 
groups as “illegal” manifestations of organized (non)labor; the later legal maneuvers of 
Macri to contain dissident socio-cultural expression; the repression of student movements 
in Chile; and, in particular, the double repression of Mapuche resistance to extractivist 
international capital in Wallmapu, authorizing (para-)military violence against them to 
19 
 
later try the Mapuche under anti-terrorist laws.33 The latter also highlights a shift in the 
neoliberal State from government to governance, noted by Jessop; that is, a unitary 
government to a legally authorized dispersion of State powers between para-, non- and 
governmental forces (without for that ceasing to be State powers). As he says, “the State 
in its integral sense is reproduced in and through continuous changes in the articulation 
of government and governance” (211). This all points to the ascendancy of State power’s 
repressive functions. I say this not to discard or diminish others functions, but to highlight 
how, with Civil Society’s withering and the ideological functions’ dispersal through 
individualistic consumerist networks, most visible has been the spectacularized 
repression of destabilizing, dissident and alternative voices and lifestyles.34 But, again, 
this all corresponds to certain tendencies that Poulantzas noted: wherein “[t]he formal and 
abstract character of law is inextricably bound up with the real fracturing of the social 
body in the social division of labour- that is to say, with the individualization of agents 
that takes place in the capitalist labour process” (88 emphasis mine). Extreme 
atomization, i.e. hyper-individualization, via various socio-economic methods is the 
hallmark of the emergent neoliberal States’ social policy and the, albeit incomplete, shift 
toward a post-Fordist mode of production.35 Because it can rely on this modified 
ideological field, the law now serves primarily, although not exhaustively, to formally 
enshrine the legitimacy of subjectivities already interpellated within neoliberal sociality- 
and to refuse authorization of, and thus authorize violence against, those that cannot or 
will not incorporate to global capitalism’s spectacular auspices. Poulantzas remarks: 
“[d]espite all the decentralization reforms of a techno-administrative character, real 
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power is shifting away from the commune or region towards the central state apparatus” 
(227).  But this requires us to ask the final, lingering question of the State: if the 
contradictory unity presented by and as the State tends to functionality for a hegemonic 
power bloc, what can we infer of this power bloc based on the distancing from the 
national masses we have seen in these two States?  
 Poulantzas says of state policy that “the establishment of the State’s policy must 
be seen as the result of the class contradictions inscribed in the very structure of the 
State” (132). Recall that these contradictions are always between fractions of the 
Dominant class(es), and never include direct conflict with the Dominated- and that this 
shapes the State’s institutional materiality. Given what we’ve seen, and I’ve insinuated, 
the hegemonic bloc can be broadly referred to as global capital- but, to forestall hasty 
conclusions, this does not in any way strip capital of its necessarily situated base. Rather, 
the global capital power bloc is composed of international and, not national, but what 
Paul Thomas calls domestic capital. Similar to Jessop’s “de-nationalization”, this form of 
capital is produced when the contradictions of a national territory’s internal capital are 
permeated from without by and begin to reproduce interimperialist contradictions; that is, 
they become increasingly “internationalized”.36 Domestic capital, then, is territorialized 
capital that reproduces and advances international capital’s imperatives within a 
geographically delimited legal order dependent upon the State. This further necessitates 
the State’s institutional materiality as (re)producing global capital’s functioning and 
existence- and thus is strongly against any withering of the State before global(ized) 
capital. I would even draw out the implicit conclusion in most revindications of the State 
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and assert that we cannot even speak of a global, supposedly deterritorialized capital 
without the territorializing functions of the State. While the relevance of capital’s 
national aspect may have withered, the State has not. This was an explicit, as in Chile, or 
implicit, as in Argentina, goal of the social, political and economic restructuring and 
disciplining pursued by the dictatorships, along with centralization. Constantine 
Tsoukalas astutely notes of this tension that “to the extent that national states are not 
abolished, there can be no deterritorialized imperialism” (227); such that “[t]ogether with 
exploitation, imperialism is hiding behind the ‘neutral’ logic of a supposedly uncontrolled 
transnational market logic” (228). His inversion allows us to understand that any sense of 
imperial, global capital is dependent on the State’s continued territorializing functions, 
for as long as the State exists. Should it cease to, then imperialism itself as an analytical 
category would lose all consistency and functioning, necessitating a conceptual 
reconfiguration to fully invest “global” capital with a new, properly global meaning. But 
this imperialist impasse is effectively aporetic insofar as the State is invested in and 
articulated by the maintenance of the Domestic/International, i.e. Global, hegemonic 
bloc’s functioning- this because, as Poulantzas observes, “the capitalist State is 
constituted by a negative general limit to its intervention- that is to say, by specific non-
intervention in the ‘hard core’ of capitalist relations of production” (191).37 So, to tie up a 
loose end in passing, I refer to ouroboros capital to describe capital in this state of 
spectacular global saturation that conceals the fantastic, incomplete nature of real 
subsumption. A snake wrapped around stated global bodies, constricting but not 
consuming them- instead eating itself alive. But what state does this leave us in? 
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The Machinic State 
 We are left, in effect, not with a State that has been ground down to irrelevance; 
rather, we have a State that grinds down all domestic resistance to international flows of 
capital. To abuse a somewhat unrelated metaphor, the State functions as a translation 
machine, facilitating the existence of international capital in and as physical intervention 
within the (newly minted) domestic sphere. And reversing that, this existence modifies 
the State’s institutional materiality to facilitate the emergence of domestic capital, such 
that international capital’s extractive propensities are co-extensive with state institutions, 
up to and including post-Fordist capitalization of social relations. I say translation 
machine because it establishes the two spheres it translates between in their existence and 
as interlinked; one as the obverse of the other, both achieving meaning only through the 
exchange between and of them facilitated by and facilitating the neoliberal State. I say 
translation machine to preserve some of the lingering materialist structural determinism 
within Poulantzas’s work because, as he himself notes and I referenced above, I reject all 
use for the bourgeois state form sans radical change- that is, without its elimination. 
Machinic, then, because without persistent and significant force from horizontal, 
constituent power dedicated to generating alternative relational forms of and for power as 
such, the State will grind down all cogs inserted equally- regardless of their radicality or 
intentions. But I do accept the possibility of alternative relational forms of power, distinct 
from Poulantzas’s rejection of it based in a reading of anarchist thought that, to use an old 
Marxist saw, may well be dubbed a product of false consciousness. 
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 This possibility, though, must always be situated within a specific historical 
constellation, responding to the drives and material determinations of that constellation’s 
subjectivation. Today, in at least Argentina and Chile, although perhaps elsewhere as 
well, the above limitations inherent to the capitalist State, even in its neoliberal 
manifestation, have generated situations in which the possibility of these alternative 
relational modes is (perhaps again) emergent. Because the ‘hard core’ of capitalist 
relations of production has shifted its focus towards global capital as an 
international/domestic, as opposed to inter-/national, dynamic, the negative limit of non-
intervention eschews state action towards remedying the increasing distance from the 
masses and the growing, alternative forms of labor and sociality within these territories. 
While there may, periodically, be attempts at reorientation, even those are undercut (at 
times literally) by the demands of global capital on domestic markets and modes of 
governance.38 By gesturing to this cleavage in a prior state model, I do not mean to 
perform some complete separation of all the actors and forces here presented, nor any 
unification establishing a new conflictive binary. Much as I eschew the assumption of 
real subsumption, due to differentiated development and situated modes of production, I 
would refer to none of these processes or situations as totalizing nor finished. Rather, by 
articulating this understanding of the State, particularly in Argentina and Chile, I mean to 
allow that we conceive of the ongoing and forthcoming possibility of and potential in 
alternative emergent spatial, relational and subjective practices.39 Given my institutional 
situation within an academia equally overdetermined by the State, I must strive to be 
aware of these possibilities and potentialities, embodied in subjects and practices 
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otherwise than our knowledge, because they teach us our limitations and how to act 
within them, without them.  
Otherwise Than the State 
 My dissertation works towards these necessary, nigh anti-conceptual modulations 
of thought and practice- that is, towards an anarchist mode of reading- by tracing certain 
tendencies of leftist politics in historic poetics and intellectual work, later bringing them 
to bear on situations overdetermined by the neoliberal State. The key points around which 
I articulate my reading are those mentioned above: a sense of solidarity as practiced in 
writing; friendship as a form of love that teaches us to carry on, and carry out, rebellious 
action; the impossibility of ascribing failure, as proper to and dependent upon bourgeois 
historicity, to emerging commonalities; and the historical and present limitations of 
leftists’ epistemic presumptions, particularly as the contemporary left grows away from 
the State and becomes forcefully aware of long-standing indigenous opposition to state 
politics, ontologies and epistemologies. I structure my work, on a theoretical level, as a 
generative dis/encounter between deconstructive ethics and contemporary horizontal 
political thought, particularly if not exclusively the works of the Italian autonomists 
Paolo Virno and Antonio Negri. By highlighting the way that a singularly plural, ethical 
sense of co-emergence complicates the, at times, subtly totalizing tendencies of 
autonomist thought of the common, I bring the role of the State back into view and 
demonstrate the simultaneous utility and limitations of a sense of the common predicated 
on the necessity of real subsumption. And by insisting on the co-emergence necessitated 
by deconstructive ethics, at the aporetic breaking point that obtains between the common 
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and the singular, I offer a reinvigorated sense of ethical responsibility’s persistence as the 
necessary kernel for any sense of radical commonality to come. While none of the 
examples that I explore manage to escape the State’s conceptual apparatuses, although 
some either tried or signaled what does, they are limit cases of political discourse insofar 
as it is forcefully bound to the State. Each offers us a method for thinking through the 
conceptual destabilizations that interest me and, thus, thinking through those concepts, 
such that they might be resituated in our own actions.  
 Chapters one and two function as something of a theoretical excursus. Given the 
tendency on the part of anarchist thought toward production elsewhere than traditional, 
institutionalized channels, it often leaves key concepts underexplored. For instance, 
solidarity as a situated action, or friendship understood as loving- without a fuller 
fleshing out of what those entail. The first chapter deals with the solidarity of Nicanor 
Parra’s re-socialized poetics. I examine his works Artefactos and Chistes parra 
desorientar a la policía poesía to explicate how he enacts a writing of solidarity that 
signals, without capturing in a name, an emergent spatial practice otherwise than the 
State’s. Initially, by engaging with literary and artistic criticism from and concerning the 
period covered in the interval between these two books, I assert that his is a body of work 
re-articulated horizontally within the social sphere, after the collapse of the autonomous 
sphere of art instigated during the avant-garde. Then, bringing Paolo Virno’s work on 
jokes and the sociality of language together with Jacques Derrida’s thought of the 
signature’s recontextualizing iterability, I explore how this writing figuratively marks the 
limits of the State’s spatial practice as articulated within language. Parra’s poetics open 
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for persistent, recontextualized engagement, the emergent social unrest and discontent 
marking the books’ publication- in 1973 and 1983, crisis years for the Chilean socio-
political order. He enacts a solidarity without epistemic capture- refusing the nomos, his 
work signals but doesn’t fix a sense of emergent multitudinous subjectivities, otherwise 
than Chilean state spatial practices.  
 The second chapter takes up Juan Gelman’s Si dulcemente, reading within the text 
a model for friendship as a form of love radically other than those traditionally associated 
with the term- filial, fraternal, romantic, agape. This model teaches us to re-situate a way 
of loving, friendship-as-love, such that we carry on in and out of solidarity with those we 
love and have loved, despite death or failure. After examining how love shifts within his 
oeuvre from a theme to the act of thematizing driving the poetry, I bring together Si 
dulcemente, the work of Emmanuel Levinas on love in Totality and Infinity and Jacques 
Derrida’s study of friendship in The Politics of Friendship. In this conjunction, I 
demonstrate how friendship follows the same active structure of love and socializes it by 
destabilizing the presumedly singular ipseity of any friend, present or absent. This 
destabilization opens a futurity for radical practices and becomes the hinge for an ethical 
sense articulated with the common. Love between friends is an elective affinity, and 
when born of rebellious action can only be a horizontal force that escapes the State’s 
overdetermined, disciplinary sociality as an excess. Further, by opening itself to the 
iterability of a love in and of solidarity, the text pro-poses an autodidact’s pedagogy, 
paradoxical as it may sound. Offering a model by en-acting it, the texts allows that 
readers can themselves re-situate that model in and through their own action. Exploring 
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the sense of these underworked concepts, and in articulating one with the other, I 
establish historical antecedents- a tentative genealogy- for horizontal tendencies that 
emerge again after these dictatorships.  
 The third chapter is an examination of audiovisual documentary and video rebelde 
produced in Argentina after, and about, the events of the 2001 saqueo by international 
financial capital, articulated with a sustained engagement with Negri’s thought of the 
common. Exploring the explanations and representations of emergent subjectivities in 
audiovisual and critical work, I trace parallel but rhyming tensions within both fields, 
using each to describe and explicate the other. Juxtaposing older forms of radical 
documentary, recent contestatory documentaries and video rebelde, I explore the 
exhaustion of nationalist political categories in the face of global capital and the 
neoliberal State. This echoes the impossibility of containing a cacophonous subject 
within an audio-visual production that retains discernible traces of the authorial voice. 
Parallel, and complementarily, I set alongside one another Negri’s thought of the 
common and what Ana María Fernández describes as entre-muchos, to deconstruct 
Negri’s terms and demonstrate how his thought contradictorily forces one to ascribe 
failure to movements other than constantly generative. By bringing these two modes of 
analysis together, I strive to show that we must escape capitalist historical teleology, in 
order to think senses of persistence in common, as carried out by common singularities. 
This expounds on the necessity of what Jacques Derrida calls, in his text Archive Fever: 
A Freudian Impression, an anarchivic drive; as a modality of writing destabilizing to 
archival consignation within the State’s ordering of knowledge. Against this ordering, I 
28 
 
underline the cacophonous singularity of hand-held video as a way of situating them 
within larger aesthetic, and thereby political, moments, without having to fall back on 
aesthetic categories insufficient to an-aesthetic objects. Or political categories insufficient 
to impolitical actors. This chapter is, in some ways, the culmination of the previous two, 
proposing an approach to emergent subjectivities other than a priori violent imposition.  
 My final chapter serves as coda and autocritique, meant to explore the limits of 
even horizontal political analyses or movements insofar as they are articulated with 
knowledges, categories and histories developed under the auspices of the capitalist, 
colonial State. I do this while reading the poetry and prose of Mapuche activist and public 
figure, Elicura Chihuailaf Nahuelpan. By bringing together his work in Recado 
confidencial a los chilenos and De sueños azules y contrasueños with Jacques Derrida’s 
work around languages of arrival in The Monolingualism of the Other: or, The Prosthesis 
of Origin, I explore how Chihuailaf is constantly arriving to either Mapudungun or 
Castilian, without either the event of arrival nor access to subjective plentitude. In this 
way, his work teaches us to recognize the categorical limitations on the concepts with 
which we presume to articulate our solidarity. I emphasize the spectacular virtuality of 
the figure of the Mapuche as incorporated to the Chilean nation-state’s historico-political 
discourse, which renders the actual, lived being signaled by the name “Mapuche” 
unspeakable and illegible from within the State’s language. I refer to this as a coda 
because, within my work, it compels us to return to the earlier readings and theorizations 
to re-evaluate them on the basis of epistemo-conceptual limits imposed by our situated 
reality. Ending with a reflection on the impossibility of radically liberatory discourses 
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adequately including certain structurally excluded forms of life and subjectivity renders 
the work a call in itself, one that demands persistent work towards a politics to come. One 
perhaps no longer a politics, because politics and its state referent will be exhausted as 
modes of action and concepts. 
Learning to Learn, Together 
 Ultimately, in the following work, I am attempting to articulate what I am forced 
time and again to call an anarchist mode of reading. This, however, is not itself meant to 
be a settled and consistent mode- neither concrete, nor universal, nor even 
universalizable. Rather, I mean this to be a conceptual exposition and a methodological 
exploration. Both should be approached with the necessary skepticism with which one 
approaches the radically other but, at the same time, both should be understood as 
offering themselves up for an autodidactic pedagogy aimed at the constant re-situation of 
radical thought by a yet uncountable number of subjects. I referred above, in passing, to 
certain anti-conceptual tendencies within my work, but that was an intentionally 
provocative inaccuracy. Rather, what I want the reader to take from this is the need to 
first act in whatever way we might act, wherever we might act, to enable others and 
ourselves to act more fully. That is, to understand the need to act joyfully, to act in 
solidarity, in whatever situation we are in- mine being, of course, an academic one- so 
that those utterly other with whom we are in solidarity might themselves know joy. Let us 
set aside any conceptual pretensions and strive to understand and act wherever it is we 
are given to do so, according to whatever terms are the most appropriate, so that we 
might know joyful forms of being otherwise than and opposed to the violence of the 
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capitalist State. As for our vaunted concepts- they will follow from our work, and we can 
read them later, in a mode otherwise than how we might now.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Alix Kates Shulman claims in a short autobiographical piece, “Dances with 
Feminists”, to have accidently passed along the idea to a friend in the 1970s, who in turn 
was responsible for the production of shirts with the (now unrecognizable) quotation. 
 
2 Lefebvre references the type, that is a role that we are fully engaged in playing 
and yet alienated from, in the preface to a reprinting of the first volume of his Critique of 
Everyday Life.   
 
3 This is discussed in Timothy Mitchell’s contribution to The Anthropology of the 
State and in the introduction to the collected volume to which I will soon return, 
Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered.  
 
4 A more recent well-known example would be Sayak Valencia’s Gore 
Capitalism which, while referring to “Marxist state theory”, does no such thing. A hasty 
reference may be to the post-hegemonic turn, but I feel that’s more symptomatic than 
causal.  
 
5 The two authors in question here are Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas. The 
debate ensued shortly following the publication of their books The State in Capitalist 
Society and Political Power and Social Classes, respectively, when Poulantzas published 
a review of Miliband’s work to which the latter responded. The initial rapport is collected 
in the edited volume Ideology in Social Science and Miliband’s review of the English 
translation of Poulantzas’s book is collected with other essays in Class Power and State 
Power. Clyde W. Barrow’s contribution to the Paradigm Lost collection is an excellent 
history of the debate and its effects.  
 
6 In the purely theoretical vein, it’s also worth referring to his sections on the 
“General Characteristics” and “Relative Autonomy” in Political Power and Social 
Classes. 
 
7 By rearticulating his thought of the State in a way that centers its relationality 
and doesn’t reify it, Poulantzas here (perhaps unwittingly) undermines many of the astute 
criticisms Phillip Abrams had of his earlier work in “Some Notes on the Difficulty of 
Studying the State”. 
 
8 For a discussion of the reformist bent that can be found in his final work, Paul 
Thomas’s contribution to Paradigm Lost is worthwhile. 
 
9 It’s worth including here the lengthy quotations I’m referring to in this section. 
As regards resistance and Foucault, highlighting the different uses of ‘resistance’ in each 
author: “...no kind of resistance is possible if we follow Foucault’s analyses. For if power 
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is always already there, if every power situation is immanent in itself, why should there 
ever be resistance? From where would resistance come, and how would it even be 
possible” (149). To elaborate how he conceives of the limitations on power, and thus sites 
of ‘resistance’, he clarifies “As regards the State (although this is also true of mechanisms 
of class power not included in the State), such limits are defined and materially grounded 
by the reproduction of class places and positions within the State. Power, even in its state 
form, is never pure immanence. The State and power in general are not an essence or pole 
standing in counterposition to struggles. If struggle always has primacy over apparatuses, 
this is because power is a relation between struggles and practices (those of the exploiters 
and the exploited, the rulers and the ruled) and because the State above all is the 
condensation of a relationship of forces defined precisely by struggle” such that 
“struggles are always present in the State (and, more generally, power mechanisms); for 
even though the State is already there, neither the State nor power is the First Cause of 
struggle. Struggles are inscribed in the strategic field of the mechanisms and apparatuses 
of power- that is to say, political struggles which bear upon the State in its peculiar 
strategic field without necessarily being ‘integrated’ into the power of the dominant 
classes” (151). 
 
10 See Lili Letelier and Tomás Moulian’s contribution to Clases populares, crisis 
y democracia en América Latina. 
 
11 Adolfo Gilly refers to the parliamentarian tendency in his Por todos los 
caminos/ 1: escritos sobre América Latina 1956-1982, and for an interesting discussion 
of the effects of this fragmentation in the artistic scene in Chile, see Willy Thayer’s “El 
golpe como consumación de la vanguardia” in El fragmento repetido and the debate he 
had with Nelly Richard on the subject.  
 
12 Regarding this process’s dependence on previous agricultural reform and 
nationalization to stabilize its transitional economic policies, see Javier Martínez and 
Alvaro Díaz’s Chile: The Great Transformation.  
 
13 I am referring particular to the discussion of this in Latin America in the 21st 
Century: Towards a New Sociopolitical Matrix, Garretón, et al. 
 
14 I am thinking specifically of the work of Manuel Antonio Garretón Merino, of 
whose works I have included three in the bibliography. 
 
15 This tendency is noticeable in the referenced work of José Joaquin Brunner. 
 
16 Salazar explores this in Historia de la acumulación capitalista en Chile 
(Apuntes de clase). Post-Fordist here refers to the subsumption of social relations to a 
mode of production that generates surplus value through capitalizing on relationality. I 
will address this more directly below. 
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17 Gabriel Salazar, again, explores this in Dolencias históricas de la memoria 
ciudadana. Moulian also, interestingly, suggests the necessity of forging subjects from 
particularity on p.78 of his Chile actual and takes up similar themes in his later Deseo de 
otro Chile.   
 
18 This is noticeable in Moulian’s discussion of malls in Chile actual, as well as 
his discussion of “protected democracy” on pp. 48-9 of that work. 
 
19 Obviously, the classic referent is Peron. This appears, again, in Garretón, et al. 
(2003). José Nun also discusses this in “La teoría política y la transición democrática” 
(1987).  
 
20 See Juan Carlos Portantiero, “La concertación que no fue: de la ley Mussi al 
plan Austral” (1987). 
 
21 In saying this I am basing myself principally on James McGuire’s Peronism 
with Peron, Laura Tedesco’s Democracy in Argentina (which will return often in this 
section), and José Nun’s “Argentina: informe preliminar acerca de la situación de los 
sectores populares en el proceso de transición democrática” (1989).  
 
22 Tedesco, again, offers an excellent discussion of these years. It might also be 
productive to return to Gilly’s comments on the montoneros from Por todos los caminos, 
in order to trace the extreme manifestations of movimientismo, but that discussion is 
better left for the second chapter. 
 
23 See the contributions by Kent Eaton and Ernesto Calvo & María Victoria 
Murillo to Argentine Democracy.  
 
24 See: Garretón, et al. (2003); Torre in Argentine Democracy; and finally, Broken 
Promises: The Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy and Argentina Since the 2001 
Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, which I discuss more at length in 
Chapter 3.  
 
25 See: the contributions by Auyero and Perruzzoti in Argentine Democracy. It is 
also worth referring to the piece by Marcelo Fabián Sain, “Police, Politics, and Society in 
the Province of Buenos Aires”, which I analyze at length in Chapter 3 and which 
examines a specific case of these networks utilizing the repressive policing apparatus not 
out of interest in suppressing popular struggle, but as a way of creating bad press for a 
political opponent.   
 
26 Tedesco discuss this at length in the fourth chapter of her book. When 
considering this, the praises heaped on Nestor Kirchner by thinkers like Ricardo Forster 
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(see the referenced volumes) reproduces an interesting division that I map here between 
the traditional and the emergent centers and foci of left thought in Argentina. 
 
27 Here, as elsewhere, the reference to the non-functionality of traditional 
institutions of Civil Society is not meant to insinuate that they simply ceased to exist. 
Rather, it signals the way in which a modified structural relationship with the State re-
oriented them towards newer, individualistic consumer models of socialization, as I 
explore below. 
 
28 Concerning both the movementist tendencies and this paradoxical effect of the 
human rights groups, see Perruzzoti, ibid.  
 
29 See: Poulantzas (2000) pp. 38-9. All citations following this are to State, 
Power, Socialism unless otherwise noted. 
 
30 Concerning the implications of a shift to the post-Fordist MoP, see: Paolo 
Virno, A Grammar of the Multitude. For a discussion of the crisis of the University in the 
same time frame, see: Willy Thayer’s La crisis no moderna de la universidad moderna. 
 
31 One might easily append here a discussion on the growing prevalence of the gig 
economy in Latin America, and globally. Although, it may be more interesting, and 
relevant to my work, to highlight the way that, for instance, documentaries about the 
cartoneros and academic work produced about these groups (including mine) extract a 
value from them that will not likely be remitted. And that while being, presumptively, in 
solidarity with those subjects. 
 
32 This was, in fact, a topic often and explicitly discussed by referencing the 
struggles of Allende with the courts from elsewhere- see a piece in Miliband’s article 
collection and passing comments by Poulantzas. As regards Alfonsin, see both Tedesco, 
ibid. and McGuire, ibid. 
 
33 This will be discussed more at length in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
34 See Stanley Aronowitz and Andreas Kalyvas’s contributions to Paradigm Lost. 
 
35 I say incomplete because both the uneven capital developments that Salazar 
notes and the rapidly growing informal economies beyond the grasp of the state make 
Negri’s real subsumption a yet untenable assertion. 
 
36 See Paul Thomas’s contribution to Paradigm Lost, particularly pp. 83-4. 
 
37 Interestingly, in the introduction to Paradigm Lost, the editors note a succinct 
but crucial difference between Poulantzas’s thought and that of Hardt and Negri, or for 
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that matter Deleuze and Guattari. On p. xix they underscore that the core disjunction 
between the two types of state thought is the absence of an appreciation for spatial 
practices and divisions in the (inter)national division of labor in both Hardt and Negri and 
Delezue and Guattari- something that Poulantzas, I believe rightfully, emphasizes.   
 
38 See, e.g. Miguel Rivera-Quiñones piece in Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis, on 
Kirchner’s relation with transnational corporations. When I say literally undercut, I mean 
literally. See https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/01/argentina-new-river-soya-
beans. 
 
39 These currents are already in motion in Latin America. The work of Colectivo 
Situaciones is an excellent example, as are Hupert 2011 and Benasayag 2000. And the 
longstanding opposition of indigenous groups, especially the Mapuche in these two 
territories, cannot but be mentioned- although, as I will explore in Chapter 4, it may be 
somewhat more complicated.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Many Parras: Techniques of a (re)Socialized Poetics 
 
 It’s difficult to begin writing, or write about beginnings, as beginnings only 
appear after they have ended, and you have begun to write (about them). A trap of 
retroactivity that will haunt the periodization in the following chapters, and whose 
failings will become one of their themes. Nevertheless, I have to start somewhere, so I 
will focus on a specific case, as all instances of this problematic only appear in a given 
situation. I begin with the poetry of Nicanor Parra, as the problem is compounded when 
we lack a fixed consensus about whether anything has begun at all, or whether our 
vocabulary is adequate to the task at hand. The articulation of this difficulty is at least 
double, and in truth, of course, exceeds that doubling. Criticism on the writing and art of 
the mid-twentieth century is so often dislocated- no longer the avant-garde moment, not 
yet the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary fervor of the late sixties and seventies, it 
tends to be pushed in one direction or the other. The moment is retrospectively articulated 
so as to conform to more definite critical referents, rather than maintain the ambivalence 
that allows it to prefigure so much of what was, and is, to come. While the broad strokes 
of that assertion hold for writers and artists of the fifties and early sixties across the 
globe, there is a particularly acute lacuna around this period in Chilean criticism. For that 
reason, we have figures like Parra- apt for exploring alternative politics yet rapidly 
sidelined by both politics and literary criticism. Exploring the tensions of criticism in and 
around that moment will allow me to sketch a space for writing in, and out of, solidarity 
with a mode of being beyond state language. The space of Parra’s solidarity has a binding 
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role throughout my larger work and, so, elaborating its political and critical implications 
is essential to framing my broader gestures. I will begin this chapter with a conventional 
reflection on the critical approximations to the various periods of Parra’s work, and, later, 
how those intersect with the political currents of those epochs. 
Where(in) we find ourselves  
As Pablo Oyarzún notes of Chilean art criticism concerning the fifties and sixties, 
the reigning sign is that of no sign- a lack of consensus writ large behind the always 
retroactive imposition of contexts and periodization. Which is to say, beginnings and 
endings show themselves always, yet only, in their critical identification. Further, 
Oyarzún notes that the social’s politicization was beginning to effect a blurring of 
distinctions between and within institutionalized discourses- a significant point to which I 
will return, and whose later implications we saw in the Introduction.1 Parra’s entrance to 
this amorphous milieu, then, is in many ways excessively appropriate: trained in math 
and physics, which he also taught, he gains renown principally for his poetry; brother to 
Violeta Parra, uncle to Ángel, father to Catalina, he is integral to a prominent, political 
family in the Chilean arts yet has a distant, and at times outright conflictive, relationship 
with institutional left politics; finally, his citational yet disjunctive relationship to literary 
antecedents dis-locates and re-situates his work as regards the prior and, thus, the present. 
To wit- Parra is a particularly apt figure for expressing the discursive imbrication 
constitutive of the period, if only retrospectively.  
 His citational relationship with the prior suggests another source of seemingly 
originary difficulty when discussing him- the critical disagreement concerning his 
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genealogical position vis a vis the preceding (and in Chile, concurrent) literary avant-
garde(s). Yet, presuming any historical placement or generational fixity multiplies the 
difficulties of determining the con-text, as iterability ensures that texts inevitably 
overflow generational bounds. Always a necessarily singular choice and gesture, 
retroactively transposing a work into a general literary history always bears some 
measure of failure. As with all genealogical positionings, “[a]n inheritance is never 
gathered together, it is never one with itself. Its presumed unity, if there is one, can 
consist only in the injunction to reaffirm by choosing. ‘One must’ means one must filter, 
sift, criticize, one must sort out several different possibles that inhabit the same 
injunction.” (Derrida Specters 18). Specters of various traditions inhabit the works signed 
Nicanor Parra, such that they cohabitate and are conjugated together time and again, most 
frequently in an ironic mode. Even as Parra cites what may be an influence, the citation 
itself interrupts the presumption of present, past or future context, undermining and 
resituating said presumptive influence. However, perhaps appropriately, it is in literary 
periodization’s elisions and failures that his politics’ traces become more pronounced. To 
later elaborate on this conceptual juncture, I must reflect on what was immediately prior 
to and influenced Parra- the early twentieth century artistic avant-garde.    
I’ll take one of Parra’s explicit influences as my point of departure- surrealism. 
Prefacing a 1947 exhibition in Paris, Georges Bataille sees surrealism as marked and 
circumscribed by the absence of myth. “Myth and the possibility of myth become 
impossible: only an immense void remains, cherished yet wretched” and further, “[t]he 
absence of God is no longer a closure: it is the opening up to the infinite” (48 emphasis 
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mine). Which is to say that the works exhibited were not produced in a social 
environment over-determined by a totalizing moral system, but rather in that post-
Nietzschean moment of a certain (artistic) will to power. At least, on the edge of that 
moment, pushing towards it by availing themselves of the artistic and critical technics 
developed during the long romance with bourgeois art. Bataille ends his brief note 
enigmatically, indicating that “the absence of myth is also a myth: the coldest, the purest, 
the only true myth” (48). Killing God, central to the onto-theological hierarchy long 
determinant of the social and aesthetic realms, does not, then, simply collapse those 
structures. Rather, it vacates them, opening space within them to transpose man’s 
immediate, material concerns to the mythical realm. Deifying the mundane thus reasserts 
the social’s tenuous limits- concealing anew its structuring principal by negating it, but 
only according to a structurally facilitated negative methodology. The order of things has 
not changed- although the sovereign has been replaced, the play of signs continues 
unabated within sovereignty’s auspices.2 Walter Benjamin affirms of them that “they 
exchange, to a man, the play of human features for the face of an alarm clock that in each 
minute rings for sixty seconds” (192); yet, despite their screaming discord, they were still 
bound by the Art against which they struggle, toward its mythic outside. 
 So, what does this have to do with Parra? The answer is double: it provisionally 
situates Parra in history and also indicates a route to his work’s politics, heretofore 
construed as simple negativity for rejecting the terms of politics as such. Historically, 
Parra himself does not hesitate to mention that antipoetry carries a debt with surrealism- 
he utilizes a variety of their techniques, although he does not entirely share their goals 
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and world view(s).3 Antipoetry is a movement doubly after surrealism and the rest of the 
avant-garde- diachronically posterior and taking full advantage of the potential for 
writing revealed with it. As Enrique Lihn relates of his time with Parra, “[l]a imitación 
estaba prohibida inter nos, era el indeseable tic de la flojera mental. Nicanor, demócrata 
del oficio de la palabra, ofició como jefe de taller. De allí salió El Quebrantahuesos, 
diario mural: la perfecta copia original del collage surrealista.” (17). But the after’s 
second gesture again recalls Benjamin, when he writes of the surrealists that “to organize 
pessimism means nothing other than to expel moral metaphor from politics and to 
discover in political action a sphere reserved one hundred percent for images” (191 
emphasis mine). Might we not also see an apt fit for Parra’s famous coarseness and 
vulgarity? Further yet, as Parra himself says, “[e]n relación con este mismo tema quisiera 
repetir una frase que ya es una frase hecha en materia de teoría antipoética: en la 
vulgaridad está la vida” (Lerzundi & Parra 392). Parra writes pessimistically 
undermining decadent, autonomous art’s a-sociality, in favor of life, while surrealism yet 
relied on its artistic con-text even while lashing out against it. His work embraces life’s 
grotesqueries and cannot be subsumed to critical attempts at retroactively prolonging 
autonomous art’s reign, extending it to include Parra and others. Instead, not even 
pretending to exult man, negating Bataille’s true myth, his work glimpses the social 
within and alongside which it newly (or perhaps again) formed a part. Following the 
tension he produces in historicizing literary critique through its articulations, we arrive at 
a sense of writing in, and as, solidarity without epistemic capture.4 But we should further 
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unpack the avant-garde’s goals to ascertain what role they may have in Parra’s oeuvre, as 
well as how he diverges from them.  
I dwell on what can be said of the avant-garde because Parra is often critically 
subsumed within it, and I find this gesture untenable.5 While seemingly something of a 
digression, this periodization of art and its relation to capitalist state apparatuses 
encompasses and prefigures much of the following and situates my thought of art’s 
socialization and social functioning. Parra’s epochal moving past hints at a shift to 
another mode of artistic production and critical work of interest to me, wherein function 
completes a triad with form and content, and whose ambivalent reign is solidified in late 
capitalism’s dyad: culture industry/contestatory art. So again, what can be said of this 
avant-garde? Peter Bürger, in Theory of the Avant-Garde, seeks to answer this and clarify 
the role of the bourgeois “institution of art” in the social order’s maintenance and 
foundation, after Kant and Schiller. Himself after and indebted to Herbert Marcuse, 
Bürger signals that bourgeois art’s principal role was that of neutralizing critique. As he 
says,  
Art allows at least an imagined satisfaction of individual needs that are repressed 
in daily praxis. Through the enjoyment of art, the atrophied bourgeois individual 
can experience the self as personality. But because art is detached from daily life, 
this experience remains without tangible effect, i.e., it cannot be integrated into 
that life. (12-3) 
 
Integral to the ideological (re)production of bourgeois life’s material conditions, art 
deferred or deflected resistance to and dissent from the bourgeoning capitalist mode of 
production. By providing a-social catharsis and cathexis for popular affects, it helped 
impede the transposition of aspirational cathexes to the socio-political structure that 
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would otherwise be placed in crisis by their investiture.6 This alienating, subsumptive 
role characterized art’s autonomy and the avant-garde moment signaled that role’s 
implosion. Bürger posits that “with the historical avant-garde movement, the social 
subsystem which is art enters the stage of self-criticism”, which he previously indicated 
would facilitate its own “objective understanding”. It was a protest, then, “whose aim it 
[was] to reintegrate art into the praxis of life, [revealing] the nexus between autonomy 
and the absence of any consequences” (22).  
 He says of their critique that “the demand is not raised at the level of the contents 
of individual works. Rather, it directs itself to the way art functions in society” advocating 
a sublimation of art to lived praxis (49 emphasis mine). However, we now retroactively 
understand this demand as a failed, futile gesture, despite its repercussions in subsequent 
artistic production. Perhaps, then, it is accurate to say that their wishes’ realization 
signaled a radical inversion of the presumptively anti-capitalist values central to their 
initial artistic impetus. They gravely underestimated the capacity of the bourgeois 
capitalist State to incorporate principally discursive dissent to its mode of production, 
particularly dissent dependent on its structures of authorization and remuneration. The 
stage of the protest was that against which it was directed- the autonomous subsystem of 
art- and this was the protest’s contradiction, if also its strength. Being within and 
discursively bound to the bourgeois articulatory structures proper to “autonomous” art, 
their critique existed at that sphere’s limitrophe, collapsing back into it without escape. 
As Bürger says, “for the (relative) freedom of art vis-à-vis the praxis of life is at the same 
time the condition that must be fulfilled if there is to be a critical cognition of reality. An 
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art no longer distinct from the praxis of life but wholly absorbed in it will lose the 
capacity to criticize it” (50). The avant-garde not only unveiled its critique’s absent 
ground; it set fire to the stage while still on it, dis-covering its absence.  
Though, the above also hints at my divergence from Bürger. Art indistinguishable 
from life hardly lacks power for critique; rather, the critique no longer pertains to a 
separate sphere and is dispersed, along with that art, throughout the life with which they 
are rejoined. Life is not so monochromatic as to be incapable of including the artistic in 
its repertoire- art as a lived praxis does not demand we live life artistically, but rather that 
art be lived anew as a part of life and not apart from it. Bürger insists, however- and I 
don’t entirely disagree-, that this was what allowed the emergent so-called “culture 
industry” to coopt the historical avant-garde’s protest, staging an illusory elimination of 
the art/life distinction to then re-found that distinction in art’s commodity form. Where 
the surrealists replaced God with Man in a failed protest against the former, the capitalists 
made Man a Commodity by making us believe being was an aesthetic, sacralizing the 
profane in the name of God-Capital. At once allowing for art’s broader commodification 
and reserving for it (the illusion of) a separate sphere, thus begins a new epoch of art’s 
incorporation to the flow of capital.7 And yet, if the avant-garde critical gesture were not 
completely undermined? If instead what was needed was exactly this “dissolution” of the 
sphere of art? To explore the ambivalence emergent from between Bürger’s stance and 
my own, I refer us to Parra. 
 Unlike critics such as Ivan Carrasco Muñoz and Federico Schopf, I reject the view 
that Parra continues the avant-garde by appropriating their stylistic innovations. The 
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usage of forms that predate his work, that is, the application of rules, or structural norms 
concerning poetry explored by prior literary movements, does not signal complete 
historical coextension. Every application of a rule, even the most bizarre, is a singular 
decision that leaves traces of the possible contained by the decisive injunction. The 
entrance into language is always into a social structure and so, following Paolo Virno, 
applying a preexistent rule “is still always public praxis: nothing that can be carried out 
alone, privatim” and furthermore, that “the applicative decision does not ever obtain its 
peculiar juristic force from the rule. Nor does it seem to contradict the rule; nor does it 
seem to agree with the rule” (Multitude… 109; 112). While Virno is discussing the social 
articulation and (re)application of juridical norms as laws, this grammar also contains and 
determines any particular instantiation of the applicative case. While he later presents 
jokes as a microcosm of innovative praxis, which I will return to regarding Parra’s 
politics, here it signals Parra’s ambivalent, coded mode of breaking with the prior from 
within its rules. His irony and humor allow his writing to perform a poetic exodus in/from 
even the avant-garde, undermining its forms and goals as he avails himself of them, 
putting them into crisis. Escaping into the social, his work makes immanent poetry’s 
critical functioning as a particular linguistic act and a synecdoche for sociopolitical 
grammar(s). 
 Reading in “Manifiesto” that “Los poetas bajaron del Olimpo” and “No podemos 
vivir sin poesía” yet focusing solely on the anti-poem’s literary intervention- the 
incorporation of the common voice, etcetera- would be superficial (Obra Gruesa 211-4). 
In form and content, he demystifies the illusory autonomy wherein poetics was kept apart 
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from sociality and publicly resituates poetry as a form of relational praxis, not a 
transcendent act of genius. As the name suggests, the poem is a paean to the 
(re)socialization of poets and poetry, having left behind mythopoetic projects. Poets are 
amongst us: a socialized, collective subject dependent on poetry that we no longer receive 
from above, but rather beside us. His poetics is articulated against the proposition of 
poetics- an exodus from the preexisting representative order, yet also from the avant-
garde’s (re)incorporation to the concurrently arisen culture industry.8  
This (re)socialization complicates Bürger’s assertions. For Bürger, “when art and 
the praxis of life are one, when the praxis is aesthetic and art is practical, art’s purpose 
can no longer be discovered, because the existence of two distinct spheres (art and the 
praxis of life) that is constitutive of the concept of purpose or intended use has come to 
an end” (50). But that is exactly the gesture of Parra’s poetics- the demystification of the 
older, ideological distinction. And yet, as must constantly be reaffirmed, his antipoetry is 
still poetry- it is still art, despite and because of its articulation within the social fabric. 
Instead of art’s elimination, we see its radical re-socialization, which further includes the 
critical tools developed under autonomous pretenses. Here I differ marginally, but 
importantly, from what Chilean critic and philosopher Nelly Richard says of the 
Avanzada’s later realization of the avant-garde de-hierarchizing of the art-life relation. As 
she says,  
[t]o break with the foreclosure of art’s interiority (its inner walls) and accomplish 
the avant-garde goal of art’s incorporation into life’s exteriority, the divisions that 
render art incommunicable- the walls of a room (= the confinement of art and the 
institution as closure)- must be abolished. For the horizontal exchange of the signs 
‘art’ and ‘life’ to occur, the features of superiority and exceptionality that 
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distinguish (highlight and favor) the private meaning of art must also be 
eliminated. (Insubordination 27)      
 
While I agree with this insistence on collapsing the hierarchical, institutionalized system 
of (aesthetic) authorization, my disagreement is with the concomitant assertion: that the 
avant-garde project’s realization “[implies] reconciling art and life into a whole without 
divisions or compartmentalization” and “the absence of all limits (discursive boundaries) 
because each limit was perceived as a limitation to be abolished” (Insubordination 27; 
28). Coinciding with what Bürger described, this explicitly involves a collapse of 
discursive difference, a revelation of two distinct yet concomitant terms as one 
accomplished in total fusion, eliminating the possibility of singularities to capacitate 
productive critique. Positing this collapse, she reinforces the presumptive discontinuity 
between art and the quotidian produced in bourgeois institutional valorization and 
authorization, and she thus reifies the retrospective autonomy of both. Without ceasing to 
insist on the terms’ co-implication, the avant-garde anti-hierarchical project is more 
productively understood not as a totalizing (re)union of art with life, but strictly as the 
productive destabilization of the authorizing structures presuming said disjunction. When 
we allow that autonomy was always already a deceptive premise allotted only certain “art 
objects”, without weight beyond bourgeois institutionality, the tools of critique are 
socialized (perhaps for the first time). However, critique implies discursive iterability 
and, as such, maintaining some difference written art/life- unless one wishes to posit a 
utopian immediacy for art’s capacity for social change. A collapse of differences that 
flattens art and life’s discursive fields onto a plane of superficial identitarian coextension 
prevents mutual critique through the process of horizontal, reciprocal (re)authorization. 
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Art is a part of daily social life but does not exhaust it; the social comprehends art but is 
not only artistic. Eliding fusion assists in positively understanding the relationship 
between art and the social as reflection and co-implication, in which each one maps the 
other’s gestures and fluctuations without needing the force of a proper name’s authorial 
assignation. The violence of decisions made in and about both is re-distributed between 
and becomes re-generative of the them. Whereas before there was a dual critical violence 
to the social- physical State repression and artistic affective diffusion- art’s productive re-
socialization facilitates the social’s defensive re-appropriation of previously misdirected 
contestatory drives, against the law. Examples from Parra’s earlier work will help me to 
illuminate this point.     
Double-negation and the Literary 
 Briefly commenting Poemas y antipoemas, widely agreed upon as his first 
significant work, will allow me to establish my routes and tone.9 Without proposing an 
exhaustive reading, I would like to focus on the negations, and negations of negations, 
through which the text participates in language’s social functioning. This is an arbitrary 
place but, being already critically insisted upon, it informs my reading of his later works.  
I borrow Virno’s elaboration of “so-called evil” and culture’s moral ambivalence. 
Of culture he asserts “that [it] exhibits substantial ambivalence: it smoothes out danger; 
but in other instances, it multiplies and diversifies the occasions of risk”. He then posits 
negation as one characteristic of the (disoriented) human animal, cultural producer 
produced in culture, saying “negation is equivalent to a certain degree of ‘separation’ 
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from its own vital context” (Multitude… 18); a basic function of language, culture’s 
persistent substance. He continues on to say that  
[…]it is precisely to this negation that we owe the eventual failure of recognition 
between members of the same species […] located at the limit of social 
interaction, the eventuality of nonrecognition reverberates, even at its center, and 
permeates the entire web. Language, far from mitigating intra-species aggression 
[…] radicalizes this aggression beyond measure. (Multitude… 19) 
 
This negation occurs at the moment of the face to face encounter(s) formative of the 
ethico-political subject, underlining the broader ethical undertone of his affirmation; 
further, by foregrounding language, it is offered up for use regarding any linguistic act. 
Be it the negation of the Other’s subjectivity, or of bounded literary constructs- for 
instance, a poem as “not a poem”, or an anti-poem. I would like to suggest that this 
aggression marks the transition from an aloof, autonomous poetics to one embedded 
anew in the social, vying for its own recognition.  
Significantly, Virno indicates that negation can itself be negated. Whence the 
claim that “the public sphere- interwoven with persuasive discourses, political conflicts, 
pacts, and collective projects- is none other than a second negation by means of which 
one represses anew the first negation […] a negation of the negation” (Multitude… 20-1 
emphasis mine). A second negation constitutive of the social and one of sociality’s basic 
functions: negating the negation of the Other’s subjectivity. Narrowing my lens, then, to 
Poemas y antipoemas, its recursive play of negations and irony marks the text’s opening 
to the world via a poetics (re)submerged within relational sociality, as bound by and 
reflecting its rules. Beginning with the title, another proper name, it is plainly a double 
negation: of poems as such and of that negation, still being poems, after all, despite 
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Parra’s bluster. Insofar as, even in name, the book is bound by the social, there is a 
synecdochal relation between the two. Already before opening the book, it is arraigned 
under the sign of the ambivalent social world and announced as double. The text plays 
out the tensions and encounters that facilitate socio-linguistic innovation, albeit on a 
smaller scale. By challenging one social form, the ambivalence here resumed as “not not 
a poem” glimpses the regularity of human behavior that underpins rules and, thus, the 
social. As Virno puts it, “the fact that every rule, standing out against the background of 
regularity, can be both instrument and object of control, is the political, even 
constitutional, equivalent of the ambivalence that distinguishes the linguistic animal” 
(Multitude… 39). While poetry’s rules control its production, here Parra assumes control 
to (re)configure the rules otherwise than as they are without, for that, ceasing to abide by 
them. As above, Parra’s art is then horizontally re-authorized as such within and by the 
social, partaking of the same processual recognition as all other singular acts. More 
clearly, it may always be deemed “not art” the same as it may be affirmed as art. Within 
the text and its dual negations are suggested possible ruptures that might index 
multitudinous life beyond state language, without attempting the impossible naming of 
language’s outside. It confronts, synecdochally, the terms determinate of all social 
functioning, by exposing in one form of sociality the ambivalence of which Virno writes. 
A brief note on the text’s irony, its dual negativity’s primary manifestation, will 
serve as segue. Federico Schopf asserts its fundamental defensiveness: “la ironía no es en 
los antipoemas sólo un instrumento de desublimación- que el hablante antipoético maneja 
con soberanía- sino más radicalmente una actitud de defensa ante una realidad agresiva, 
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mejor dicho, un modo de defensa, comunicación y, desde luego, conocimiento” (“La 
antipoesia…” 176). Poetic irony, which interprets the layered negations, defers a decision 
on the text’s validity or merit by deflecting it into the social field, without sacrificing its 
particularity as text. Irony finds its limit not only within the text’s already socialized 
bindings, but also outside of them. Preemptively negating the text’s negation, it is always 
already distorting critique by allowing the poems the simultaneity of being and not being 
what they seem- a role carried out on several levels. Here I emphasize one poem relevant 
to my work’s thematics, although similar analyses could be performed with many.  
Selecting a poem, I follow René de Costa’s schema for the book. The tripartite 
structure separates it into a sequence of negations of prominent poetic styles, performed 
in said styles- forcing a stylistic double negation. His sequence is: “Mistral y el 
modernismo; en la segunda, Neruda y la poesía de mensaje; y en la tercera, él mismo, el 
‘autor’ contra el ‘poeta’” (23). Each section is and is not faithful to the style with which it 
is paired- which will become clearer shortly, as I turn to a “modernist” piece. More than 
repeat these observations, I wish to center the work’s dually negative irony as 
highlighting the collapse of the autonomous position previously afforded poetry and poet, 
and as fundamental to Parra’s general style. Thus, this brief stop with his earlier work 
indicates a functioning that will be of importance later.  
I will focus on his poem “Defensa del árbol”, which, with its tongue-in-cheek 
didactic tone, prefigures his later ironic political gestures by adopting a modernist, 
nationalistic stance to subvert it and render it excessive. Although nominally 
recriminating a young boy’s destructiveness, slippages in meaning realized through 
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subtle personification suggest a more pointed allegorical reading. A constant duality, 
being both what it seems to be and its negation, points toward the sutured projects of 
culture and nation-state, and the pedagogical import of the one for the other. The work 
performs the tone and tropes of modernism, especially Mistral’s familial and arboreal 
themes, whilst their subtly imperfect appropriation humorously undermines their excesses 
and presumption. All while maintaining itself comfortably within the prescribed form: 
playing by the rules, if you will, to laugh them off.  
In reference to any and no tree in particular, both schooling and scolding the boy 
that throws stones, the speaker intones: “Debe ser siempre por el hombre / Bien 
distinguido y respetado / Niño perverso que lo hiera / Hiere a su padre y a su hermano” 
(ll. 9-12, 53).10 By moralistically prioritizing the phallic tree’s well-being via analogous 
relation to the father and brother, it realizes a primary slippage: here and throughout, the 
speaker invokes the oedipal structure to call into question the boy’s behavior. Moreover, 
the syntactical inversion of the phrase split between the first two lines insinuates both an 
ethical obligation towards and a necessary being of this tree. Certainly, the 
psychoanalytic reading is apparent, but I would like to suggest a slightly different, if not 
unrelated, direction. Louis Althusser proposes of individuals that they “are always 
already subjects” and as such, “are ‘abstract’ with respect to the subjects they always-
already are” (192). To support this, he invokes the same Freudian familial structure 
implied in this principal slippage- the father, the tree, the one that ought not be harmed, 
occupies within the familial ideology a nominal role that guarantees the child’s 
subjectivity. The name of the father anticipates the child’s first breath, fitting it into the 
52 
 
larger, multipartite system of state ideological apparatuses that determine state language. 
Throwing stones at the tree that is not the father and yet stands for him, as symptomatic 
of oedipal rebelliousness, might be read as a coded reference to a rejection of the name, 
the familial ideological technic par excellence. Further, the final verse’s conjunction of 
father and brother to the signifying chain begun with tree folds in potential political 
overtones. Or it could be the guilt driven, over-the-top didactic gesture that it plays at- 
perhaps Parra’s experience as a teacher coming through. This reading is always held in 
suspense by the might, the straightforward and ironic readings constantly at odds with 
each other, both deferring interpretation and thus a decision on which rules.   
This ideological complex reasserts itself in the poem’s re-presentation of the 
mother- as innocent, unknowing, purity that raises the child. “Seguramente que tu madre / 
No sabe el cuervo que ha criado / Te cree un hombre verdadero” (ll. 17-9, 53). Invoking 
the mother that assuredly “no sabe”, the always uninformed maternal figure that was and 
was not an object of affection, is excessive. She becomes the silent ground guilt relies 
upon to make a “true man” out of this childish crow. She is not virginal, per force, but 
nor does she lack of the virginal; never speaking, never granted the word, only spoken for 
and on behalf of, the mythical grounding of the family structure who is nonetheless 
excluded from any exercise of authority.11 From this one may again, not incorrectly, erect 
a simple oedipal reading. A bad subject that would kill the father and usurp the mother to 
reclaim ideologically “virginal” territory and assume the word within the family, even if 
this is only achieved through metaphorically displacing the affection of and for the 
mother. This reading might hinge on the crow, a scavenger not opposed to violence, and 
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the use of “verdadero” to modify “hombre” in the last line. Yet, a second slippage directs 
us towards Althusser’s Absolute Other, the Sovereign, the Father of the (secular) State. 
These lines follow in short order: “La gran persona que es el árbol! / Él da fruta 
deleitosa / Más que la leche, más que el nardo; / Leña de oro en el invierno, / Sombra de 
plata en el verano / Y, lo que es más que todo junto, / Crea los vientos y los pájaros” 
(ll.26-32, 53). Tree, father, provider of sustenance and means of life- the Great Man 
emerges from the palpitating, archaic syntax of the first line’s proclamation. Not merely 
sustaining the family, he also provides gold and silver- that is, money, value-, joy and the 
very environment in which the subject thrives. These are the bounds of subjective reality, 
wherein the subject is subjected; and these lines’ slippage is crucial. The poem is elevated 
to a defense of the State as embodied by the Sovereign, threatened by youthful disorder- 
in a way reminiscent of León Rozitchner’s work on the externalization of the internalized 
structure of familial authority and its projection onto the State.12 These lines subtly 
potentiate a critique of modernist poetry’s pedagogical role in national propaganda, 
ostensibly from within its own rules. They go so far as to use its florid, colorful, and at 
times contradictory imagery: “leña de oro”; “sombra de plata”; “fruta deleitosa”, which 
sonically suggests that it is delicious while also a crime to eat, calling to mind the Edenic 
apple and another Sovereign. Didactic poetry, like school and family as an apparatus that 
interpellates bourgeois subjects, does not go unscathed. All are bound together in verse 
and confused under the gaze of the Great Man, calling on one another for justification, 
just as they are called upon in turn. This gesture might teach a tongue in cheek lesson, or 
it might destabilize autonomous art’s pedagogical pretense. Both readings are held in 
54 
 
suspense by the interpretive ambivalence and the double negation reinforced by, and 
necessary to, the ironic interpretation.13 This tree is not the Sovereign while, at the same 
time, it cannot escape being him. 
The poem’s coded ambivalence, while suggestive of this critique, gives over to 
the deferred addressee the task of constructing meaning from its ironic twists and turns 
via their supplementary interpretation. On its own, it’s not a poem about a tree, and yet it 
is; it’s not a poem about the family, but still very familiar; it’s not a poem defending the 
State, but still beneath its shadow. Publicly and proficiently performing, it signals the 
style’s un-fixity and possible discursive polyvocality. The poem is socialized beginning 
with its name- not unlike the subject granted the name of the father before its first breath- 
and it insists on the tensions to be resolved anew with each reading. By playing with the 
modernist project’s effaced alternatives it signals the potential for an alternative reading, 
without forcing it to emerge within the poem. Possibility indicated and yet suspended, 
deferred; there is no Olympian nomological gesture that would force what might be 
understood otherwise to exist within the State’s language. An obligation to the form is 
lacking in this poem that is and is not a modernist piece, and yet it is masterfully well 
formed. Reading in a certain manner, one may run their hand along the law’s immanent 
edge, made coarse by irony, and feel there the possibility of a poetics excessive to it. 
Parra suggests a route that may be otherwise by forcing readers to recognize modernism’s 
stakes, without presuming to demonstrate an escape from language, which constantly 
expands as we attempt to contain within it previously unforeseen forms of sociality. 
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As I mentioned above, one may seek out these negations throughout the text, 
concerning multiple state ideological constructs- for me, this “defense” was most 
appropriate. But, by way of demonstration, let us pause at the poem where the book folds 
back over itself- a citation of the entire text, embedded within it. To approach “Los vicios 
del mundo moderno”, I refer to one line: “El mundo moderno es una gran cloaca” (l.63, 
108). This isn’t because there’s nothing else of note; rather, its importance derives from 
what it conjoins interpretively. It agglomerates various terrors plaguing the world, listed 
throughout the poem, to code a straightforward message- the world and the culture 
through which we approach it are as ambivalent as… an egg we’ve yet to crack. By 
emphasizing the polysemic discourse(s) on a reality in which “[l]a policía atemorrizada 
huye de estes monstruos / En dirección del centro de la ciudad”, the poem presents the 
terrors and complexities of the crisis in poetic meaning and, perhaps, the law (ll.9-10, 
106). Yet, crucially, it contrasts the terrors plaguing the law to the unadulterated reality 
beyond them- “el mundo ha sido siempre así. / La verdad, como la belleza, no se crea ni 
se pierde / Y la poesía reside en las cosas o es simplemente un [espejismo del espíritu" 
(ll.73-5, 109). A book of poetry asserting only that Parra is not a poet in as much as he is, 
it sets itself beyond art’s former haughty autonomy. Here poetry is no longer a 
pedagogical apparatus but a singular voice in a multitudinous cacophony, the latter 
presented by the poem only in its absence. Parra pretends no authoritative naming and 
gestures towards the tenuous, simultaneous beauty and suffering of being otherwise.  
The poetic, here, is not what it inhabits- the world beyond the word of man. And 
yet, it does not cease to reside within the world, a part of things apart from them. Poetry 
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is not the world, but not not the world, as it forms one part of it- one that may be drawn 
out into the order of language without diminishing always excessive reality. Its non-
prescriptive critiques are contingently authorized and granted force horizontally, as 
teasing out language’s ambivalence and reminding us of the world that escapes our 
words. The only available action at the edge of the law is to constantly decide to act 
however you can, knowing that your actions have a responsibility to not expand that edge 
while clinging to its flickering appearance. From there, the territory where one might, in 
the future, become many, the poet-as-singularity speaks to suggest that “Tratemos de ser 
felices, recomiendo yo, chupando [la miserable costilla humana. / Extraigamos de ella el 
líquido renovador, / Cada cual de acuerdo con sus inclinaciones personales. / 
¡Aferrémonos a esta piltrafa divina!” (ll.84-7, 109). Humans are and are not miserable 
creatures; it depends on how we cling to what little scraps of the world our words catch.  
This text affronts poetic norms, recognizing poetry’s ambivalent role as a 
synecdoche for the law that determines being as being subject to the State. Refusing to 
decide its poetic status, the text takes up arms against itself in crisis, when the rules of 
poetics are confused with common social behavior and senselessly precipitate an 
interpretive decision. Senseless, because the decision’s sense could only be found by 
resolving the tension between the bourgeois individualism of the first poem’s 
recriminations and the multitude otherwise than the State, towards which the poem’s 
irony gestures. Predetermining that decision’s nature would eliminate any power it might 
have, confining it to the terms of extant bourgeois social structures. Accounting for this, I 
sense emerging a path otherwise than poetry’s rules, modelling a politics otherwise than 
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the State’s. Something that is not yet language or, at least, something unspeakable in the 
State’s language. This path will characterize Parra’s socialized poetics and begins to 
appear in the anti-poetry, to persist in finding a-new its sense of a politics to come.  
So, returning to the above discussion of art’s re-socialization, if art seems 
purposeless post-avant-garde, it is only in so much as said purpose was articulated in 
service of the bourgeois State, whose institutionality construed, and whose capital 
facilitated, its illusory autonomy. However, highlighting the (new) socialization 
determining the space of Parra’s poetics, we have also come to the second aspect of Parra 
criticism: his potential politics, or his political potential. 
Critics of his politics, or lack thereof, are various. There are those more interested 
in literary history, such as Muñoz, that view Parra’s as a purely negative critique. There is 
also the more doctrinaire left that deemed poetry’s role to be in the service of hegemonic 
revolutionary aspirations and censured Parra’s ambiguous public behavior, viewing his 
work and life as lacking a solid political project.14 Nonetheless, there are those that seek 
to rescue, or uncover, a serviceable politics from within his work. Amalia Rodríguez, 
while recognizing that Parra’s work has a destructive bent, remarks that it does not lack a 
positive sense behind, beneath and beyond its negative critique. For her, “puede 
interpretarse, entonces, el artefacto como un intento de reducir el poema a su unidad 
original, la célula, que podría multiplicarse y dar origen a nuevas estructuras poéticas. 
Parra destruye el mundo, pero es para reconstruirlo de nuevo” (63 emphasis mine). 
Following the subversive nature of his works, she asserts that:  
Para un hombre como Parra, la terrible enfermedad de nuestra sociedad es el 
poder. Todo poder es represivo, es la negación de toda espontaneidad y de toda 
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creatividad. Y aún más grave, el deseo de poder en los individuos está en 
conflicto con el espíritu de solidaridad propio de la naturaleza social del hombre. 
Es un error, por lo tanto, pensar que la postura anti-autoritaria del anarquista es 
individualista y asocial, al contrario, nace de la convicción de que sólo en la total 
ausencia de poder puede darse en la sociedad un estado de unidad auténticamente 
solidario. (66-7) 
 
Taking up the anarchistic discussion, Patricio Lerzundi notes of the artefactos that “es 
una confirmación más de que el poeta no es un demiurgo sino simplemente un obrero de 
la palabra” (74). This echoes a nineteenth century poem by Patricio Miranda Venegas 
which asserts that “Todo poeta popular / es trabajador primero, / defiende, en sus 
proporciones, / la causa del pueblo obrero” (Tipos y cuadros… 26)- nodding to another 
important influence on Parra. While these observations may pinpoint Parra’s sympathies 
and somewhat explicate the artefactos and chistes, Marlene Gottlieb succinctly 
(re)situates his political praxis in an article on his later work: “Nicanor Parra es el 
anarquista de la poesía” (77 emphasis mine). That is, his praxis is manifest as and in a 
specific mode and didn’t go further afield, despite a synecdochal relation between spheres 
of socialization. Enthusiasm aside, Parra was not participating in direct actions along the 
lines of torching police facilities when he directs his humor and irony at institutions with 
a policing effect on society.15 His work belongs principally, although not exclusively, to 
the re-socialized poetic-critical discourse. We must confront it therein, as articulated with 
and in relation to other overlapping, mutually constructive social discourses. Given this, 
when Lerzundi asserts that credit is due Parra for a “renovación total de la expresión 
cultural”, it is minding culture’s horizontal (re)socialization that I must assess the 
assertion, without effacing the distinction between discursive modes (76). And so, I must 
object. 
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 Here I might re-iterate my hesitance to identify in Parra a beginning. Were we to 
see in Parra’s work a total renewal of cultural expression, we would be assigning to it the 
beginning of something that had, in a sense, not been before; renewal as naming anew, 
opposed to a citational dialogue with the past highlighting iterability’s disjuncture. But 
the first stance does not pertain to Parra’s broader poetics, nor is assigning a proper name 
poetry’s task.16 Poetic iterability breaks with the prior, “engender[ing] infinitely new 
contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion” for poetry, facilitating its resocialization 
by deconstructing its previously assumed (and deeply ideological) autonomy (Derrida 
“Signature…” 320). He neither avails himself of anything newly created nor creates 
something new; rather, his work takes place anew in language’s oscillating sociality, 
exposed in the avant-garde crisis and the concomitant demystification of art institutions 
and art’s institutionality.  
In as much as (some) art is no longer functional to the State’s subjectivizing 
apparatuses, its critique exposes human behavior’s regularity as the substratum 
underpinning the application of rules and yet exceeding them- as the limit of the social 
that folds back with(in) sociality. Parra manipulates the faculty of language- which Virno 
associates with the general intellect- to carve out exodic paths through language’s 
habitual use; that is, use which does not yet conform to bourgeois literary rules as 
granting the artist an autonomous position within, and supplementary to, their system.17 
We read amongst the “Guatipiques”, “Dice abajo los de arriba / debe decir arriba los de 
abajo” (Chistes… 164). Taking advantage of macrostructural play (here within the 
“social”) to belie the high/low distinction, Parra’s poetry indexes, without naming, voices 
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apart from bourgeois art and society. Before, art was meant to subsume affective tensions 
that threatened disruption of the burgeoning capitalist (representational) system- an 
indirect politicization of the aesthetic. Now we comprehend art’s explicit re-socialization 
as the obverse of its ambivalent post-avant-garde duality; the other face being 
incorporation to the culture industry. It has become possible that it assumes a plainly 
critical role within the social, because of the ambivalence inherent to the 
contestatory/incorporative split. 
 Parra’s poetry indexes an excessive social relationality that escapes recognition’s 
manifestation as representation within hegemonic politico-cultural struggle, even in its 
most populist forms. It (re)textures a fluctuating social topography at state language’s 
frontiers, which alternative relationality cannot puncture without being subsumed.18 This 
seems most effectively realized through literature as particularizing the universalizing 
faculty of language, whose functioning subtends multitudinous sociality. As the poet’s 
name cannot be entirely effaced, Parra’s negations, irony and humor allow his unicity 
with(in) non-hegemonic sociality while fully embracing and manipulating the iterability 
that characterizes both common subjectivity as a generalizing one and the singular human 
beings within it. This without ignoring that his poetry functions necessarily from within 
state structures, as institutionally authorized works of art. Moreover, poetry is writing as 
an artefact of and amongst other artefacts- we constantly reengage these works as we 
reread them and, with each reading, determine their significance anew. This is aided by 
the multitude to which they refer, and to which they are indirectly functional, that persists 
in its ambivalent nature beyond sovereign structures and thus beyond the scope of any 
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single interpretation. Re-iterating the assertion that opens this paragraph- his poetry 
indexes a mass exodic persistence. As Virno puts it,  
Neither A, nor not-A, neither resigned acquiescence nor struggle to seize power in 
a predetermined territory, but an eccentric B, achievable only as long as other 
premises are surreptitiously introduced into the given syllogism. The separation 
from the ‘house of slavery and of unjust toil’ takes place in the precise moment in 
which a side road, uncharted on sociopolitical maps, is identified. (Multitude… 
148) 
 
I will now turn to others of Parra’s works, allowing that they have no “purpose” as art 
and, thus, can indicate paths newly glimpsed, further illuminating fragmented and 
fragmenting horizontal social space.   
Humor and the Third Person 
 Keeping the prior in mind, I’ll address the works least bound to the poetic and 
most to the social, and thus Parra’s politics: Artefactos and Chistes parra disorientar a la 
policía poesía.  
Written just before and during the dictatorship, they index a social whose exodus 
from statist spatial practices was exacerbated by the progressive dissociation of the 
multitudes from authoritarian state apparatuses. These works are marked by a heavily 
effaced authorial presence and an almost complete dissolution of the narrative first 
person, still predominant in his early anti-poems. Of his work, they offer the most telling 
instance of the paradoxically empty fullness of his resocialized poetics. This is perhaps so 
salient due the timing of their publication: Artefactos was published in 1973 and 
Chistes… in 1983, both years that mark profound crises in the Chilean state and 
economic order. Following Javier Martínez and Alvaro Díaz, those years signaled a 
strengthening of State institutionality in service of a neo-liberal transition that, despite 
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being politically and economically untenable without the strengthened State, would come 
to demand its complete reformulation.19 As the artefactos bear witness to the 
multifaceted socio-cultural crisis that was the violent destabilization of and coup against 
the Allende regime, they sense a distress on the outskirts of high political drama and a 
cynicism as regards the Allende government’s evental nature for the present and future of 
Chilean politics. While this was due to political tensions instigated by the conservatives 
and foreign capitalist interests they were, nonetheless, at times aggravated by the Unidad 
Popular’s attempts at dialogue with its entrenched opponents. A decade afterwards, 
Chistes… weaves itself neatly into the decentralized discontent of massive popular 
protests against the dictatorship’s social, political and economic policies. A step removed 
from lived experience by virtue of being writing, they articulate a pointed critique of 
bourgeois conciliation and the traditional left’s inefficacy in the face of a violent 
dictatorial regime. These texts partake in an immersive socio-linguistic 
indeterminateness, indexing socio-historic flux in its fragmentary and allusive gesturality.       
Marlene Gottlieb indicates of this period that the poetic voice, the lyrical “I” that 
“speaks” the poem and formally marks the ambiguous relation poet/speaker, has been 
nigh entirely effaced. Only the proper name’s re-iteration marks the works presented, 
piecemeal or in their entirety. She underlines that in the artefactos  
el individuo desaparece y sólo se oyen los gritos de combate de la multitud. En el 
artefacto el poeta no inventa imágenes de pequeños mundos individuales. 
Verbaliza algo que ya existe y que anda disuelto en el aire cultural que todos 
respiramos… [l]a creación del poeta consiste en dar forma a algo que existe fuera 
de él, algo que marca un espíritu de época, una herencia cultural común. (89)  
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This stage of his work solidifies the break with previous forms and indicates an almost 
complete submersion of the poetic in the ambivalent field of reciprocal recognition 
characterizing the social’s ethicality. If in Poemas y antipoemas Parra bore witness to a 
crisis in literary rules and normality, coinciding with a general crisis of art that facilitated 
its communicability, now his poetry opens to the world without taking refuge in any past 
rules.20 Perhaps no surprise, both texts operate under, in the sense of repressed as well as 
hidden by- as other than yet constituting the legibility of- what Nelly Richard terms the 
dictatorship’s “self-founded […] truths- truths closed in on themselves by a doctrinary 
chain that sought to reinforce the inexpugnability of meaning” such that “[t]he 
persecution and censorship of politics and the political during the first years of the 
military government led art and literature to serve as substitute means for the evocation-
invocation of silenced voices” (Insubordination 41). Both illustrate techniques for a 
poetics of solidarity, so I will attend to them chronologically. 
 Due to their polysemic nature, there is something in these works that touches on 
almost every possible concern. So, linking the sections of my work, let’s begin with a 
simple artefacto- “TODO // ES POESÍA // menos la poesía” (Chistes… 133).21 Initially it 
asks to be read as replicating the universalization of the poetic and therefore 
romanticizing life- the complete dispersion of Art, or rather potential objects of art, being 
strongly reminiscent of Kantian natural beauty. But by introducing an unexpected 
interjection, a tertium datur marked by the shift from capital to lower-case script, Parra 
undermines the ability of any art, especially poetry, to capture this “poetry”. He reaffirms 
the real’s excess alongside art’s irreversible adhesion to, and separation from, life. This 
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conception conforms to the effects of the contextual distancing performed by linguistic 
negation and reaffirms art’s socialization. Anything is or may be poetry and yet, upon 
being named poetic, ceases to partake of life’s poetry. In a similar, although more vulgar 
vein, we have “LA / POESÍA / MORIRÁ / SI NO / SE LA / OFENDE // hay / que / 
poseerla / y humillarla en público / después se verá / lo que se hace” (135). Shocking with 
the suggestion of violence against an always already feminized poetry, the fragment 
reveals, against expectations, that poetry now only exists publicly, humiliated and 
degraded though it may appear. What may come of poetry, no longer cloistered away, 
cannot be foreseen and is born by the future tense. But it would have remained 
impossible had poetry not entered the coarse, ambivalent social world that may yet negate 
it- autonomy in a critical apparatus renders its criticisms sterile.  
As socialized, these proclamations find in each reader a third party never 
assuredly their addressee. They force each possible addressee to confront a sudden shift 
in their understanding of poetry and its social function. Jolting or dark humor exposes 
and enacts alternative poetic discursivities, formally exemplified by sudden interjections 
of a tertium datur. These fragments illuminate what Virno calls the zone of indistinction- 
the zone between a conceptual rule and the regularity of its “use”- from which spring 
new, tangential articulations of language. Or, to reframe that, therein is exposed the play 
pervading the structure of the law and its absent center, here written Parra. 
 This gesture jolts more strongly when the artefactos are explicitly political. The 
melancholy tone of “REVOLUCIÓN / REVOLUCIÓN // cuántas contrarrevoluciones / 
se cometen en tu nombre” is further accentuated when one accounts for Artefactos being 
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published in 1973, knowing that Chile had been undergoing a prolonged conservative 
counter-revolution to the rise and policies of the Allende government (134). The 
inclusion of the lowercase, almost whispered interrogation as postscript demands 
constant (re)evaluation of the initial, capitalized injunction. Writing’s iterability 
supplements the initial, incomplete context’s trace, rendering it simultaneously lament 
and interrogatory. What would seem a commonplace graffiti theme in any country 
undergoing political upheaval and militant class tensions is recast in a new light, 
highlighting the asocial negativity that may be provoked by generative, radical change.22 
By refusing to ignore the possibility of opposition and the anxiety with which this invests 
radical action, it resists being read as a superficial rejection of militancy and reminds the 
reader of the risk inherent to action that seeks generativity from within ambivalence. 
Read during counter-revolutionary violence or as a historical retrospective, the quiet 
aside’s inclusion- not comic, although otherwise abiding by the Freudian structure of the 
joke- rends the public proclamation’s univocal understanding and opens paths for 
melancholic and chagrined readings of the spirited invocation. Restoring ambivalence to 
a politico-cultural experience that would determine the tone of not only the poem but the 
historical moment, the artefacto signals alternative discursive modes without language 
from within it and striates the state-centric discourse’s surface at its regulatory limit. This 
etching indexes, and almost maps, the experiential fragmentation unveiled in and by the 
violent, authoritarian political experience that unfolded in a perverse dialogue with the 
specter of social revolution. Each of this surface’s ridges is an unrealized breach of the 
golpista discourse’s presumptive totality, signaling its possibility without pretending to 
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capture thriving, unspeakable discontent; the necessarily unspeakable resembling a 
general strike without language, un-incorporable to the law yet provoked by its threat of 
violence.23 Thus, these works do not pretend to re-present a protest before language, 
already within language themselves. Rather, they are situated at the limit of what can be 
written and belie totalizing pretenses, as a document of and in the constantly (re)forming 
space of the State.  
More pointedly, and these postcard artefactos all have jagged, torn edges, there 
are examples like: “L’ETAT C’EST MOI / LA REVOLUCIÓN / CUBANA / SOY YO” 
(135). Conjoining Louis XIV’s famous proclamation with the Cuban revolution brings 
forward the progressive totalitarianization of the Cuban revolutionary state, likely not 
ignoring Castro’s recent visit to Chile.24 Again, it is too easy to read this as a rejection of 
the entire process- a view commonly held at the time. Rather, the sharp critique 
underlines the caudillo fallacy, wherein the revolution dwells in its leader and his actions 
alone- explicitly Castro and implicitly an idealized version of Allende-, a reasoning 
which reinforces a state-centric political strategy that can only replace a sovereign, 
without challenging the State’s institutional materiality. Given poetry’s position as 
interlocutor with(in) the social, the irony underlines the faulty assumption that 
revolutionary action is executable only via the sovereign exception, which pertains to a 
structure determinate of and determined by the capitalist order- a reality all too apparent 
ending 1973.  
 The artefactos take full advantage of humorous resources to develop a sharp-
witted critical mode reliant on common linguistic forms and diction; nonetheless, they 
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still retain a grotesque, formal trace of the anti-poems’ authorial voice. Not until the later 
publication of Chistes… does this signature’s effacement near, without reaching an end, 
as it is articulated most extensively with(in) the ambivalent social sphere. With Chistes…, 
Parra takes up the earlier potential for decentralized poetic subjectivity that Gottlieb says 
he fully realized in the poem “Graffiti from the Mausoleum of Ezra Pound”. Dispersed, 
multivalent writing on the wall, it engages singular readers, unknown addressees, through 
their capacity to simultaneously re-write the work on the surface of a mural that Parra has 
re-presented in the text, free of and yet supplementing the name of the poet. As such,  
el mural, aun más que el artefacto, es una poesía colectiva. Es la culminación de 
la despersonalización gradual que se nota en la poesía de Parra. El poeta no quiere 
ser unilateral. Abre su poema a todos; cada uno escribe en su propia letra, cada 
uno se expresa en su propio estilo, en su propio nivel. (95)  
 
A poetic opening to the world whose sociality blurs to minimality the distinctions 
between reading and writing. However, realizing such a socio-poetic aperture uncovers 
anguished traces within the poetry that, following Virno, are a natural response to this 
conjunction, due to a sense of “not feeling at home.” An anguished sense of risk 
engendered in a post-metaphysical “homelessness” is central to multitudinous praxis 
beyond the State- and is generatively mitigated in and by intersubjective linguistic play. 
To wit- concerning this anguished potential, take the case of the poet and poetry. More 
than misinterpretation, there is the danger of unveiling the secret at the center of his 
work, behind his proper name- of exposing himself completely, as entirely knowable in 
his writing. However impossible an unveiling, this danger pushes him to defer the work’s 
authorship and interpretation on to others. Called as he is to write, given the re-socialized 
poet’s uniquely double position as singularity-cum-critic, Parra responds by 
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disseminating his writing into the public sphere and decentering himself as authorial 
voice.25  
 These poems’ presumed materiality- the space occupied by writing- reinforces 
and extends this decentering. The artefactos are conceived of as and initially published 
on unsigned postcards; further, frequently conjugating together symbolic and linguistic 
modes of communication by supplementing text with drawings, they reinforce the lack of 
a single context by effecting a constant, doubly-articulated chain of meanings whose 
incessant resignification is determined by the situated interpretive decision to favor one 
symbolic mode over another, or not.26 Cast into the world, they are offered much like the 
chiste’s graffiti-esque jottings, both continuing to “act” in the poet’s absence. Missives, 
they act before the (im)possibility of an addressee to come and take up anew the process 
of signification, de- and re-codification, regardless of the author’s in- or at-tention, or 
support for “the plenitude of his meaning, of that very thing which seems to be written ‘in 
his name’” (Derrida, Signature 316). The assertion of their indexical function hinges on 
the space in(to) which these jottings are offered and, thus, the relation that obtains 
between art and the social. We are due a detour to elaborate it.  
As Nelly Richard says, “[t]he structural relationship between aesthetics and 
society is based not on the linear correspondence of form and content, but rather on 
responses set loose by the multiple fractures of signs involved in symbolic creation, 
which unsettle every order based on linear transfers between text and context”. This leads 
her to affirm that “artistic-cultural practices […] actively dismantle and reformulate 
tensions and antagonisms via figurative languages that intervene in social discursivity, 
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redistributing its signs, and changing them into new, multiple, and fluctuating 
constellations” undermining, or at least complicating, the totalizing impulses of any 
ideology and Ideology in general (Insubordination 67). As for periodization, she presents 
this in the context of the Avanzada group with which she worked during the late 70’s and 
the 80’s. While Parra was at most indirectly involved via his daughter Catalina, the 
destabilization of linear transfer and fragmentation of social discursivity is equally well 
affirmed of his work in these collections, which signal the shifting social terrain beneath 
and beyond the dictatorial State, without attempting any univocal incorporation of the un-
nameable otherwise. They emphasize and exacerbate the contradictions in what Henri 
Lefebvre refers to as “absolute space”, which, within the language I have been using, is a 
correlative of capitalist culture’s representational order. My sense of art’s 
(re)socialization runs parallel to what Lefebvre denominates “differential space”, which 
emerges from abstract space through the accentuation of difference that “will restore 
unity to what abstract space breaks up- to the functions, elements and moments of social 
practice” and “will put an end to those localizations which shatter the integrity of the 
individual body, the social body, the corpus of human needs, and the corpus of 
knowledge” (52).  
Parallel, but not co-incidental, because Parra resists the name’s spatial unification, 
as per the anarchic bent I read into his work. Because of this, I speak of it as indexing the 
incremental articulation of this alternative spatial practice, without founding it or 
pretending to totalize the fragmentary, polyvocal cacophony seething elsewhere. In a 
space not yet present; one perhaps to come. As I demonstrated with his ironic double 
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negations, Parra writes from within and through an order of institutional language, while 
simultaneously supplementing and undermining the same order, the order of the same. 
Although his works cannot take full account of coming movement, neither contained nor 
containable by any extant institution, they do serve to texturize the presumptively smooth 
and impenetrable discursive boundary at and from which they are situated. In its 
indexicality I find the core of Parra’s writing in solidarity, and of poetry’s general 
solidarity- without facilitating epistemic capture, it sees and allows to be seen other, 
possible movement. Displacing author-ship and author-ity onto the social sphere by way 
of unsigned works’ (de)contextualizing iteration, this poetry unleashes and is integrated 
to a constancy of modulations that signal an exodus from predominant capitalist spatiality 
into space yet to arrive. 
 With the weight of authorship now shifted onto the oscillatory dynamic between 
poet and public, the nameless and unnamable reader is a third person bearing witness to 
an interminable, strange dialogue. This shift is due to extreme modifications to poetic 
language, for Schopf exactly what facilitated the older anti-poems’ wide reception and 
status (“La antipoesía…” 181). Gottlieb contrasts the role of this nameless reader with 
that of the reader of Machado’s proverbs, saying of them that “el lector pasivo que recibe 
las palabras proverbiales de Machado, poeta-profeta, es [al leer a Parra] un lector activo, 
cómplice, participante en el artefacto” (93). Our acceptance of the reader as participant in 
the poetic dialogue between Parra and public, a singularity that bears witness to writing 
yet cannot fix the author’s place, offers up, anew, the exodic thread binding these 
scattered fragments. As I referenced above, this poetry attempts to make visible 
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something constantly beyond the work. Something before us, facing us, looking us in the 
eyes- Parra’s ironic humor. Let us then take the title of the second work at face value, as 
its titularity enjoins us to, and consider these disaggregated bricoleur’s pieces jokes.27  
In his analysis of jokes, Virno returns to Freud’s work to highlight how the third 
person is the audience of the joke and, at the same time, “not limited to amplifying the 
effects of the witticism; this ‘intruder’ actually makes it possible” (Multitude… 80). 
Whereas the joke’s author expends “excessive psychic energy” in crafting it, and thus 
cannot laugh heartily without reflection, the third person “who shares the same 
inhibitions as the joke teller, can enjoy the overcoming of these inhibitions without 
assuming any psychic waste” (Multitude… 81). Where Virno most diverges from Freud is 
where he is most informative to me. For him, in a play on J.L. Austin’s seminal work 
How to Do Things With Words, telling a joke is doing something new with words.28 
Moreover, it is  
[…] a ‘doing’ whose reality depends entirely upon the presence of outsides and, 
in the strongest and most complete sense, upon public action. It is nothing less, let 
us understand, than a political discourse held in a general assembly that urges 
towards insurrection against the constituent powers: if enunciated in the absence 
of witnesses, it is as though this discourse had never occurred. The intrinsic 
necessity of exposing oneself to the observation and judgments of one’s equals 
carves out with precision the sphere of praxis. (Multitude… 82)  
 
The intersubjectivity necessary for the joke’s realization is the crucial point. As I have 
echoed in my analysis, the joke is a microcosm of praxis’s functioning and puts in relief 
the interplay of the two levels, as all particular actions will. Jokes signal the possibility of 
new relationality by highlighting how language can reveal social practice’s limits and the 
regularities that support, yet are produced by, its rules. Parra’s texts coincide with the 
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panic or calls for action that characterized both moments in which they were written. 
They seek out and suggest alternative routes that may have gone unnoticed or 
unconsidered when the social order was not facing some sense of crisis. Here I am again 
echoing Richard, when she speaks of how the Avanzada’s fondness  
for dismantling meaning transformed its critique of power in representation (the 
official power’s totalitarianism) into a critique of representations of power- that 
is, into a critique of figurations of the system that reiterated the violence of 
discursive intimidation in each enunciated series, grammatical chain, or 
subordinate phrase. (Insubordination 49)  
 
To reconstitute this lens in my own reading, now to the chistes themselves. 
Fragmentary, short bursts, they share graffiti’s tone and styling, scrawled on the 
page as on an alley. Even the first person proclamations read as vague and contingently 
cast into the world; for instance, “CREO EN UN MÁS ALLÁ / DONDE SE CUMPLEN 
TODOS LOS IDEALES / AMISTAD / IGUALDAD / FRATERNIDAD / EXCEPCIÓN 
HECHA DE LA LIBERTAD / ESA NO SE CONSIGUE EN NINGUNA PARTE / 
SOMOS ESCLAVOS POR NATURALEZA” (155). Alongside the indeterminate first 
person singular, deflecting interpretation on to a realm of reciprocal reading-writing 
signaled by the switch to the first-person plural, this interjection is decidedly bitter. 
Understood as a partial index of public discourse, it refers us to a moment in which 
disillusion caused by state violence and the still livid marks wrought upon the body 
politic provoke a skepticism of bourgeois liberal ideals. The social fabric has been 
severely rent by the preceding and ongoing dictatorial violence and public discourse, in a 
public sphere only just reemerging, is understandably terse. This graffiti, then, as now, is 
writ on the State’s walls in its victims’ blood; desiring no proper name, it invokes an 
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incomplete differential space by demanding that all silent passersby sign it anew, with the 
names of another. That is, “de aparecer apareció / pero en una lista de desaparecidos” 
(158).  
The chistes even seem to negate the role of the poetic without society, including 
this bit: “poesía poesía / cómo si en Chile no ocurriera nada!” (157). As though criticizing 
readers, witnesses to this rattling breath being born anew in the social, the imperfect 
subjunctive reminds us that it is time to veer from gilded texts. Yet, its ironic 
ambivalence also jabs at those who dismiss poetry outright, as though it did not occur in 
Chile, as though it were a non-event, something a-social. The chiste’s fragmentation and 
hastiness enact an anti-poetry, scoring the walls raised amongst us; this faux-graffiti’s 
illusory materiality both binds and disjoins reading subjects. These “jokes” enact no 
pretense of subtlety, shocking with sudden turns and combinations that force recognition 
of the unsayable, disrupting conscious defense mechanisms and inscribing themselves 
within the reader’s mind.29 They manifest a public sense of kairós, the proper moment for 
performing an action, while also undermining any proper moment in favor of the moment 
always arriving, in which we form the social and the common.30 Orienting themselves 
toward the coming re-combination of violently disassociated concepts, they shock the 
reader by forcing her to recognize relationships yet to obtain. Their thematic ambivalence 
opens a space where the reader might bear witness to sociality’s reconstruction.  
And also its desperation. “YA NO PEDIMOS / PAN, TECHO NI ABRIGO / 
NOS CONFORMAMOS / CON UN POCO / DE // A I R E // E X C E L E N C I A” 
(156). This chiste’s tone and intent are deferred until the incessant moments of reading, 
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which allow a repeated public re-airing of grievances. Lacking a clear intended signified 
for the boldened excelencia, it also implicates the reader as object of the complaint- 
always possible when your words are written on the walls. The reader is not the State and 
yet is within it, in that, signing the poem upon reading it, (s)he is always already 
imbricated in state language and the law’s spatiality. Subjectified and yet simultaneously 
outside as well, the reader is ambiguously included under the sign of nosotros, as much 
subject as object of the complaint. This ambivalent duality reinforces the text’s sociality 
and authorial dissemination, further re-marking the horizontally articulated ethical-
political relations of a common subjectivity superseding any pretensions of state capture. 
Any appeal to authority is belied as futile and always too late in the renunciation of the 
most basic needs (bread, a roof, clothing), as the text resituates an understanding of a 
possible, just social sphere beyond the State’s rigid discourses and with(in) an exodic, 
horizontal field of im-possible mutual responsibility.  
And yet, and yet, it must be acknowledged that in other chistes we can still intuit 
the effaced author’s grievances, himself a part of this multitude, sharing its concerns. 
Etched into one wall is: “CANCIONES PROTESTA // LOS POLLITOS DICEN PÍO 
PÍO PÍO / PORQUE TIENEN HAMBRE / PORQUE TIENEN FRÍO / PIECECITOS DE 
NIÑO AZULOSOS DE FRÍO / COMO OS VEN Y NO OS CUBREN / MARX MÍO!!” 
(156). Substituting Marx for Dios at the end should not be read as a critique of Marx per 
se, but rather of those that hold up Marxism as the revolutionary way in times of 
suffering, while doing nothing but singing protest songs from a far haven. The 
unexpected replacement in the common phrase caustically suggests that Dios would have 
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been an equally viable insertion, for all the good it would do. These are words on the wall 
of a pueblo that has no time for tame(d) messianic visions espoused at a distance. No 
longer a truly univocal pueblo, it can only overflow that sign into the realm of generative 
action. The singers’ distant, almost haughty perspective does less for the social than even 
this poetry and fails to recognize that criticism can no longer produce the illusion of its 
own authorization, nor await it from above. Mocking them, this figurative wall bears 
witness to foolish appeals to the law that binds it, yet on which it refuses to make claims. 
Rather, indexing social movement and fragmentation, this poetry-graffiti demands of the 
singers an excessive resocialization- without demanding anything of them at all. Perhaps 
here, not in but beside this poetry and constantly fluctuating sociality, is an interminable 
political project. A politics to come and, paradoxically, already here, in implied relational 
modes that can only exceed the State’s language. Perhaps that is Parra’s politics: a will to 
solidarity; an anarchic refusal to name, incorporate, bound and tame; the grand “I would 
prefer not to”. These poems, as their way of being political, uncover the authoritarian 
State’s limits by indexing their instability- the instability of a State trembling as it 
endlessly attempts to ground itself, failing to find a wall to lean on. 
Politics, Somewhere Outside  
 Responding to the criticism of Nicanor Parra’s poetry requires that one begin to 
cut through the competing ideological slants of the perspectives and, further, of the work 
itself. One cannot help but situate the work within the greater constellation of literary 
significance, immediately exceeded; nor can one ignore the acutely unique political 
position adopted by it, perhaps not political at all. To begin responding to this, I 
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understand literature, and all art not subsumed to the culture industry, as re-socialized in 
the wake of the collapse of art’s social autonomy as explicated by early bourgeois 
conceptualizations. Reconfiguring our critical lenses in this way also re-determines the 
politics of any writing, or action, attempted by “artistic” production, such that we can 
recover the threads of a political project beyond the hegemonic struggle for state power. 
Parra’s writing is thus decidedly political and, more importantly, articulated with(in) an 
ambivalent social space. While it might be said im-political by the standards of a politics 
preoccupied with the immediate struggle to assume hegemony, asserting and abiding by 
its own terms, it is necessarily not not political. Rather, the work’s politics are radically 
distanced from the State’s apparatuses and the people’s artifices. His poetry announces 
part of a coming exodus (or one perhaps already underway) from the rules previously 
determining politics, accomplishing the older popular poet’s goal as a worker whose 
work speaks for, by speaking in solidarity with, the multitude beyond the State. 
 I have attempted to articulate within my reading how techniques of negation and 
fragmentary dispersion predominant in Parra’s poetics, particularly in works that efface 
the poet’s proper name and open space for readers to come, signal a sense of space and 
solidarity other than the hierarchical state apparatuses determinant of the political. Not to 
aver that this poetry serves a political mission, but rather that it offers up a sense of space 
superseding that of the law’s regulatory discourse. A space within and through which, 
perhaps, one might approach an understanding of political action and discourse that 
effects a general ethico-political removal from the overdetermined representational 
spaces of the capitalist State’s economic and legal discourses, suggesting an-other 
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approach to the terrain of politics as such. A space the bonds and functioning of which 
are determined by love in and of solidarity, throughout time, underlying and persistent in 
political praxis and not suddenly made present all at once. A space of active solidarity, 
which this poetry enjoins us to further explore without striving to univocally name.    
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Endnotes
                                                 
1 In commenting Pablo Oyarzún here, I refer to his work “Arte en Chile de veinte, 
treinta años”, Georgia Series on Hispanic Thought, 22-25 (1987) 291-324.  
 
2 Here and throughout the work, references to play within language are citing 
implicitly or explicitly, the article by Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences,” Writing and Difference, Trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: 
U Chicago, 1978) 278-93.  
 
3 With regards to antipoetry’s relation to surrealism, see Ricardo Yawal, “La 
antipoesía de Nicanor Parra y su deuda con el surrealism,” Nicanor Parra: Antes y 
después de Jesucristo, ed. Marlene Gottlieb (Princeton: Linden Lane, 1993) 185-200. 
Nonetheless, I do not wish here to negate all relation or agreement with surrealism or the 
idea of the necessary conditions for art’s free production- quite the contrary, I see them as 
essential to Parra’s, and thus my, project. One would be hard pressed to find 
disagreement in Parra with André Breton’s  “Manifesto for an Independent Revolutionary 
Art”, What is Surrealism?: Selected Writings, Ed. Franklin Rosemont (New York: 
Pathfinder, 1978), when he makes the strong claim “If, for the better development of the 
forces of material production, the revolution must build a socialist regime with 
centralised control, to develop intellectual creation an anarchist regime of individual 
liberty should from the first be established” (245). Rather, Parra does not seem to further 
share the belief that “the supreme task of art in our epoch is to take part actively and 
consciously in the preparation of the revolution” (245-6). His position is more 
ambivalent, subtle, and is what I seek to tease out.   
 
4 I am borrowing this understanding of solidarity from the work of Alberto 
Moreiras, The Exhaustion of Difference: The Politics of Latin American Cultural Studies 
(Duke UP: Durham 2001). 
 
5 Here I am principally referring to Iván Carrasco Muñoz, “El antipoema de Parra: 
una escritora transgresora,” Nicanor Parra: Antes y después de Jesucristo, ed. Marlene 
Gottlieb (Princeton: Linden Lane, 1993) 115-129 and Federico Schopf, “La antipoesía y 
la vanguardia,” Nicanor Parra: Antes y después de Jesucristo, ed. Marlene Gottlieb 
(Princeton: Linden Lane, 1993) 131-184.  
 
6 This idea is strikingly similar to, and complemented by David Lloyd and Paul 
Thomas in Culture and the State (New York: Routledge, 1998) when in their analysis of 
the interpellative role played by the autonomous field of art in bourgeois society they 
assert that “Culture produces the consensual ground for the state form of representative 
democracy by drawing the formal or representative disposition in every individual out of 
each person’s concrete particularity” (14-5). Further, both supplement in turn, in my 
reading, the dual definitions of culture offered by Herbert Marcuse in “Affirmative 
Character of Culture”, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, Trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro 
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(Boston: Beacon, 1968) 88-133, originally published in German in 1937. He says of the 
“useful” definition that culture “signifies the totality of social life in a given situation, 
insofar as both the areas of ideational reproduction (culture in the narrower sense, the 
“spiritual world”) and of material reproduction (“civilization”) form a historically 
distinguishable and comprehensible unity” and in contrast that “[t]here is, however, 
another fairly widespread usage of the concept of culture, in which the spiritual world is 
lifted out of its social context, making culture a (false) collective noun and attributing 
(false) universality to it”, which he refers to as “affirmative culture” (94-5). While I 
hesitate to accept both of these definitions simultaneously and/or unqualifiedly, they, 
along with Bürger, are constantly in play in my discussion of culture and, more narrowly, 
art, throughout this work.  
 
7 This echoes what Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle (Detroit: Black and Red, 
1983), analyses with regards to the development of what he refers to as the spectacle. 
Debord says of (bourgeois) culture that “the entire vicious history of culture can be 
understood as the history of the revelation of its inadequacy, as a march toward its self-
suppression. Culture is the locus of the search for lost unity. In this search for unity, 
culture as a separate sphere is obliged to negate itself” (par. 180). Particularly relevant to 
this discussion of the tensions following the “demise” of the avant-garde, Debord asserts 
that “[i]n the case of representations, the critical self-destruction of society’s former 
common language confronts its artificial recomposition in the commodity spectacle, the 
illusory representation of the non-lived” (par. 185). 
 
8 In terms of understanding the meaning of a cultural crisis and the leveling of the 
grammatical and syntactical, or the rules and regularity, I refer here to Paul Virno, 
“Multitude: Between Innovation and Negation,” (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e) 2008) 
52-5 
 
9 In this sense, I agree with the general chronology that Federico Schopf refers to 
throughout his writings on Parra. 
 
10 All further citations from this text will be from the same edition of Poemas and 
antipoemas. 
 
11 I am thinking here, in particular, of the analysis of the role of the mother, and 
specifically the Virgin Mary, in art that partakes of Christian morality and society in the 
work of Julia Kristeva, “Stabat Mater”, Trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Poetics Today 6:1-2 
(1985) 133-52. 
 
12 I am referring here to León Rozitchner, Freud y los límites del individualismo 
burgués (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI 1988). 
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13 Parra’s demystification of the teacher compliments, interestingly, certain 
assertions of Lloyd and Thomas, ibid., regarding the pedagogical nature of culture (see: 
note 5) and the role of the school and the teacher. Of the school and the teacher they 
assert, “The school, in other words most effectively permits the transfer of the subject 
from the private domain of the family into the public world of the political, not by 
teaching civics but by representing representation” (20). Thus, Parra’s gesture takes on a 
further valence, that of undermining the classic institution of the bourgeois state’s drive 
towards representability.  
 
14 Here I think of the affirmations in the article Ivan Carrasco-Muñoz cited above 
and reflections by Parra in Leonidas Morales, “Conversaciones con Nicanor Parra,” 
Nicanor Parra: Antes y después de Jesucristo, ed. Marlene Gottlieb (Princeton: Linden 
Lane, 1993) 313-372. 
 
15 In fact, following the anaylsis of Victor Muñoz Cortés in Sin dios ni patrones: 
Historia, diversidad y conflictos del anarquismo en la región chilena (1890-1990) 
(Valparaíso: Mar y Tierra 2013), by the time that Parra gained prominence for his poetry 
and anarchic literary gestures, there was effectively no chilean anarchist movement to 
speak of, it having lost prominence after the government’s legal incorporation of labor 
concerns during the 30’s and more so with the concurrent rise of state centric, USSR 
allied communist movements. So, perhaps tragically, we may never be sure if he would 
have torched police cars, had there been a large movement inclined in this direction. 
 
16 In this sense, I must mark a difference with a recent champion of Poetry 
with(in) philosophy, Alain Badiou, who asserts in various places the manner in which 
Poetry names or can name such an ambiguous beginning. See, for example, Alain 
Badiou, Conditions, Trans. Steven Corcoran (New York: Continuum 2008).  
 
17 In reference to the general intellect as language and its role as common ground 
in relating to the hierarchical structure of rule of law see Paul Virno, A Grammar of the 
Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms-of-Life (Los Angeles, CA: 
Semiotext(e) 2003) 35-41 and Giorgio Agamben, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules 
and Form-of-Life,Trans. Adam Kotsko (Stanford: Stanford UP 2013), in particular Part 3 
of Chapter III.  
 
18 The most fully formulated articulation of a populist theory of hegemony can be 
found in Ernesto Laclau and Chanal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards 
a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso 1985) and with regards to the critique of 
the theory in the Latin American context see Jon Beasely-Murray, Posthegemony: 
Political Theory and Latin America (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota 2010).  
 
19 Javier Martínez and Alvaro Díaz, Chile: The Great Transformation (Geneva: 
UNRISD 1996). While this text is in many ways controversial, in that it asserts a certain 
81 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
necessary linkage of the nationalization and socialization projects of the two governments 
preceding the dictatorship to the neo-liberal “reforms” carried out during the latter, I feel 
that its analysis of the economic and political currents is indispensable for understanding 
the role of the Chilean state before, during, and after the dictatorship vis a vis the move 
towards neo-liberal, global economic policy. 
 
20 In thinking the general social crisis of the epic of Poemas y antipoemas, the 
reference is decided to the brief but suggestive thoughts of Gilles Deleuze in “Postscript 
on the Societies of Control”, October 59 (Winter, 1992) 3-7. If we follow the analysis in 
Muñoz Cortés (ibid.) we might find further support for the assertion of a general crisis, 
particularly for the anti-capitalist left and non-state centric groups, in his discussion of the 
military junta of the thirties and the way in which the legal incorporation of methods for 
allaying the concerns of workers and the chilling effects that this had on effective left 
organizing of all stripes, although he focuses particularly on anarchist thought. 
 
21 All further citations referencing Artefactos y Chistes para desorientar a la 
poesía are taken from the same anthology. 
 
22 While referencing here the class tensions that were present in Chile at the 
moment, it deserves mention that these can reasonably be conceived of as otherwise than 
the actual, presidential level power dynamics at stake in the coup. With regards to the 
cleavage between civil society and the political civil class as operative of a second level 
tension, beyond and supplementary to the material class conflict, in Chilean politics of 
the last two centuries and the manner in which it reproduces a single, albeit polyvocal, 
political ruling class, see Gabriel Salazar Vergara’s extensive work in La enervante 
levedad histórica de la clase política civil (Chile, 1900-1973) (Santiago: Penguin 
Random House, 2015).  
 
23 In referring here to a general strike in, and of, language against the violence of 
the state, I am thinking simultaneously of the discussion in Walter Benjamin, “Critique of 
Violence”, Reflections, Trans. Edmond Jephcott, Ed. Peter Demetz (New York: 
Schocken, 2007) 277-300; and Jacques Derrida’s elaboration of the theme that extends 
more explicitly the non-claimant gesture of positioning a protest beyond the language of 
the law, that is, the state, in "Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’", 
Trans. Mary Quaintance, Cardozo Law Review 11 (1989-90) 920-1045. 
 
24 My emphasis here falls decidedly on the progression after Castro’s Palabras a 
los intelectuales and the work of Desiderio Navarros, “In media Res Publicas: On 
Intellectuals and Social Criticism in the Cuban Public Sphere”, Trans. Alessandro 
Fornazzari and Desiderio Navarro (Nepanthia: Views from South 2.2 2001) 355-71.  
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25 My thinking about the duty to respond to a call and the secret is decidedly 
shaped here by Jacque Derrida, Pasiones, Trans. Horacio Pons (Madrid: Amorrortu 
2011). 
 
26 A number of anthologies recreate the original form of the artefactos, in as much 
as that is possible. See for instance, Poemas para combater la calvicie: antología, Ed. 
Julio Ortega (Santiago, Chile: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2013).  
 
27 The idea of the poet as a bricoleur is borrowed from Patricio Lerzundi, 
“Introducción,” Nicanor Parra: Antes y después de Jesucristo, ed. Marlene Gottlieb 
(Princeton: Linden Lane, 1993) 74. 
 
28 It is perhaps possible to read in to this assertion on the part of Virno a touch of 
Derrida’s analysis of Austin and, more generally, the speech act, particularly with regards 
to the written sign, of which Derrida points out “By the same token, a written sign carries 
with it a force of breaking with its context, that is, the set of presences which organize the 
moment of its inscription” (“Signature…” 217). Thus, in a certain reading, all written 
signs carry with them the trace of the joke, just as the joke partakes of writing and its play 
of differance. This will significantly inform my reading of Virno on this issue. 
 
29 Here I am relying on the exposition of the Freudian idea of shocks and their 
relation to the disruption of the conscious and the function of memory in the urban 
environment given in Walter Benjamin, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire”, Illuminations, 
Trans. Harry Zohn, Ed. Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken 1969) 155-200.  
 
30 Concerning the idea of kairós and its relation to the telling of jokes, I refer here 
to Paolo Virno, Multitude: Between Innovation and Negation (Los Angeles, CA: 
Semiotext(e) 2008) 87. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Endless Act(s) of Love:  
Juan Gelman and Sweetly Writing (for) What’s to Come 
 
Infinity, if there is one, is thus found rustling among the abandoned 
clothes and old stuff accidentally bequeathed by the dead- no one’s 
property anymore- the rags, recycled, that eventually, perhaps, get 
taken up by some other body, in some other movement, evanescent and 
alive. 
-Judith Butler, “Hegel’s Early Love” 
 
Assim façamos nossa vida um dia, 
Inscientes, Lídia, voluntariamente 
Que há noite antes e após 
O pouco que duramos. 
-Fernando Pessoa, “As rosas amo” 
 
 Gliding beneath love and revolution and death, recollection and survival, there is 
a duration and a faithfulness to, an infinity grasping out through and toward nothing. An 
act of passion that is a passion (re)enacted that, despite its object, if an object can be had, 
is both a past and a future that is not quite yet, a not quite present that propels us forward, 
in our recycled rags and life and awareness of death that never quite hits its mark. But it 
nonetheless leaves a mark which can be a model, traces of an act of faithfulness and a 
carrying inside of oneself that undoes both of its terms, inside and one self. Love, the first 
thing and the last, constant and constantly (re)created, a passion made by and making 
other passions. Revolutionary, filial, fraternal, erotic- love is the trace, and thus the 
model, beneath the other passions that constantly inscribe it there and move from and 
over it, in the single day, with night before and after, that we last.  
 Yet, with all that, I still haven’t said much of anything about love. Perhaps love 
does not belong to the I nor the realm of the thematizable; it is a sensual act that burns up 
in realization, without leaving the merest cinders to satisfy a concept. This idea underlies 
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much of the philosophical reflections on love: that love is an always incomplete action, 
constantly rehearsing itself, different from and yet bound to and binding its actors. But 
within that discourse, too often does the stress fall upon eros and its accoutrements such 
that, even metaphorically, the concept is bound strongly to a distinct index of passions.1 
Within the intimately related field of literary criticism, so often a space reflecting upon 
love due its object’s contingency upon it, the situation is entirely worse. We have very 
few, if any attempts, to tease other loves out and learn from them, preferring to let them 
lay in the realm of the completely sensuous. Ignoring the positive lessons of love is, 
perhaps, a mistake, as it often retains an ethical element or coexists intimately linked with 
one- and ethics lends itself intimately to the lesson. However, as love is always an act of 
faith(fulness), it resists any total conceptualization, makes its marks and moves on, 
leaving behind a question and a call to answer in its passion’s wake. So, my work will 
strive to tease out a lesson from traces of a revolutionary’s love left in his writing, to 
discover a model, a pedagogy of love, (im)proper though it may be. 
 Whereas in the prior chapter the focus was on a writing in solidarity as an a-
nominative index of the otherwise that escapes the political as determined knowable by 
the State’s law, here I wish to concentrate on the impulses and faith that drive such a 
gesture. If the unnamable space of a politics otherwise demands an impossible and 
forward-facing solidarity from even those not participant, it demands even more strongly 
from those that might occupy it, if only briefly, profoundly durable, imperturbable faith 
and love. I read in the poetry of Juan Gelman, so full of love and yet also melancholy, 
politics and loss, a framework for the faithful lover, the revolutionary. This work will 
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focus on his slim and striking volume Si dulcemente and how it births itself as an act of 
friendship-as-love, reenacted despite the beloved friends’ loss; an ethics of revolutionary 
love that lends itself and the remnants of the dead to learning how to carry on being 
faithful to love’s encounter, as one already many. This will require, principally, 
decoupling love from its erotic confines, allowing us to trace a process based on an 
ethical and non-proprietary experience that will form the core of a literary pedagogy of 
love. To approach this, I will read Emmanuel Levinas’s reflections on love from Totality 
and Infinity through the lens of Jacques Derrida’s The Politics of Friendship, using the 
latter to bring out from behind eros the former’s effaced loves, and so understand the love 
in friendship and the politics therein bound. Turning then to the work itself, I will trace a 
sensual experience through poetic language’s contortions, so proper to the work of 
Gelman. While within the Levinasian framework a work cannot be nor provoke an ethical 
encounter stricto sensu, in the improper sense of friendship-as-love writing is the place 
where love leaves its trace and begins its lessons.  
So, then, where?  
 Peering out from time to time throughout this chapter, there is a very material 
question to be addressed, initially here. It concerns the nature of the revolutionary actions 
that Gelman and the Montoneros were involved in, during which this love began to be; 
and further, the state of Gelman while writing this text- where and when, if not to 
presume a why. While a longer discussion of these other, silenced themes cannot here 
avail itself of the necessary space, I must insist on their being otherwise than the State, 
against it and beside it, and attempt to sketch out my reasons for this insistence. In a 
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similar vein as what Gareth Williams details in his analysis of the pueblo’s immanent, 
egalitarian nature overflowing the bounds of the sovereign and his1 exception- the ability 
to thematize the Other as Citizen within the law, what Levinas identifies as characterizing 
the State’s violence - loving as herein read supersedes all determinations of the State’s 
law.2 The action of loving inscribed in and by the text is a model for the constant 
redetermination of a just, extra-state sociality lived as a constant action of springing forth 
anew from language’s edge.3 This requires a longer fleshing out, a historicization, an 
embodiment, such that it might take up the abandoned clothes of the beloved and bear 
them forth beyond what the text teaches us to teach. I will attempt, for now, to situate the 
Montoneros and Gelman, and in doing so will highlight some major themes to follow.  
 As we are moving forward, and have already done so, we must confront the 
moments past from which we live as present. Perhaps the most intriguing way, in this 
case, is signaled in commentary on the supposed polemic between Gelman and Oscar del 
Barco, an Argentine philosopher and ex-militant in the Ejercito Revolucionario del 
Pueblo (ERP).4 Not wanting to revive nor prolong that debate, already well commented, 
it suffices to say that I find that del Barco fundamentally simplifies the Levinasian ethical 
imperative and essentializes the assumption of ethical responsibility, albeit for a 
legitimate reason, failing to allow for multifarious manifestations of ethical commitment. 
Further, demands that former militants acknowledge and assume responsibilities for their 
actions in the interest of “truth”, commonly citing del Barco poorly and further muddying 
ethical concerns in favor of epistemo-historicist ones, are based on a historical 
                                                 
1 Because it is usually a he, and the structural position of sovereign itself forces a masculine face out of any 
person who might assume it 
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misunderstanding as regards the Montoneros. They consistently and in the moment did 
just that- announcing their authorship and reasoning for the attacks, within their 
conception of politics and strategy (and, implicitly, ethics).5 But that little aside there, at 
the end, gives away the game- the imbrication of the ethical and the political in this 
debate, and how that allows us to approach it.6 In this debate concerning what may be 
fairly called an accusation of ethical failure, what is ignored and yet makes possible the 
accusations, is the concomitant political failure. Only insofar as they failed to re-found or 
escape from the State can accusations of a supposed ethical failure be leveled. The State, 
any state, will have always already intervened in an encounter with its functionaries (the 
predominant Montonero target, at least initially) by masking their face with a uniform or 
title- an intervention which suspends a decision on the possibility of a properly ethical 
encounter with said functionary whenever the encounter occurs in the context of a 
challenge to the State’s order. 
 More precisely: despite their material situation and potential, the Montoneros’ 
failure to pursue a consistent, univocal political agenda (wherein politics comprehends 
the State as a central referent for hegemonic articulations of power) permitted prior 
repressive and ideological structures to persist, grounding accusations of ethical failure. 
Yet, this is also what makes them most interesting to me. They maintain a surprisingly 
ambivalent relationship to the State and its politics, and they have a unique position vis a 
vis the State and what occurs otherwise. This may seem an incongruent statement to 
make concerning a militant Peronist organization, so it requires some clarification. 
Carlos Altamirano lends us a first sense of the issue- as he says, the Montoneros 
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established a Schmittian distinction of absolute hostility, “Peronism versus anti-
Peronism”, at the same time that they maintained a secularized vision of the socialist 
revolution as eschatological telos.7 Thus, one might assume that they were over-
determined by the Political writ large, such that they manifested two seemingly distinct 
projects articulated together. But others would say it in another way- the always prickly 
León Rozitchner states very plainly (much as he did for years) both that the revolutionary 
movements in Argentina were farcical and misguided and that Peronism as such lacked 
any meaningful political consistency. This succinctly undermines both of Altamirano’s 
assertions and brings to the fore later comments, wherein Altamirano foregrounds doubts 
about the Montonero leadership’s commitment to state-centric Peronist efforts.8 While 
my argumentation follows a different path, I think these two points are well placed beside 
one another- while Altamirano correctly presents the nature of their rhetoric, a nature that 
led some, such as Adolfo Gilly (who will return shortly) to see in them the future of 
Argentine left organizations, so too does Rozitchner correctly identify the group’s 
failings. But it is exactly this double failure- both as a state-centric Peronist group and as 
a revolutionary militancy- that interests us, as it situates the Montoneros at the limitrophe 
of the political as articulated in and by the State and permits us to index the moment and 
its failings.9 
 What do I mean by this assertion of a double failure and why do I make it? The 
latter before the former. As I have stated or insinuated, the logic of radical love I trace 
exceeds, and in doing so unveils, the bounds of hegemonic, state-centric politics and, 
therefore, must operate at and spring from politics’ limit, although it must fail to escape 
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in doing so (another failure, one which offers us an object to study). Their failure, though, 
is both double and deeply rooted in the specificity of the Argentine situation. Here 
Adolfo Gilly is revealing in his understanding of the political climate in Argentina and 
the Montoneros’ role. For him, the Argentine working class’s roots are horizontally 
extended throughout the social, as what he calls a “capillary social organization” and 
amongst which the Montoneros explicitly situated themselves. This he opposes to the 
Chilean situation, characterized by a general parliamentarianism and a strong electoral 
presence (something underlying much of the previous chapter’s commentary on the 
mainstream Chilean Left) (62-4 translation mine). This might complicate Rozitchner’s 
assertions, but I’d like, rather, to highlight how it reaffirms them while positioning the 
Montoneros otherwise than exclusively within the State (not, of course, to deny their 
extensive and routine involvement in the return of Perón and his early government). For a 
base, a source of legitimacy and an orienting point within the political milieu, they 
referred constantly to the people, to Peronism as a social movement and organization. In 
other words, while national, they set aside the preeminence of the -state half of nation-
state to focus on the necessity of positioning oneself alongside those that form a social 
movement’s true force. This was their first ‘political’ failure- a failure to derive their 
necessary organizing principle from the State as central referent for political organization. 
For as much as they did engage with and in state-centric politics, they consistently strove 
to ground themselves otherwise than within the letter of the law. 
 Gilly, in a phrase I’m fond of, refers to the form of social organization 
characterizing the Argentine left as the “sindicato real.” This encompasses “todo ese 
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tejido que va desde la sección y la fábrica, pasando por los delegados y las comisiones 
internas, hasta los dirigentes regionales y nacionales de cada categoría, unidos todos en 
una relación interior plena de contradicciones y choques pero integrando una misma 
realidad social indivisible” (58). The functioning that Gilly ascribes to the sindicato real, 
particularly as situated in the factory, the workplace and, moreover, the fabric of human 
socialization, signals the strong possibility of reframing this concept within the discourse 
of the multitude- particularly as regards the multitude’s work of love as both generative 
and cooperative, and achieved in militancy.10 But this is not to force the point of the 
multitude. Rather, it is to signal the key difference that both Gilly and the autonomists 
attribute to the sindicato real or the multitude- its distinction from the people or el 
pueblo, which for Gilly was absolutely essential insofar as the sindicato real’s “lived 
experience” separated it from and enjoined against simple inclusion within the people of 
the nation-state (66). The second failure of the Montoneros is this- as Gilly indicates, they 
operate within and manifest (internally) the (internal) logic of bourgeois social structures, 
which “es su cobertura y, al mismo tiempo, su debilidad” (64). They failed to 
meaningfully incorporate themselves to the lived experience determinate of the sindicato 
real and, despite seeking their grounding therein, were always already separated from it 
by an insuperable hiatus- much as their revolutionary leanings separated them from the 
State. Or, to use autonomist language, they were trapped within the bourgeois, 
individualist thought of the sovereign State and, therefore, failed to escape into the flux of 
the multitude. Their state politicking under the name Peronism, perhaps, refused to let 
them go beyond the confines of the national, the people. So, given this double failing, 
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they per force exist at a conceptual limitrophe, between and yet indexing both state 
politics and that that moves otherwise. But how in the world did this happen? 
 To unravel this history, because Gilly’s analysis focuses on the later history of the 
Montoneros and the Argentine moment of the late 60s and early 70s, Richard Gillespie’s 
Soldiers of Perón is crucial. As he argues, with extensive historical and politico-
economic substantiation, from as early as their transition away from origins in a 
nationalist, conservative-leaning catholic youth organization, the core of what became the 
Montoneros consistently displayed a disjunction from the country’s lived economic 
experience- that of the sindicato real. Because they drew from predominately middle-
class families in their organizing and formation, as opposed to the stronger roots of, say, 
the CGT in long-standing syndical organizations, they consistently (re)produced the 
hiatus between them and the class interests they claimed to espouse. Thus, even as they 
adopted bakuninist urban guerilla strategies, taught to them by Spanish expatriate 
Abraham Guillén, they lacked the meaningful horizontal support to situate themselves as 
participants in the sindicato real.11 Hence their rhetorical insistence on situating 
themselves alongside exactly those from whom they were infinitely distant- in need of 
radical justification, of grounding, they perpetually sought it within the sindicato real, 
despite being unable to bridge the experiential gap between them. Still, this clarifies the 
complications caused by their distancing from the State after Perón’s deceptive return 
and, as such, their first failure. 
 A sense of the second failure also dwells in the organization’s origins but does not 
seem as inevitable as it will in hindsight. Nonetheless, Juan Gasparini makes it apparent 
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that this internal bourgeois, hierarchical structure was a graver problem than even Gilly 
intuited. In his monograph Montoneros: Final de cuentas, in a chapter dedicated to 
militarism and its role in the Montonero commandants’ decision making, he leaves no 
room for equivocation- of those leaders he says “[z]ambullidos en el elitismo, nadan lejos 
de los millones” (131). He goes on to reinforce that the predominate issue at stake for the 
majority of later Montonero defectors was exactly the hierarchy and elitism distancing 
the organizational command chain from those on behalf of whom it claimed to be 
operating. As he details, despite their formation as a “sociedad paralela”, their 
dependence on and, in fact, preference for violent means made it such that they removed 
themselves from currents within the sindicato real that tended toward and clamored for 
peaceful democracy, just when those currents clamored most loudly- wherein “no admite 
disociación entre medios y fines” (196). By continuing to insist on violent guerilla tactics 
in a moment when the support was simply not present- mostly due, according to his 
testimonies, to decisions by the central Montonero leadership- they cemented their 
second failure: the lack of solidarity and generative cooperation, in mutual becoming, 
with the sindicato real that subtended and moved otherwise than the Argentine nation-
state’s sociality. Thus, in their development, the Montoneros as a militant organization, 
despite, or perhaps because of, their initial promise, irremediably situated themselves 
between the state and the multitude of the sindicato real, pushing against both yet never 
entirely embedded in either. Their rhetoric notwithstanding, their double failing is, in this 
understanding, exactly why they could produce a loving militant as capable of indexing, 
with the fullness demonstrated, the point at which he found himself. A failed point, yes, 
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but one from which it was possible to generate a new movement towards the to-come. So, 
before moving along with him, a brief note on his participation. 
 Any attempted discussion of Gelman would be unpardonably remiss to 
understand him as anything other than integral to several levels of the Montoneros, which 
is also a major thread in the debates around del Barco’s naming him. In fact, both 
Gillespie and Gasparini reserve an explicit place for him, both sympathizing with his 
efforts and setting him apart from the morally questionable leadership, and detail his 
work as a literal exemplar of the movement- particularly abroad, where he cultivated the 
internationalism that Gilly highlights as essential to a situated national revolutionary 
movement.12 Still, Gelman also split in one of the major moments of organizational 
decomposition, due explicitly to his rejection of the internal hierarchical organization, 
tendencies to espouse “la lucha armada pura”, and the manner in which these alienated 
the movement from the masses.13 This is all to say that, despite the del Barco debate, and 
despite, or because of, the Montoneros’ political failures, Gelman has always occupied an 
exemplary position in relation to them- indexing the just currents in the group that itself 
indexed the point at which the larger political ecosystem, dominated by an indeterminate, 
populist political tendency, ceased in effectiveness. The point where one begins to grasp 
at, although not attain, the ethico-politico being-with of the sindicato real, the multitude, 
the lived reality of the Argentine masses- howsoever you might call the (always already 
ethical and political) being determined otherwise than the bourgeois, authoritarian State’s 
totalizing law.14 Gelman retains the earlier promise that made possible the group’s 
meteoric rise, without succumbing to the a-strategic and indefensible violence that 
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characterized their twilight actions, nor some later, nigh inexplicable conciliatory 
tendencies.15 From this brief sketch of the organization and Gelman’s relation to it, we 
must return to the underlying question: what trace, what affect, what motivation and 
movement pervade Gelman’s work following the limitrophe militancy captured in the 
Montoneros’s double failure? What might we learn from his continuous writing, the 
endless worlding in his acts of language, the cooperation between friends and 
revolutionary comrades, otherwise than death? Love, it was always already love; it drives 
him, lights the traces of his pen, and lends itself to our learning. Where? When? Most 
importantly- how?  
Movement, before melancholy 
 Before love moves the act of writing, it moves within it, a theme that resounds in 
Gelman’s earliest works and perhaps contributes to its predominance within critical 
discussion of his oeuvre.16 Yet, even from this internal articulation, preempting its 
unfolding from the status of theme into the act of thematizing, love is at once tender 
caring, revolution and a vision of what (perhaps) will come; something otherwise than the 
horizons that yet determine the world wherein one loves. Thus, it’s worth reflecting, 
briefly, on the early sense of love in Gelman’s poetry, which may turn out to be less than 
irrelevant in its future doing. 
 As early as his second book, El juego en que andamos, collecting works from 
1957-58 and beginning of the shift away from his affiliation with the Argentine 
communist party, love and revolution are coupled.17 This is telling, not only given his 
involvement in revolutionary movements, but also his work’s later shifts towards a vision 
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of poetry, and writing in general, as integral to changing reality.18 We must tease out this 
link between love and the revolutionary act, if only to later ask to what end love acts 
revolutionarily, if it could even end. In the poem “Camaradas”, a sense of the revolution 
as entry into a more immediate reality encompasses an odd triad: pain, love and death. 
These comrades “Han sustituido el dolor por la certeza del dolor, / el amor, por la 
inocencia del amor, la muerte, / por la íntima amistad” (52).  There is an opening in 
revolution, a gesture towards the immediate limits of life lived through action. In place of 
certainty, the certain experience, in place of a vision of love, love, and tellingly, in place 
of friendship, death. Moreover, and this begins an ambivalent linkage that continues in 
his later works, a syntactical ambiguity engendered in enjambment links the last three 
terms- love, death and friendship. Friendship and thoughts of love are themselves set 
back, seen as states of peace and potential that, enacted, are effaced by actual loving, its 
certain uncertainty, and the death beyond friendship. Early on, he establishes a tension in 
which hang both the unspeakable act of love and the death that springs from acting out of 
friendship- a tension that nonetheless, or perhaps inevitably, opens toward the world. 
While it may yet stop, this tension contains a not yet- “Adónde, adónde, cuando la vida es 
ancha a / partir de ellos, a partir de sus brazos tendidos / hacia el mundo” (53).  
 From here this interlocking continues as a theme, notably in the later “Fábricas 
del amor”, a meditation on the night-covered creation of a beloved. Walking dark paths 
under the night sky the poet speaks to the beloved, “Yo te oficié, te recité” (58). Creating 
love is always an action, constantly re-doing itself, time and again; before the beloved 
speaks a word and after-words, after the ambiguity of the beloved’s many names. And at 
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the end, it can only finish in reality: “En realidad quiero decir: me haces andar contra la 
muerte” (60). Again, the act of loving, of creating love and the (be)loved by loving them, 
positions itself as forestalling death only insofar as it is a moving against. And both are 
characteristic of the comrades named by the prior poem, the revolutionary act’s 
anonymous face. Thematically, this interweaves love and revolution in their status as 
unstable acts; as a moving towards and through, and not that from which one sets out, not 
the thought of setting out but the having already gone. Yet further, in Gotán (1962), in 
speaking (of) Fidel Castro’s acts in the poem sequence “Cuba sí”, his actions and his 
heart unfolding like a revolutionary flag are “como un golpe de amor en la cara del miedo 
/ como un hombre que entra temblando en el amor” (89). Again, and again, love and 
entering into the act of love are interwoven with leaving behind stable friendship to re-do 
being in the constant, boundless flux of revolutionary struggle, death and pain. But only 
later does the theme of love fully unfold, in the 1968 text Traducciones II: Los poemas de 
Yamanokuchi Ando, in which, by destabilizing its set perspectives, Gelman dislocates 
himself within poetic language and pushes past a given state language’s boundaries, 
undermining his earlier work’s lyricism.19 Love as a theme is pushed to its breaking 
point, past the limit of the written page, to blaze a path forward into the world. In the fifth 
poem of the sequence of “translations” this cleavage is clearest and, so, the poem 
demands extensive citation 
    si tanta luz o intensidad de amor 
    no pertenece o cabe aquí o necesita 
    otro mundo ¿cuál es la realidad? 
    ¿la ausencia de piedras veloces como el mar o voces 
 
    que vendrán tiernas? ¿o esta es: 
97 
 
    amor que se cumple como 
    fuego que todo alumbra dudándolo?  
    ¿y cuál será la vida que se dan 
    realidad y amor tristes 
    por negación vergüenza o furia? 
    ¿o no se tocan jamás? 
    ¿o insoportables se tocan para 
    envenenarse y quisieran 
    la una en el otro cambiar y 
    de nuevo empezar 
    a ver qué pasa ya sabios?  
    (254-5 italics mine) 
 
In the intimate coupling that predominated between love and reality, a hiatus begins to 
open, forcing a reevaluation of the real state of love, its actions and the life it brings. That 
is, it shifts to a realm written and at odds with reality, a world of action determined by 
acting. Love shifts from the act as theme to the act of thematizing, that which impels 
itself forward as action and makes that action an act of love. Still, it is not revealed by 
opening toward the world; it conceals itself in its uncovering, remaining a passion behind 
those it sends off in(to) the word. What is love? Rather, how is love? 
A Vision, an Act 
 If, in a cleaving that spans and undermines time within love, such that love’s acts 
are always different, love begins to motivate writing as much as, or more than, it is 
thematized within it, how does one read this? How is love done and, in reading after 
acting, re-done? This problematic begins to become clear in an article by Kate Jenckes, 
“Juan Gelman’s Open Letters: Mourning and Mundo beyond Militancy.” She sets herself 
a dual task in the piece. She simultaneously confronts accusations, based on del Barco’s 
subtly misguided reading of Levinas, that Gelman is an exemplar of unethical mid-
twentieth century militants and, also, readings (in the article, by Ben Bollig) that, while 
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not repeating the ethical claims, make him a “melancholic militant” that cannot let go of 
the past.20 Based in an excellent reading of his oeuvre, she says that “Gelman’s poetic 
project is dedicated to the possibility of rethinking politics as an exposure to what may 
come, beyond ideals, identity, or calculation” (157). Assembling an understanding of 
Derrida’s view of positive mourning, she centers on how the act of mourning is such that 
“[t]he aporia of mourning invokes a kind of taking in of something that cannot be taken 
(insemination as dissemination, if you will)” to highlight how “a holding close that is also 
an exposure to the unassimilable nature of the other involves an experience of the past 
that will always exceed our attempts to remember or represent it, and of the future as the 
ever-present possibility of an event, the irrepressible fact that things happen” (159). 
Parting from this taking in of the other as an excessive overflowing of horizons of 
presence, signaling a futurity hidden in his supposed melancholic nostalgia, she analyzes 
his Carta abierta, an incredibly difficult book addressed to his disappeared son- an 
address that doubles the impossibility of any arrival by obviating the question of the 
supposed addressee.  
 She signals that “[f]or Gelman, as for Derrida and Celan, poetry- far from being a 
machine of redemption- is a reminder of the ongoing nature of survival and world, 
irreducibly divided by time and inscribed by the possibility of what is to come, which can 
arrive from both past and future.” She then ends on an open note, a wound signaling a 
wound- “Gelman compares poetry and survival with love. Their impossibility, 
paradoxically, is the condition of their very possibility: love, poetry and life itself are not 
instruments of production, bringing the possible into the actual, but, […] are open to the 
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possible, come what may” (18;19). In this final linkage, Jenckes signals the same 
tendency I have traced- locating love at the level of poetry, concomitant and motivating, 
an echo of its own echo, a reflection of a mirror set before its merely thematic expression 
within the work itself. Differently and yet coinciding with my reading, love is positioned 
as a force logically anterior to the actual, positively melancholic work that unfolds in 
writing poetry- in a sense, a potential for actual passions.21 Yet, it is also here that her 
framework undoes itself, positing a revolutionary poetic project dissociated from said 
revolutionary’s understanding of love’s force. In Gelman’s words, she treats only love’s 
innocence- the potential, the pre-revolutionary-, and not love itself- the action, the 
unfolding that led to its own escape from the word toward the page, (un)expressing itself 
as being inexpressible, constantly re-presented. Jenckes, privileging the metaphor of 
pregnancy, an apt one to be sure, stops her analysis at the carrying with in opening 
towards the world, focusing on what Gelman’s poetry carries, with an eye toward the 
future. Yet, Gelman consistently associates love with action, as I have shown, and as 
astute an analysis as this article offers, insofar as it does not carry with it the action of 
love, only what love potentiates, it excludes something essential to Gelman’s project 
(without, of course, erring at all). So, the question reasserts itself: how is love? Jenckes’s 
analysis, as sharp a blade as any, hesitates before that cut- but it does give a sense of the 
target. 
 Perhaps this has much to do with her suturing of Derrida and Gelman; perhaps a 
turn to Levinas will lend a hand in loosening these ties. The love behind Carta abierta is, 
as evinced by the poems’ addressee as well as Jenckes’s focus on the pregnancy 
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metaphor, always a filial love, which can only end in an asocial centering of the poet’s 
(unbounded) ipseity folding back on itself. The blurred boundaries of filial love in 
Levinas are such that “[t]he I owes its unicity as an I to the paternal Eros. The father does 
not simply cause the son. To be one’s son means to be I in one’s son, to be substantially 
in him, yet without being maintained there in identity” (278-9). Further, Levinas signals 
that “[t]he paternal Eros first invests the unicity of the son; his I qua filial commences not 
in enjoyment but in election. He is unique for himself because he is unique for his father. 
This is precisely why he can, as a child, not exist ‘on his own’” (279). The book’s 
motivating love is thus folded over upon itself, and yet ruptured by passions that predate 
the loss. The ideal loving relationship, between the child as Other-that-is-you and 
simultaneously absolutely other, is also to be in the child, to see extended beyond 
yourself your self, to be given infinity in the Other that is radically separate from you and 
also the face before which you are infinitely responsible. And so, following Jenckes, in 
mourning, in taking in something of the other and thus making possible an opening to the 
to come, the father further takes in a part of himself that was cast out and taken in by the 
son-as-absolutely Other. There is, then, a snapping back of an impossible fragment of his 
ipseity hidden in the taking in of the Other that reintroduces the I to itself, in the Other’s 
guise. That is, if the Other also carries you within them, by taking them in you also take 
(back) in a part of yourself, dis-guised in that Other. Thus, the motivating love inscribes a 
fundamentally egoistic loss, that of one’s futurity in the child-as-Other, and signals a, 
partial or temporary, return to interiority’s bathing in the il y á. There the I lives from… 
without the introduction of exteriority, that is, the ethical encounter, as, for Levinas, “the 
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element [the “there is” (il y á)] separates us from the infinite” (132). Death, in Gelman’s 
case of the son, would not be the loss of or doing away with this particular love- rather, 
the love is frustrated in its projection on to/ward a material(ity), in the son, and this 
impedes its being carried forward.  
Facing death, the poet’s will produces a work of labor within the element, as “[t]o 
will is to forestall danger. To conceive of the future is to fore-stall. To labor is to delay its 
expiration” (Levinas 166). As Levinas explains of labor, it is an attempting to possess, as 
“[p]ossession removes beings from change” (160)- a carrying on of the poet’s future as 
the doubly undeliverable writing of filial love that removes it from change. While true of 
all works- to which I will return- in this instance, the play of the self re-sounds the loss of 
itself as future, and precludes for this love, which would be an opening to the world, that 
it have a social aspect. Carta abierta ceases to be political as such, cleaving to the 
Derridean reading of mourning without undoing its own radical interiority, the fault of 
the lost object; again, the son. Yet, love still hides behind this writing and it seems that, 
allowing a different Derrida to guide us, it may yet appear. Although, it now falls to me 
to clarify this term I’ve danced around, before (re)socializing it. 
Love, or rather loving, is, as we have seen time and again until now, an action 
always underway, directed towards the to come, characterized by a faithfulness and a 
constant demand for (re)doing. Loving is, further, marked by the traces of a strong ethical 
force that determines the responsibilities between those that love one another- lovers, 
family, friends. Levinas’s thought sounds a call to love’s action, as opposed to the 
innocence of love that Gelman places before the act and, read through the deconstructive 
102 
 
lens that has been one of my work’s themes, this provides the most fruitful understanding 
of the term. For Levinas, love partakes of the same nature as the face-to-face encounter, 
which is to say all relationships with the absolutely Other. And yet, it goes further, 
beyond the other and towards a future, completely undetermined- “through the face filters 
the obscure light coming from beyond the face, from what is not yet, from a future never 
future enough, more remote than the possible” (254-5). For Levinas, “to love is to fear for 
another, to come to the assistance of his frailty. In this frailty as in the dawn rises the 
Loved, who is the Beloved” such that in the encounter with the beloved “[t]he essentially 
hidden throws itself toward the light, without becoming signification. Not nothingness- 
but what is not yet” (256 emphasis in original). His reading characterizes love by a 
constant sensual grasping at the secret beyond the face of the other that is exposed and, 
by its exposure, concealed; the secret, the interiority of an other expressible only in the 
impossibility of its present expression. Loving is, or seems, in many ways, a relationship 
of constant hoping or grasping for some fixity of the other’s subjectivity, understood as 
their infinitely unknowable alterity. A figure best thought as the inefficacious hand, the 
metonymic figure par excellence for the act of taking possession, in this case constantly 
grasping at a secret yet to arrive and impossible to unveil in exteriority, which is the force 
and marking of its veiling. Nonetheless, Levinas draws a fine line between love and 
friendship. If love is always “the love of the love of the other”, then “love accordingly 
does not represent a particular case of friendship. Love and friendship are not only felt 
differently; their correlative differs: friendship goes unto the Other; love seeks what does 
not have the structure of an existent, the infinitely future, what is to be engendered” (266 
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emphasis mine). Derrida and The Politics of Friendship may aid us in understanding the 
untenable drawing of this line. 
The disjunction between the two otherwise similar thinkers is immediately 
apparent in Levinas’s assumption of the essential, preexistent stability of the I and the 
Other as operative in his formulation of the encounter. And in a rare moment of direct 
address, in his essay on Levinas’s thought, “Metaphysics and Violence”, Derrida states 
just that- “[i]n order to reject the Kierkegaardian notion of a subjective existence Levinas 
should eliminate even the notions of an essence and a truth of subjective existence (of the 
Ego, and primarily the Ego of the Other)” (W&D 110). Which is exactly the dividing line 
drawn between friendship and love- by not presuming the existence of the Ego, the other 
and the one, and the one’s desire to reproduce itself as accomplished only in sexual 
reproduction, the distinction between correlatives tumbles before the impossibility of the 
arrival at the friend of the address by the friend. The experiences of friendship and of 
love become nigh indistinguishable. So, Derrida’s friendship allows me to extend my 
thought of love, reminiscent of Levinas, into the realm of the friend, the enemy, the 
political.  
Walking a single path through Derrida’s body of works is a task that undoes itself 
but allow that I follow the trace of one within many. That is, that “friendship consists in 
loving, does it not; it is a way of loving, of course. Consequence, implication: it is 
therefore an act before being a situation, rather the act of loving, before being the state of 
being loved. An action before a passion” such that “well, it is to love before being loved” 
(PoF 8 emphasis mine). We see here a path, a double sense of friendship as loving that 
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posits love as an action, as a matter of course, and then further as an action that cannot 
know its correlative, being as yet undecided. A simple corrective to the Levinasian 
formula and yet, one that forces its radical conclusions- in friendship you are constantly 
loving for the future, over a gap that can never be bridged, without any sure signs of love 
on the other side. Acting thus, one tries endlessly to bring the action to an end, bring an 
end to the action, bring forward the event’s culmination in what Derrida calls a 
teleiopoetic act- asking that they come, in the future. Its doing marks an “anchoritic 
community of those who love in separation” for whom “[t]his is not all they love, but 
they love; they love lovence, they love to love- in love or in friendship- providing there is 
this withdrawal” (PoF 35). They do not presume to possess, to contain or grasp entirely 
the friend or the certainty that love is reciprocated, and so they do not love the love of the 
other but rather they love the other without need for a reply, without insisting on knowing 
them completely. A radical distillation of the responsibility arising in the face-to-face 
encounter with the other; the discourse breaks down before it can be given, always 
unsure, one loves them while grasping for a future in which perhaps you may know their 
pardon; one is infinitely responsible before the responsibility can even be recognized. 
Ideas which Levinas takes up later, in Otherwise than Being, having taken in Derrida’s 
comments, seriously.22 So “this friendship is a species of love, but of a love more loving 
than love” as it proposes no fusion: it is sheer value of proximity and action with its 
concomitant (im)possibility of reciprocation (PoF 64). And, well,  
[p]erhaps, one day, here or there, who knows, something may happen between 
two people in love, who would love each other lovingly […] in such a way that 
friendship, just once, perhaps, for the first time […] will become the correct 
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name, the right and just name for that which would then have taken place, the 
condition being that it take place between two… (PoF 66)  
 
… so, then, it misses the mark to say that nothing is engendered in friendship-as-loving, 
as it rather constantly carries itself to term, engendering itself as action, the act of loving. 
And in being a love of loving it pushes one to love yet more, many, an amount 
uncounted, breaching the political in the determination and taking on a pedagogical tint, 
as one always wishes to show how to love well, in the hopes that that teaching might 
return (to someone already gone). That pregnancy metaphor was not a casual slippage- I 
now return to Jenckes and the discussion of what one carries inside oneself. For Derrida, 
that is the core of the responsible decision in friendship, a giving in the moment “[w]here 
I am helpless, where I decide what I cannot fail to decide, freely, necessarily, receiving 
my very life from the heartbeat of the other” or, as Derrida refers to it, lovence (69). But 
one must avoid the filial trap here, where this occurs only in a relationship that produces 
the infinity of the I, and step away towards a social being-with, one in which all 
decisions, and friendships, are constantly made only by the other(s) in me that carry me 
in themselves and re-place a me with-in me- a realm of singularities coappearing and, in 
generative cooperation, engendered in and for the to-come.23 A co-existence in 
friendship-as-love needs to be brought forth- the action of loving the act of loving the 
friend constitutes one’s sense of loving, as well as those that are loved. The action of 
friendship-as-love establishes this strange sense of community, and of politics otherwise, 
constantly re-enacted with an eye towards the future, regardless of the friend’s absence or 
presence. For this project, returning to Gelman, the text that immediately follows Carta 
abierta is far more apt: Si dulcemente.  
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 An act that becomes a route, that traces a route through friendships by acting out 
of love; it is loving. As Julio Cortázar says, opening the book, “[u]n solo y único poema 
nace de todos ellos, el último ilumina el primero como el primero contiene el último, y 
cada uno es un paso en la continuidad de la ruta” (425). A continuing teleiopoetic gesture 
that seeks to bring loving (to) an end, an event in which Gelman might know his friends’ 
love, despite their death- it carries on with carrying out the act of living with the friends, 
loving them for what is not yet. Gelman re-invokes the perhaps that is lodged at the 
center of the act of loving the friend, my preferred political gesture, in which one is 
constantly living with while hoping for what’s to come, the event naming one a friend and 
not an enemy.24 The text enacts what Simon Critchley expresses as a unity in the 
temporality of friendship, “the (present) time of writing, the moment of iterability that 
writes for friendship, for the other (future) is provoked by an experience of loss (past). 
One writes here and now for the future of friendship by recalling the past” (258 emphasis 
mine). Thus, the act of Si dulcemente: the writing of friendship-as-love that I will trace 
within the play that Critchley here notes- the play of time and place, in and by writing.  
 Still, there must be a brief pause here, appended after the fact in order to begin, 
about whether a work can be called ethical, as this book is a work written by one. 
Levinas, keeping in mind the prior discussion, most succinctly responds to this. Of 
language and representation, he signals a dual movement- “[t]he hic et nunc itself [from 
which a word extracts a thing] issues from possession, in which the thing is grasped, and 
language, which designates it to the other, is a primordial dispossession, a first donation. 
The generality of the world institutes a common world” such that “[l]anguage does not 
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exteriorize a representation preexisting in me: it puts in common a world hitherto mine. 
Language effectuates the entry of things into a new ether in which they receive a name 
and become concepts” (174-5). Put plainly, speech offers up to the Other things we have 
taken into ourselves as concepts so that a common, which is to say social, world can be 
instituted in the play of thematization. Or as Cesare Casarino puts it, “To converse is to 
be in common, to produce the commons” (2).25 But it bears stressing that, 1) the 
instrument is language offered up to the other, in the face-to-face encounter and 2) the 
other, who overflows all horizons, cannot be possessed nor entirely contained within and 
by a concept. Any idea of the other ceases to be (the) other and, conferred, can only be an 
inadequate approximation. No writing offers up the other, only concepts of the other held 
by another. Further, concerning the act of the I in representation,  
[w]e have defined representation as a determination of the other by the same, 
without the same being determined by the other. This definition excluded 
representation from reciprocal relations, whose terms meet and limit one another. 
To represent to oneself that from which I live would be equivalent to remaining 
exterior to the elements in which I am steeped. (Levinas 170)  
 
No representation can ever make a concept of the I, which cannot be extracted from its 
interiority (even if there is no essential I, and that interiority is already bound to 
exteriorities equally bound, producing the recursive gesture of taking in- in that case, 
there would be nothing to extract and nowhere from which to extract it). And so, no work 
can re-present the author, the one who writes. There is no face-to-face encounter through 
a work, through writing, so there is no ethical responsibility engaged upon taking it up. 
Nonetheless, it is still motivated by the ethical encounter and, as such, offers as theme or 
concept the mode of responding to the other’s face and, as it here offers a loving 
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friendship with the other, allows that model to be taken in, to become substantive of a 
common (social) world. Love’s pedagogical nature springs forth, here- it instructs others 
in loving, offering them a model for loving for the future, being faithful to a love even 
after the beloved’s death. So, then, here and now, in Si dulcemente, we are given (how) to 
love our companions.  
There is a time… 
 From the text’s opening, from even before it opens, there is no hesitation as 
regards the state of the friends whom the text remembers- they are dead, their deaths are a 
thing of the past and are referred to as past. Even as the poetry addresses a tú, the text 
itself being a present of writing, the events with which it deals are those of the past: “si 
dulcemente por tu cabeza pasaban las olas // del que se tiró al mar/ ¿qué pasa con los 
hermanitos // que entierraron?/ ¿hojitas les crecen de los dedos?/ ¿arbolitos/ otoños // que 
los deshojan como mudos?/ en silencio” (453).26 The present is a time of growth from the 
dead, who have died, whose time has already passed and who are no longer alive, here 
and now. Nonetheless, the act of friendship-as-love that is writing, the space of friendship 
opened in writing, always contains that fact, that death, and pre-dicts it. There is, then, a 
continuing of love, the act of addressing oneself to the friend, grasping for a friendship 
yet to arrive; not a continued life of the friends, but a continuance of the act of loving the 
friend that precedes and impels all other passions that arise while writing a present 
perfect. Part and parcel of the act of loving (the friend)- “I could not love friendship 
without engaging myself, without feeling myself in advance engaged to love the other 
beyond death. Therefore, beyond life. I feel myself- and in advance, before any contract- 
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borne to love the dead other. I feel myself thus (borne to) love; it is thus that I feel myself 
(loving)” (Derrida PoF 12). A faithfulness to love so strong that, “[t]here is no reliable 
friendship without this faith […] without the confirmed steadfastness of this repeated act 
of faith” (PoF 15). And still, as we have seen, the event of friendship is yet to come (to a 
close), and as such the act of faith must be repeated constantly, beyond death and before 
the friend’s silence. Gelman writes, time and again, the act of faith to the love for the 
friend that pulses behind this poetry, that is the poetry, a constant acting out of faith in an 
event yet to arrive. An act reinforced, moreover, by the dead friends’ silence- in a 
paradoxical manner. Because “[f]riendship does not keep silence, it is preserved by 
silence” and yet “[f]riendship tells the truth- and this is always better left unknown” (PoF 
53). Friendship-as-love is always attempting to unearth the secret of the friend, bringing 
to the fore that to which one calls, toward which one grasps, across the abyss that 
infinitely separates and yet over which we intermingle.  
 In writing, the past might always seem to be made present and thus denied- as 
voices of the dead made present. But that will always be an equivocation. They are not 
the voices of others, only the thought of them thematized as voices in the poet’s work. 
Gelman does not fall into this trap- he maintains these memories in multiple tiempos, 
multiple tenses and times.27 From the beginning, “los hermanitos hablan de la vez // que 
estuvieron a dostres dedos de la muerte/ sonríen // recordando/ aquel alivio sienten 
todavía // como si no hubieran morido” and “ahora están hablando de cuando // operaron 
con suerte” (433). There is a constant tens-ion in this book- they speak now of what had 
been, as if what had been had never happened, as if they were still alive, as if they were 
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speaking. But only as if, only as the words written on the page, unearthed and thought 
anew in the poetry. The voices are suspended across the hyphen of tens-ion, as though 
they could still speak, and not be hung across the page bereft of any presence to speak of. 
They think the poet thinking them, “los compañeros // me piensan noche a noche/ dan 
vueltas // sin dormirse/ incómodos en sábanas // de tierra o agua donde están yéndose”, 
but they think laying un-thinking in earth and water, thinking the poet only insofar as the 
poet thinks them (434). He lives his love for them, re-acting the friendship endlessly, its 
being now disseminated across the page, and so “ard[e] del arder // que arden” (434). 
Always a play of time, the poet’s time now encompassing that that was once the time of 
his friends, the tens-ion in the many voices on the page faithful to love’s act. 
 This tens-ion spreads out on the pages in every direction, drawing together 
multiple articulations of time as language, pulling past and present together to thrust them 
toward the future. As the poet speaks of them, he speaks of what their past looked for in 
the future, repeating them as “matando a la derrota general/ compañeros // murieron/ 
dieron vida para que // nada siguiera como está” (445). Companions, who we already 
understand as committed to action, to the pain and love and imminent death of 
revolutionary action, who died to defeat, to undo, any totality of defeat- to spread 
themselves out in the minds of those to come, becoming a concept of the future. Their 
deaths, in a sense, were themselves acts of faith to friendship-as-love, love in 
revolutionary acts. A constant grasping for a to come within the loving community of 
(solitary) friends- thus, much as in dying, those that love as friends are not so alone, they 
can thematize those that they love and continue to love in time.28 In “dulce // recostación 
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como humillada vía donde todos // los compañeros apagaban dudísimas // como lo grande 
que del pueblo crece/ por fin/ // en la mitad del pueblo/ alzada el alma // revolucionaria 
como alta de Dios” (436). In death the friend snuffs out grand doubts, doubts of fealty as 
of the future, and becomes that of which one may write, that for love of which we act. 
Their deaths opened toward the future and the (re)writing of deaths is due to do the same, 
as those deaths were “como escribir en la alma de la noche // las gracias por la luz que 
recibiéramos/ // o amor al cuello quieto en respirar” (439). Held constantly in the tens-ion 
of the imperfect subjunctive, they are the wish for an unknown future in the past, re-
presented in writing as a wish unfulfilled and yet relevant- “se derramasen probando otra 
vez/ la // delicada pólvora del ser/ durísimo // equilibrio del vivemuere” (436). They 
become the “vivemuere”, that lives dying, the coming back to being but not as a being, 
not as living but within the living, time and again renewed within the act of faithfulness 
to love. All acts spurred by friendship-as-love contain a revival, a surviving, that does not 
pretend to bring life to the dead but instead survives in love for them, specters. The dead 
companions are “abrigando // pechos que tiraban del poncho de la Victoria para acá/ // 
para este lado/ los de los pobres que serán victoriosos un día”, in death holding to what 
lived in them of the others, that gave them life, and who will be victorious one day, to 
come, allowing the dead a taste of victory, as well (437). Loving struggles carry with 
them the social that was forged in the recursive intermingling of others within each 
Other; in the faithful act the taking in that enables the political decision is re-affirmed, 
despite, or rather because of, the beloved friends’ deaths.  
112 
 
 Then, and actually, by necessity, from out of the deaths of the poet’s beloved 
friends springs the possibility of any reaffirmation. Of them it can only be and is written 
that “sueñan soñados/ quietos/ // nunca verán los rostros donde crecen/ // asoman/ 
continuados/ a este sol” (441). Themselves, they have no future, torn from the eternal by 
death’s infinity- they have no faces to see and be seen. And yet, they grow behind the 
faces that will come; in death they are as ideas, possessed by and possessing as specters, 
that grow within and behind countless other faces- of the poet, of the readers, of 
comrades to come who will learn from and act a-new loving. The future of the past is 
behind those faces that carry it out and forward in their love, forestalling death. They will 
say together with others as the others speak, “alguna vez al sol de la justicia/ 
caminaremos”, as it is “amor donde los compañeros pueden ser”, love as when and where 
they can re-present themselves carried within the poet (441). These “compañeros 
moridos/ // tristes agrandan el amor/ // sentados en mi alma a dos sillitas”, continue their 
broken speech from within the poet, visible in the imperfections of his language. 
Fragments of others within him that carried him within themselves have returned him to 
him, in a cacophony of speech- “quejándose/ // o comparando/ hablando/ meditando/ 
evaluado/ // como cuando vivíamos/ luchábamos/ juntos” (442). The gerund, the doing, is 
active in the present as traces of the past, the product of joining what was once together 
with what is present in the writing, which will later be, itself, a once was. Love acts 
toward the future and thus is always re-starting, beginning a-new, from the deaths of 
comrades that behind the face of the poet, of us, “esperan que empecemos otra vez” and 
realize a rupture in the act of love and writing, a decision beyond the act (446).29 
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 As the text opens itself, explicitly, to hope and the future, this rupture is registered 
in the unfolding. As Cortázar signals opening the book, all the poems together form one 
poem, the last line of each becoming the first line of the following- with the exception of 
the last two, which both borrow only “esperan” as a title, playing off each other as a call 
and response. They break the continuous structure that interwove the future perfect and 
the present to point openly toward the future. The initial hope is composed of questions 
that undo any perceived fixity of belief in the actual continuance of an essential presence 
of the dead that may have arisen from the preceding poems, letting them lay there in 
death and gesturing toward a future opening. Thus, “pasás a paso de olvido/ calladita/ // 
no respondés a mis palabras/ tu // mejilla es luna no ofrecida/ beso // que los pasados días 
no besás/ // patria o peso del pecho/ corregís // tanta amargura/ bellezas del mundo/ // con 
ninguna te puedo comparar/ // sola/ abrazando a tantos compañeros” (447). A last kiss of 
an other gone, that slips towards forgetfulness’s infinite past- here likely the 
granddaughter he thought dead before birth. But not yet gone for good, there is still hope- 
“[f]or to love friendship, it is not enough to know how to bear the other in mourning; one 
must love the future” (Derrida PoF 29). Setting aside doubts, then, in the second poem of 
the same name, the obligatory response that can never truly respond to the first’s 
questions, calls and doubts, there is an open reaffirmation of the future more future than 
the word, “vamos a empezar la lucha otra vez/ el enemigo // está claro y vamos a empezar 
otra vez” that sees the poem, and the book, end “otra vez/ otra vez/ otra vez” (447). 
Undoing doubts, the time of the book, woven so carefully from a chorus of voices past, 
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present, dreaming of a future yet to be, promises to be the future again and again and 
again. 
…and a place… 
 And yet, and yet…this friendship-as-love was forged within and acts from a 
revolutionary passion, and every revolution in space must have a place, if it is not to be 
utopic- and Gelman’s revolutions were not, neither in writing nor fighting.30 However, 
the space of writing is suspended above the page. So, beyond time, we must also 
understand the spaces folded into his work- spaces of revolution(s) folded into the space 
of writing, disseminated as potential across the page, preempting writing and, in writing, 
pre-figuring revolutions that are not yet. Held within the work’s futurity is the hope of 
folding out into a new space, unfolding the page in an action learned from and as love’s 
action; being in life the same rupture as on the page. As the preface to the book, the poem 
that serves as epigraph and the poetry of Gelman itself attest to, the revolutionary 
struggle in Argentina is suspended over these pages, deferred in the deferral of presence 
effected by writing. Of the poet’s voice, shaded by countless specters, it becomes 
preoccupied and “ya caminando con la pies del mundo/ preguntaría // dónde los ríos de 
pasión de los compañeros // corren/ queman qué mar” (434). In this thematization, the 
action of loving the dead comrades realized by Gelman, the struggle itself is thematized 
and held as revolutionary potential to be disseminated into the other’s- sustaining the 
silent possessive, opening toward the others as part of the commons and into the other’s 
struggles, as a potential model to be realized in loving action.  
 The spaces folded into this book’s verses in many ways echo the interlinked triad 
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of temporal indicators, distinct and yet bleeding into one another in slippages unveiled by 
the loving that moves the friends between them. Death, writing and the future all occupy 
their own real and metaphorical spaces of (un)folding within the long act of being faithful 
to those that have, will have and will act within them. Death, then, hides beneath sea and 
stone, in beds of water and soil within which, as we have seen, the comrades speak in the 
poet’s speech. They are spaces anchored in the past, where “se tiró al mar” and where lay 
“los hermanitos // que entierraron”, that have relevance in the present insofar as they 
ground it, in the sense of the logically past, what must come before in order to speak now, 
as well as the chronological past, marked by the preterite tense of their inscription (433). 
And yet from them “empezó el misterio del mal olor/ // el mal olor subía de cenizas 
podridas/ // el mal olor cubrió a los compañeros como nube”, signaling interment’s space, 
the earth and the waters, as contested and, further, indicating the internal space of death- 
of the two enemies, the obvious external and the internal’s creation or discovery (437). 
Death resides inside, and “los // enemigos de adentro son difíciles de ver/ tienen // cara de 
compañeros/ son compañeros/ se equivocan/ algunos // tienen las cenizas podridas/ dan 
mal olor // sobreviven/ no sobreviven porque sí/ // los mejores cayeron/ y lo peor // es el 
pueblo callado” (437-8). Internal death is the space opened by failing to act faithfully, 
failing to continue in friendship-as-loving and going silent while the best fall. This death, 
different from the loving acted out in this poetry, is the forgetting, the letting die inside of 
the idea of those that carried each other in love, the death of the others you took in that 
returned to you part of yourself in them. Something that becomes one of the 
“paredísimas” circumscribing death’s house, the space from which those that continue 
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loving or should most demand your love are excluded. The space that forgets death, 
where “cerrás la puerta a huerfanitas // de dichas y victorias/ no servís/ // humeás por 
dentro oyendo disolverse // los companeros en el páis/ paisándose” (443).  
 Outside those walls, in writing’s space, is where the faithful lover dwells, where 
loving continues and death is held in suspension for the future. A space of “barrios de 
fuego // donde pasaba mi alma como voz // ya caminando con la pies del mundo” (434); 
space open to the world, of the world, where one recreates the common (social) world in 
the infinite responsibility before the other and in the act of (still) loving those who were 
loved. Where there is fire, there is pain but thus also action, love, and eventually, 
forestalled yet not forever, death. Writing’s space is death’s postponement, the act of the 
will which sets aside the end for enjoyment of the now, its pain and love notwithstanding, 
rather, constitutive of the space and the fire. Within the literal, physical pueblo we find 
the space of writing and love, along with the suffering before the violence of capital and 
the State; the space of the “sol // que se levanta a pura voluntad // sobre la pecho que 
desgarran cierres // como pobres del mundo/ a pie/ de pie/ // contra el negocio de acudir 
al mundo // solísimos/ ya ciegos/ de mirar” (436-7); the space of the pueblo’s collective 
will to move together and not alone. Here the lover’s soul walks amid the suffering of 
action, revolutionary and loving, and yet bears with(in) it the past, which is also the space 
of death, of dead companions “sentados en mi alma a dos sillitas” (442). So, the internal 
space of love’s act opposes through contestation the internal space of death, which it 
shares yet from which it differs, and it is in this contestation, as will be seen, that a space 
to come blooms. 
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 Much like the birds that only fly away in and from this work’s lines, the future 
casts itself forward from the chest of the poor, the pueblo, the poet; from inside, the space 
contested by death and writing and, in loving, opened towards the future. Overlapping the 
space of death, under ground, at the bottom of the country, it still breaks out in the future 
tense, as “el frío de los pobres que un día triunfarán/ cruje // en el fondo del país” (438). 
In the future, then, where time and space are conjugated together in faces where the dead 
grow, they will carry on unto the not yet the loving that laid the foundation for 
revolutionary passion. A space to come, where “al sol de la justicia/ // distribuidos/ altos/ 
pan que pana // la vida de vivir/ como niñitos/ // descubriendo el páis de la bondad” 
(441). Páis, peace and country together, accented within one word, a space yet to come 
that unfolds itself, as the yet to come (re)articulates the loving community folded onto the 
space of the page, the literal space of writing, and buried in the past behind the page, the 
memories bound to the loving act that carries this space forward.  
 Through articulating this final space, conjugating together the text’s other spaces 
and temporal plays, the problematic of the opening to the future world, acutely signaled 
by Jenckes’s reading of Carta abierta and carried through my own reading of Si 
dulcemente, fully unveils itself. For all that the text suspends revolutionary potential in an 
act of love that folds space and time into the present space of writing, it must nonetheless 
unfold itself anew in actions that take up the model of friendship-as-love articulated with 
this poetry. While we can trace the force of love that moves the poetry, itself the act of 
loving from within and beyond death, for the opening to the world to be actualized in a 
revolutionary practice it must be practiced by a coming community founded by loving 
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that, in producing new representations of space through ethical loving of others, also 
forges a new way of living space.31 The best a text may do is instruct its readers such that 
they more fully learn and teach in their face to face encounters within the commons, 
within exteriority; thus diminishing the war of existence and adopting their infinite 
responsibility before the Other. In this sense, it may guide others in realizing what 
Casarino refers to as a “surplus commons”- a non-teleological conception of a commons 
in language, action and affect that will always overflow any attempted incorporation by 
capital. A commons beyond value and capital, a love beyond possession and loss, a space 
and time come into being all at once that would facilitate a political reconceptualization 
of love as beyond measure, a way of being in common beyond the bounds of the State.32  
…to teach and be taught 
 I must briefly preface my attention to the work’s pedagogical slant- but this 
preface will allow me to open my own writing more to the avenir. For several reasons, 
although I will focus on a historical one. 
 My segue here has to do with this text’s historical moment and how it indexes a 
single experience of what I see as the affective tensions pervading the Argentine moment 
after the dictatorship’s fall allowed for more public, or rather common, reflections on the 
left’s recent failure(s).33 The hiatus between the initial writing of the text in 1984 and its 
more widely available (re)publication in 1994 encompasses the moment between the 
dictatorship’s end and the slow fruition of Menem’s neo-liberal policies- as it is 
simultaneously embedded in a failed (old) left milieu reflecting on the relatively recent 
past (exemplified, for instance, in the del Barco debate). Inscribed within it, in the death 
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that belongs to the comrades it recalls, is that left’s failure- yet, unavoidably and, I argue, 
distinct from other memories mired in failure, Gelman’s modelling of the continued 
action of love born in and from solidarity allows for a revolutionary continuance and 
becoming in the same gesture that it indexes the common scars of failure’s experience. 
Thus, he is doubly important as an auto-didactic pedagogical model- both for those that 
were and must continue, and for those that are and are becoming, those to come. His 
singularity offers itself in writing as an experiential nexus that facilitates a temporal 
junction in and from which revolutionary time may rejoin itself in the actions of 
multitudinous revolutionary subjects acting in common from an ethical striving toward 
and within love, as he models. I do not believe this gesture to be an accident, and so I 
insist we teach ourselves from and be taught by it.  
Returning to Levinas, we see that the encounter with the other is, in unfolding, 
one of teaching- a conversation that brings two in common. In his thought of it, “[t]his 
voice coming from another shore teaches transcendence itself. Teaching signifies the 
whole infinity of exteriority. And the whole infinity of exteriority is not first produced, to 
then teach: teaching is its very production” (171). Hinging a reading on the metaphor of 
the other shore might tempt us toward the river Styx, towards death as instruction- but 
nothing could be more of an error. For all that the text may collapse time and space into 
writing to later bloom, at once, into a new mode of (revolutionary) life, it cannot 
reproduce the processual face-to-face experience Levinas here describes. Sweetly, it 
bears the marks of lessons learned, and allows itself to be made a lesson, but always as 
prior to and only realized in the student-reader’s encounters with the other- a potential 
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realized in, as well as presupposed by, the ethical encounter of subjects-to-come 
(re)producing life otherwise than the terms of global capital.  
Teaching is a force immanent to that encounter that does not allow itself to be 
transposed; although, as a mo(ve)ment in love, its traces may be laid down in a text- as in 
Gelman’s. Teaching is the anti-hierarchical force that manifests in the other face, in 
which “[h]is alterity is manifested in a mastery that does not conquer, but teaches. 
Teaching is not a species of a genus called domination, a hegemony at work within a 
totality, but is the presence of infinity breaking the closed circle of totality” (Levinas 
171). But I approach this topic cautiously because, as established, this work itself is no 
encounter with Gelman, nor the dead he carries. Rather, insofar as the re-socialized text 
partakes of social tools- language as general intellect within the common-, it traces forces 
and modes that persist in a love of an un-incorporable surplus of life overflowing the law, 
moving otherwise than the State’s language.34 This then is where the work’s paradoxical 
instructing but not teaching arises. Being only a thematization of that which articulates 
itself through it- a revolutionary teaching/learning through friendship-as-love-, even as a 
concept of the other that the other spills out of infinitely, it cannot reproduce through 
representation the experience of the face which is teaching’s present in the ethical sense.  
And yet, the loving action that is and motivates this work cuts through this aporia, 
in a way. Or rather, it offers up the blade which may time and again be re-taken in order 
to make that cut, that decision, the political act in its purest movement, which will always 
and can only be taken up beyond the text. Traces of lessons given and received proffer an 
auto-didact’s pedagogy of love, modeling action such that one may learn to act in 
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accordance with the love, faithfulness, reality and timelessness composing this loving 
text. Such that one may learn to act sweetly in a common world where each one, 
unbounded in the differential binding to others that composes the deferred I’s sociality, 
may ask “I am I and chosen one, but where can I be chosen, if not from among other 
chosen ones, among equals?” (Levinas 279). In the anarchic state of equality that 
subtends and constantly overflows the State’s repressive violence, and its totalizing 
imaginary, one becomes amongst equals “a subject of being not by assuming being but in 
enjoying happiness, by the interiorization of enjoyment which is also an [affective] 
exaltation, an ‘above being’” (Levinas 119). Acting sweetly is the action of loving those 
beside you, making friends and living with them, teaching them and being taught, 
constantly reaffirming the friendship-as-love affirmed in living, beyond time and death, 
in the multiple spaces of life, death and the future. The very schema modelled in the 
loving poetry of Si dulcemente, to be taken up anew, as new, along with the relational 
revolution that preceded the book and will follow it, beyond it, in a new way of teaching 
and being taught. Here we have the teleiopoetic statement that reaches out to us and 
through which, through loving, we reach out toward the consummated event of friendship 
in which Derrida says one way, and Gelman differently, you  
…feel responsible towards them (the new thinkers who are coming), therefore 
responsible before us who announce them, therefore towards us who are already 
what we are announcing and who must watch over that very thing, therefore 
towards and before you whom I call to join us, before and towards me who 
understands all this and who is before it all: me, them, us, you, etc. (PoF 39) 
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Endnotes
                                                 
1 Of recently works, I am thinking here of Alain Badiou’s In Praise of Love, 
Trans. Peter Bush (New York: New, 2012), which continued with his project of 
positioning love in relation to the Lacanian discourse on desire, which he most clearly 
establishes in his earlier work, Conditions, Trans. Steven Corcoran (New York, NY: 
Continuum 2008). The work of Antonio Negri offers us a potential escape from this 
shortcoming but, as we will see later in this chapter and in the following, has deep flaws 
to be worked through. 
 
2 Williams analyses this scene of Pedro Páramo in the first chapter of his book 
The Mexican Exception (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2011).  
 
3 Concerning the relationship between language, the law and justice, I here think 
of Derrida’s “The Force of Law”, Trad. Mary Quaintance, Cardozo Law Review (1989-
90 11) 920-1045. 
 
4 Del Barco’s letter may be found archived at 
https://lectoresdeheidegger.wordpress.com/2011/09/22/oscar-del-barco-no-mataras-carta-
a-schmucler/ 
 
5 An example of this reasoning can be found in the article (and the general 
discussion engaged therein) by Ceferino Reato, “Gelman- ni dos demonios, ni ángeles y 
demonios”, La nación, 20 January 2014, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1656847-gelman-
ni-dos-demonios-ni-angeles-y-demonios  
 
6 For an excellent exposition of this imbrication, upon which I am leaning heavily 
here, see Patrick Dove, “Memory Between Politics and Ethics: del Barco’s letter”, 
Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies (2008 17:3) 279-97. 
 
7 See Carlos Altamirano, Peronismo y cultura de izquierda (Buenos Aires: Temas 
Grupo, 2001) 128-30.   
 
8 As concerns the comments by Rozitchner, see his interview in La izquierda en 
Argentina, ed. Javier Trímboli (Buenos Aires: Manantial, 1998) 181-220. For 
Altamirano’s discussion of the masks of the montonero leadership, see: ibid. 137-42. 
 
9 In this sense, the Montoneros find themselves, singularly and plurally, despite 
dramatic lived differences in their actions, absorbed in the same epistemological 
impossibility and ethico-political immanence I highlight in Parra’s writing during the 
80’s, in the previous chapter.  
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10 As regards the rigorous thought of the multitude as articulated in and through 
love, see Antonio Negri, Time for Revolution, trans. Matteo Mandarini (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2013) pp. 211-4. Concerning militancy and love, see pp. 218-20. 
  
11 As regards the economic disjuncture and catholic roots of the Montoneros, the 
first chapter of Gillespie’s work does an impeccable job of detailing the exact 
fluctuations occurring in Argentina after the initial ousting of Perón. For his commentary 
on the tensions with the working classes underlying and caused by recruitment from the 
disillusioned bourgeoisie and the shift to an anarchist strategy, see pp.76-80.   
 
12 Concerning references to his role within the organization see Gillespie p. 255 
and Gasparini p. 158. For Gilly’s take on the necessity of internationalism, in line with 
scolding non-argentine left organizations for writing off the Montoneros, see pp. 69-70.  
 
13 As regards his anti-heirarchical stance see Gillespie p. 266. Concerning his pro-
masses and anti-militarism stances, see Gasparini p. 180.  
 
14 This “being-with” is very much a reference the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, Being 
Singular Plural, Trans. Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O’Byrne (Stanford: Stanford 
UP, 200). The middle ground that Nancy establishes through his elaboration of being 
singular plural, the being-with as ontologically originary in the simultaneity of 
coappearing singularites, will serve as a conceptual bridge between deconstructive ethics 
and autonomist politics, with an eye towards announcing an anarchist reading of the 
(dis)juncture, principally in the following chapter. For now, it serves to make explicit the 
reference. 
 
15 Here a point that Gillespie and, to a lesser extent, Gasparini are insistent on 
deserves reiteration- at no point should it be understood that there is an equivalence being 
suggested between state terror and the strategic guerilla violence of militants (a claim, 
perhaps wrongly, often made of del Barco, et al.’s critique). Whereas the state’s violence 
was indiscriminate and meant to sow chaos, instability, distrust- in short, mindless terror- 
amongst the population, the so-called “terrorism” (even the later, less discriminate acts) 
of the militants was rooted in a strategy with an eye towards de-capacitating the 
apparatuses of state terror and the bourgeois capitalist order. Even in their lowest 
moments of harming civilians, the militants were fundamentally directing their attacks at 
singular manifestations of a violent being determined by the interests of the dictatorial 
capitalist state, and always made that explicit. As concerns the conciliatory acts of 
lingering Montoneros, Gilly’s commentary on the War of the Malvinas is illuminating. 
See ibid. pp. 71-83.   
 
16 What strikes me as one of the most fascinating, explicit treatments of an 
ontological value of love in Gelman’s work, cleaving close to my reading and yet at 
many points infinitely distant, can be found in the article by Geneviève Fabry, “Palabra 
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testimonial y valor ontológico del amor en los últimos poemarios de Juan Gelman,” 
Memorias en tinta: Ensayos sobre la representación de la violencia política en 
Argentina, Chile y Perú, ed. Lucero de Vivanco Roca Rey (Santiago de Chile: U Alberto 
Hurtado P, 2013) 149-163. 
 
17 For a brief but precise chronology of Gelman’s life, see: Miguel Angel 
Dalmaroni, “Juan Gelman : Cronología 1930-2000”, Orbis Tertius (2001 4.8).  
 
18 Concerning this poetic mission, see: Víctor Rodríguez Núñez, "Relaciones y 
Hechos De Juan Gelman: ‘Disparos de la Belleza Incesante’", Revista 
Iberoamericana (2001 67.194) 145-59. 
 
19 On the ways in which Gelman’s play of language and “translation” situates him 
as speaking beyond the bounds of a state, see: Miguel Ángel Dalmaroni, “Juan Gelman: 
Del poeta-legislador a una lengua sin estado”, Orbis Tertius, (2001 4.8). 
 
20 Derrida succinctly addresses this particular misreading of Levinas in his article 
“Violence and Metaphysics”, Writing and Difference, Trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: U of 
Chicago, 1978) when he reminds us that, “It is true that Ethics, in Levinas’s sense, is an 
Ethics without law and without concept, which maintains its non-violent purity only 
before being determined as concepts and laws. This is not an objection: let us not forget 
that Levinas does no seek to propose laws or moral rules, does not seek to determine a 
morality, but rather the essence of the ethical relation in general” (111). 
 
21 Concerning the logical relationship that obtains between potential and actuality, 
and the manner in which the actualization of a potential is cast backward into a point of 
logical precedence that facilitates the production of chronological temporality, Paolo 
Virno’s text Déjà Vu and the End of History, Trans. David Broder (New York, NY: 
Verso 2015), is illuminating.  
 
22 Levinas adjusts his stance in Otherwise than Being, Trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne UP 1998), such that one is responsible even before the face to 
face encounter with the other- this understanding, however, while informing our reading 
of his earlier works, goes beyond the scope of this essay.  
  
23 Here, as previously insinuated, I am relying on a presumptively feasible fusion, 
despite and against complaint on the part of some, of the autonomist view of the living 
labor of love in Negri and the ethical experience of being as being for the other in Derrida 
and Levinas, fused with a linkage through Nancy. While I will later flesh out this 
reasoning, I would like to here insist strongly on the necessary maintenance of a rigorous 
thinking of the ethical experience of the singularity as requiring this inter-singular 
coming to ipseity. I think it resolves one of the less productive aporias of Negri’s thought 
by allowing for experience as not overdetermined by his theorizing of the common. 
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24 Derrida explores this tension throughout the text of The Politics of Friendship, 
Trans. George Collins (New York: Verso 2005). Here I am thinking primarily of pp. 19-
23, 58-9 and 70-2. 
 
25 The invocation here of Casarino, and by extension Antonio Negri, in reference 
to their joint work in praise of the commons (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota 2008), is by 
no means simply fortuitous. Their explication of the concept of the commons at play 
principally in Negri’s work, but also that of various Italian autonomist thinkers, heavily 
informs the political (under)tones of this chapter and will play a large role in the 
following. While it will not enter strongly into play within this chapter, it serves us to 
mark the specter of its importance. 
 
26 From this point, hereafter I will be using the // to indicate line breaks, in order 
to maintain Gelman’s use of the / in the text. 
 
27 Elsa Crites, "Gelman: Endurance, Despair and Love", Bulletin of Hispanic 
Studies (2005 82.4) 491-500, explores this maintenance of multiple diachronic moments 
in a thorough fashion. 
 
28 Here it is worth asserting that this does not come to form a thematic economy of 
sacrifice, as described in reference to “dying for” by Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, 
Trans. David Willis (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1995), principally on pp. 40-6. I say this 
because, distinct from dying for the writing, these deaths could at best be economized 
within the internal logic of militarism, which we’ve seen to be doubly inscribed by 
failure, and itself extinct. Moreover, in thematizing, due to love or otherwise, as I’ve 
already discussed, there is no true possession of the other, even in their death- rather, 
what is (re)produced in language is the frozen concept of the other, and therefore also of 
their (uncountable) death. The logic of loving, the action of love, then, while tangential to 
the economic, supersedes it insofar as they come into contact, and escapes as otherwise 
than even an incomplete, fragmented economic dialectic. Nonetheless, I do agree that one 
should further take from the cited section the role of understanding one’s death to come, 
given to us in the death of the other before whom we are therefore responsible, in 
establishing the singular(ity). Unfortunately, I lack space for a fuller exploration of the 
consequences of this, here. 
 
29 While not entirely equivalent, this thought of fragmented, we might say 
cariological time is decidedly indebted and referring to several points in Giorgio 
Agamben, Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience, Trans. Liz Heron 
(New York: Verso, 2007).  
 
30 Again, I refer here to the work of Victor Rodríguez Núñez, ibid. 
 
126 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
31 I borrow the term “the coming community” from Giorgio Agamben’s work of 
the same name, The Coming Community, Trans. Michael Hardt, 8th ed. (Minneapolis: U 
of Minnesota 2013), which explores the development of a community of love that has as 
a predominant feature the play between the universal and singular subject(s) and the 
constant opening toward the future of that community. Concerning the method and 
necessity of constructing radical spaces and spatial practices within left movements, I 
refer here to Henri Lefebvre’s work The Production of Space, Trans. Donald Nicholson-
Smith (Malden, MA: Blackwell 1991). 
 
32 Casarino and Negri, ibid. pp. 34-7. 
 
33 Here I rely on the excellent work of Idelber Avelar, The Untimely Present 
(Durham: Duke UP 1999), in which he succinctly resumes the tensions and divergences 
in the Argentine left after the election of Alfonsín, while emphasizing the continued 
process of neoliberal transition in the moment, leaning on ideas he borrows from Willy 
Thayer.   
 
34 Here I refer back to my analysis of re-socialized poetics in Chapter 1. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Violence of Failure, or the Failure of Violence:  
Documentary, Video and Radical Political Subjectivity in Neoliberal Argentina 
 
And therefore as a stranger give it welcome.  
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, 
Then are dreamt of in your philosophy. 
-Hamlet, William Shakespeare 
 
…the fate of the documentary in the postmodern world 
becomes to unveil the irrelevancy of the pretensions of intellectuals 
-Philip Rosen 
 
 A chasm opened in the last chapter, extending itself between its end and this 
beginning. Not merely in the temporal sense of shifting from the remnants and rags of a 
failed but fruitful moment to another, more ambivalent one- which I will address- nor as 
the bridge between chapters and materials, with all the suturing that implies. No, the 
hiatus that opened to consume and consummate this chapter is also its object, the gap I 
have implied is not so easily overcome, even as it is constantly effaced: that between a 
so-called singular subject and what is common in it, and the common itself, insofar as I 
am in common, and in being so I act. To return to the previous chapters’ language: one 
must act in and out of solidarity to maintain beyond the patriarchive and its apparatuses 
of epistemic capture a subjective excess otherwise than state language. If the one is 
driven by faithfulness to a love ever to be enacted, that yet teaches us to act over and 
over, do that loving engagement’s traces survive to become social, entering the sphere 
that determines their possible, if always failed, aestheticization?1 If reading Gelman’s 
loving work, attuned to Parra’s sense of solidarity, we are meant to learn (in order) to 
teach and be taught, can we ever be sure that those lessons have been realized as more 
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than words on a page? This chapter will explore a tentative answer by intertwining a 
reading of post-2001 video rebelde and documentary in Argentina and a confrontation 
with Antonio Negri’s thought of love and the common, across the chasm opened by and 
throughout the prior chapter. Alongside and while commenting the audiovisual materials, 
I will test whether Negri’s multitude and its paradoxical telos of constantly generative 
revolutionary subjectivity are sufficient to the Argentine, or any, moment. By placing the 
multitude in a constellation of collective subjectivities, including my attempt at 
describing the subjectivity inherent to these videos, can we better understand how to 
productively think with, and not merely about, what happened and continues happening 
in Argentina and elsewhere? 
 If I led with a question of exemplarity, it can be stated more or less as such: given 
that Juan Gelman is a single figure, although an important one on the Argentine left, to 
what extent can I show that his work and, further, its lessons have become common? 
When any subject acts out loving solidarity born of an encounter with a comrade, friend, 
or Other, how can we understand the singular action’s commonality? In Gelman’s case, 
aside from his general renown, we have documentation of his reappropriation by forms of 
sociality that supersede facile or totalizing representations and, thus, incorporation into 
the State’s language. He is indirectly represented as a radical model in the 2008 
documentary Corazón de fábrica by Ernesto Ardito and Virna Molina. The documentary 
deals with the Zanón ceramics factory in Neuquén (aka, FaSinPa) and the events and 
tomas de fábricas before, during, and after the 2001 financial saqueo. Zanón was one of 
many factories recuperated by workers after capitalist abandonment due to a supposed 
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unacceptable decline in profitability and, like Brukman textiles in Buenos Aires, operated 
in a horizontal, assembly based, socialist-leaning manner (which was not always the case 
amongst recuperated factories).2 Molina and Ardito, in solidarity with the workers, 
document their struggles and organizational methods and, moreover, their solidarity with 
other recuperated factories and piquetero groups. They produced a documentary that 
while often cleaving to conventional tropes, also overflows them by being embedded in 
the worker’s ongoing struggle against capitalist and state aggression. While I will return 
to this, the scene of most interest now is brief but fortuitous for my project. One of the 
workers’ representatives is recounting efforts in solidarity with other organizations that 
include producing tiles inscribed with unpublished poems by Gelman, to be displayed 
and later donated to other locations. They capture the literal inscription of Gelman’s work 
on walls marking the limits of the political in Argentina, in an act of loving solidarity 
both singular and yet collectively taken. By not following the tiles, both expressively and 
in terms of content they reproduce the limits of attempts at totalizing this excessive 
subjectivity, the persistent and multitudinous sindicato real, to make it legible to the 
State. Glimpsing this suggests that perhaps Gelman’s lessons signal a collective model 
through which  
…the political forces of love [may] form so many institutions […] social 
and political institutions [that], on the one hand, provide a place to which 
not only you but anyone can return in order to extend, intensify, and 
conjugate the desired encounters. And, on the other hand, are constituted 
by transformative procedures that express or translate the force of the 
event in a temporal process. (Michael Hardt 12) 
 
 However, this example also contains the trifecta of concerns I wish to address in 
this chapter. Of the first order is a general question of representation. How, if it’s at all 
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possible, might one represent these emergent subjectivities, given that their principal 
characteristics include rigorous cynicism concerning and rejection of the representative 
act?3 While directed at the State’s political institutions, insofar as documentary (and 
cinema in general, in different ways) claims a particular, conventional representative 
authority concerning its subject, it is subject to the same admonition- even as we 
recognize that advances in cinematic and distributive technology mean more participatory 
models of engaged cinema.4 Despite the documentaries’ politics, they are embedded in a 
social sphere striated by their efforts and yet overdetermined by the capitalist State’s 
sociality, repressive apparatuses, and their historical development. This determines the 
works’ reception and dissemination just as it determines the political and its articulations, 
albeit to a greater or lesser extent. Because of this, and given the proliferation of cheap, 
hand-held camcorders, digital cameras and platforms for disseminating the videos, new 
modes of iterable, fantastic identification have overflown questions of intentionality in 
(re)production and dissemination and demand we think alternative forms for a coming 
political engagement and its re-presentation.5 To this end, when attuned to resurgent 
interest in audiovisual indexicality and, further, digital video’s seemingly dual 
indexicality and its emergence from (and perhaps dependence on) tensions between the 
substances of its content and expression, we can determine these texts’ politico-archival 
functionality, or lack thereof- and whose interests it most serves.6 When analyzing a film 
like Corazón de fábrica, produced in a country with a history of engaged cinema, insofar 
as documentary conventions reproduce forms of legibility functional to state institutional 
authorization and recognition, we must question whether that mode is apt for a pseudo-
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genealogical tracing of emergent subjectivities.7 Still, the audio-visual’s proliferation in 
the moment is undeniable, as Jessica Stites Mor demonstrates, so I set aside poetry to 
explore how different audiovisual forms are echoed by and explicate theoretical 
inversions key to my understanding of this moment, and my larger project. So, to 
summarize this first concern: given the boom in “documentary” production, in quotation 
marks because many videos eschew documentary’s conventional expressive tool-kit, 
(how) can it model alternative approaches to this historical juncture, to texture critical 
conceptual limits? 
 Somewhat more specific, the other two concerns are linked: to what extent and 
how can we speak of these subjectivities? Both in their practice and self-documentation, 
not to mention documentation produced about them, their fluctuating intensities and 
expression reject, and yet exceed the implicit dialectical relationship with, older political 
models’ representative orders. I have concentrated, until now, on specific, single works 
and their limits when engaging an ethico-political demand excessive to the point of 
impossibility. Now, however, the moment’s commonality and its representational modes 
demand that I more thoroughly interrogate my idea of horizontal, multitudinous 
recognition and authorization. My previous citation of Michael Hardt might suggest that I 
intend to continue with the multitude, but I instead mean for it to mark the emergence of 
the debate alluded to in the previous chapter’s notes. I maintain much from his and 
Antonio Negri’s thought of the common, as indispensable for thinking radical politics 
during neoliberalism, but it strikes me as unacceptable that it subordinates singular 
bodies’ actions to common generativity’s necessity. They open, or maintain open, the 
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possibility that common relational modes fail, and obviate the continuity of radical 
thought and subjectivities otherwise than our knowledge. Given my anarchic 
framework’s rejection of the State’s total circumscription of power, these gestures are 
verboten as senseless and blind, respectively. Exploring scenes captured, albeit 
incompletely, in Argentine video, I instead attempt to offer a corrective that explores the 
ethico-political import of what is common in any I, given the (perhaps not so) new 
realization that I am in common.  
Dinosaur Cinema8 
 The definitive event for the emergence of new forms of being-together was the 
end of December 2001, but I will begin with a later, if no less infamous, event. On June 
26, 2002, two piqueteros were murdered by the Buenos Aires police during the 
repression of manifestations at the Pueyrredón bridge, historically a transitional point 
between neighborhoods strongly marking geographically situated class distinctions.9 One 
was Darío Santillan, associated with the autonomist piquetero collective Coordinadora 
Aníbal Verón, which subsumed several uniquely generative organizations, including el 
Movimiento de Trabajadores Desocupados de Solano.10 Several threads set loose by neo-
liberal reforms, from the early 80’s through Menem’s presidency, came forward at that 
moment to be gathered together, dramatically, in proceeding days.11 Emblematic of the 
corruption, cronyism and inefficacy of the Argentine government, and Buenos Aires in 
particular, were the police and their role as chaotic agent provocateurs in a political 
power play against then president Duhalde. Marcelo Fabián Sain explores all of this in a 
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piece exemplary of the state of Argentine politics, albeit not without its faults.12 I will 
explain, as it covers several aspects of the Argentine state at that historical juncture. 
 He meticulously traces, from the 80s through the 90s, continuities in Buenos 
Aires police corruption and their extra- and outright illegal activities- association with 
organized crime, drug dealing, prostitution, and other routine violence. All tacitly 
approved, ignored, or benefitted from by political figures usually expected to step in and 
regulate the free-wheeling, mafia-esque violence of a repressive apparatus meant to 
enforce a hegemonic political and ideological program while maintaining the dominated 
classes at a remove from the State. He paints liberal institutions as radically repurposed 
or purposeless, due to inefficacy or lack of interest, during burgeoning neoliberalism. 
While for liberal Sain the center doesn’t hold and everything is somewhat catastrophic, a 
lack of regulatory intervention highlights, for me, how changing institutionality, 
reoriented by global capital’s demands, negatively affects the masses.  
Most interesting for a reflection on the neoliberal State are the political 
machinations that likely led to the commands given, or not, to the police that day. He 
clarifies that, in a baldly necro-political shift, “the police action occurring that June 26 
was not intended to control, limit, or demobilize the piquetero protest, but rather to 
provoke an open confrontation between the police and the mobilized poor” (52 my 
emphasis).13 Protest was excluded from political power, its demands illegible to state 
institutions, and yet its bodies were included in bare life’s manipulation by dominant 
class fractions seeking to effect a hegemonic shift. Pushing the dominated to the point 
where their struggle met with death, that death could be taken in hand by these fractions, 
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furthering their gain. Here is the neoliberal State imitating ouroboros capital, consuming 
itself from both ends, within and without, while smothering the life beneath it. Politics no 
longer pretends to be incorporative but is, rather, a beast apart from multitudinous, 
excessive life, which can barely exist in it as a spectacular, negative re-presentation- gore 
soon forgotten, with none of Poulantzas’s “long range” effects.14 The masses’ life, denied 
as such, is but another weapon for those class fractions to mobilize against one another.  
 Sain, despite describing failed attempts to reconfigure and purge the police of 
corruption, still proposes reform and “resocialization” for maintaining democracy as it 
“ought” to be. But this could only remedy the disjunction between efforts at neoliberal 
institutional re-configuration and the State’s previous recalcitrance- related to 
individualism’s insistence on a synecdochal sovereignty, which impedes a smooth shift 
from national to domestic capital due fear inspired in nationalistic politicians and citizens 
by alterations to state (and thus individual) sovereignty. This program would be life’s 
complete investment by state power, as self- and “community-” policing, wherein the 
State elides constant repression for targeted repression, as a translation machine between 
life’s quotidian (re)production and global capital flows.15 Reforms of this sort are, 
unfortunately, fairly successful in subsequent years, making Sain retrospectively 
prescient. Nonetheless, what interests me is the status of the lives taken by repressive 
forces- more precisely, the status of life as such, not supplemented by repression’s post 
mortem (re)subjectivation. If rebellion persists in loving solidarity, despite individual 
deaths, one must always ask how lost life continues in the intensity of a life in common 
that yet acts. Focusing only on its being taken by the State would reify that life as 
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incorporated, by death, to capital- which cannot be acceptable for anti-capitalist thought. 
To explore these lives, I offer two distinct audio-visual representations of death: 
Fernando Solanas’s La dignidad de los nadies (2005) and Grupo Alavío’s Crónicas de 
libertad (2002).     
 Although released later, I’ll begin with Solanas. La dignidad de los nadies opens 
with a digital hand-held camera shot of travel- a literal traveling shot-, transitioning to 
shots of an impoverished area outside of Buenos Aires. From the outset, it documents the 
moment’s massive nature while being primarily constituted by face-to-face interactions. 
Or rather, face to camera; although, insofar as Solanas speaks from behind the camera 
and is a recognized auteur, he is fused with the mediatory apparatus with which he 
chooses to capture the pueblo. He foregrounds the documentary’s substance of 
expression- composed primarily of his body and the camera fused to it- to facilitate a 
fantasy of participatory reproduction, wherein the spectator, less than identifying with 
Solanas per se, understands that they, too, would produce this text, if they were there 
then with a camera. This participatory potential’s emphasis goes a certain way towards 
obfuscating Solanas’s ideological construal of the content, as documentarian intervening 
in a performative documentary and in the montage- which I will here interrogate because, 
as Bill Nichols says, “[o]ur willingness to agree with what is said relies to a surprisingly 
large extent on rhetorical suasion and documentary convention” (178).16 But explicating 
this also remits to the digital’s dual indexicality, mentioned above. Digital images are in 
no way only virtual- they are physically written to a hard drive (assuring the image a 
continued indexical function) and any of the much-feared manipulations are not made to 
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the original file, but rather over-write it as an altered copy, a second file. The first 
remains as something more than a trace- that a skilled technician can again bring forward. 
In this way, the digital serves not merely as an archive of contingency, but also of 
supplementarity- of all the changes rendered, manipulations made, and edits provided 
that, without great effort to the contrary, accompany the first impression. So, I insist on 
manipulations of the substances of expression and content as also indexed by digital 
video- in Solanas and the following videos- as a way of interrogating their re-
presentational value for thinking the moment, these subjectivities, and their various 
discursive appropriations. This remits to the ontological value of indexical images as re-
presentations- problematizing yet reinforcing it discursively, being thus of interest to my 
thinking about historicization and the archive.  
Returning to the documentary, his ongoing construal is essential to the above 
emphasized terms- he is noticeably in control of and frames the film as stories he is 
beginning to tell you: stories of no-bodies. This initial framing vacates the indexed 
bodies, rendering them no-bodies and virtually incorporating them to a spectacular 
authorial vision articulated with Solanas’s cinematic language, which positions us 
alongside and before Solanas as story-teller, the only body allowed plenitude as decisive 
subject. This is consistent with his long-standing insistence on a necessarily authoritative 
position for rationalizing his films’ sensorial aspects, towards radicalization- a task he 
reserves himself.17 Secondly, he speaks of a pueblo, a people whose consistency and 
construction he doesn’t doubt, and whose new forms of struggle he re-counts as 
directionless. This extends a point made by others: his films from this period index the 
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lack of an Argentine “people”, so Solanas constantly attempts to construct a people 
through his construal of the substance of the film’s content.18 So, its consistency and its 
directionless-ness are only concretized in the language with which Solanas construes the 
pueblo as unitary political subject, re-embodying it discursively. This despite divisions 
apparent filmically, undermining an illusory univocity- he alternates scenes of and 
interviews with middle-class protestors expressing a problematic, reactionary catharsis, 
with sections dedicated to emergent forms of popular, collective resistance. 
 Part of the sequences dedicated to collective struggles, at the film’s approximate 
mid-point, he presents the Pueyrredón repression and murders of Maximiliano and 
Darío.19 The presentation is telling- favoring something between medium and wide shots 
of faceless masses overflowing urban infrastructure, he offers no firm sense of 
motivations nor of scale. We watch the event’s chaotic devolution and the section ends 
with the police murdering and manhandling Darío; then he cuts to an interview with an 
elderly man reflecting on the repression’s frightening intensity. Accepting Laura 
Podalsky’s assertion of affective touch-points beyond only the profilmic that invite 
audience encounters and overflow moralizing directorial intent, I read this jump cut as 
delimiting possible affective (re)encounters with the multitudinous event and ensuing 
violence in favor of Solanas’s narrative moralizing.20 The moralizing ensues with shots 
from within the crowd at Darío’s funeral and wake- unidentified women performing 
conventional public mourning and some political, but reactionary, commentary 
conveying grief at injustice. This scene begins Darío’s cinematic martyrization. The 
scene can be read as a microcosmic instantiation of the film’s attempted melodramatic 
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modality, meant for active radicalization of spectators. Footage of the women and crowd 
is edited in without any clear indication of chronology nor provenance, expressively 
justifying Solanas’s ideological construal; the radicalizing melodrama here relies 
primarily on suffering’s closeness to assert the material’s reality. But if this is 
melodramatic, a subjective return to innocence is desired not for Darío nor the no-bodies, 
but for the arche no-body: the Argentine pueblo itself. Yet, since the Argentine people as 
historical-political subject is absent but for Solanas’s construal of its unicity, there can be 
no return to innocence. How, if its arrival could only ever be for the first time (as though 
we can accept the nation or State innocently, both built in blood)?21 His construal is more 
interesting: Solanas solidifies Darío’s martyrdom when shooting, sustaining that verb’s 
polysemy, the corpse. The shot is a fortuitous citation of the photo of Che Guevara’s 
corpse in La hora de los hornos, reinforced later by a shot of Darío’s photo with Che’s 
face taped over his. On the wall behind the body is an Argentine flag embroidered with 
the letters MTD and, between body and flag, a cross. Solanas completely elides the flag 
and letters, implicitly expressing the invisibilization central to his construal of this space 
and practice as direction-less, a facet of the pueblo’s suffering.22 For me, this is a second 
killing- of the specter of a life lost in loving struggle, in the name of a nationalist 
narrative that Darío’s actions problematized. Solanas centers traditionally indexical and 
iconic material in a larger sequencing to recast Darío as an iconic martyr within 
Argentina’s national militant history, rendering his exodic work invisible.23 
 Continuing this, the film introduces Darío’s partner, Claudia- and I sustain that 
possessive because, as the close following shots and non-diegetic, melancholic music 
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reinforce, the film recasts her within the heteropatriarchal narrative of a woman left 
behind to beatify a man. This, too, is part of the film’s always already failed 
melodramatic mode, whose attempts at incorporating these bodies to its narrative are 
structurally analogous to the law’s incomplete and thus processual subjectivation. Despite 
re-counting their first meeting in a collective space, there is no space for her subjectivity 
as forged in struggle and in these spaces, thus framing this section as a pilgrimage to see 
the martyr’s works. She and the spaces, both articulated with(in) the radical, exodic 
piqueteros action here absent, are invisible but for their iconic value. Solanas, in his 
authoritative narrative construal and the montage that allows no one site to come forward 
as it articulates itself, make them invisible despite, or because of their hyper-visibility. 
That her mourning is due to the loss’s immediacy is left only implied as she recounts the 
event and is re-framed to render her a passive observer for not advancing to the protest’s 
front line, like Darío, to whose life hers is subsumed. Again, in cuts from the 
manifestation to this sequence, the amount of time past and how Solanas became aware 
of this group are completely obviated. Foregrounding her mourning and rendering her 
invisible but as the widow carrying the martyr’s memory forward as loss at an 
indeterminate future moment- thus eternally- Solanas reinforces the hetero-romantic 
structure determining the State’s utilization of the family in capitalist relationality. This 
sequence covers about 10 minutes, plus a later aside to add that Claudia, et al., “brought 
the perpetrators to justice”; dubious, given what Sain details about Argentine police. 
 On the other hand, we have Grupo Alavío’s “Crónicas de libertad”, collectively 
produced and released in 2002 and also seemingly filmed with a handheld camcorder. 
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The short lasts just shy of 15 minutes and begins with a not-quite establishing shot of 
burning street barricades, then a quick aerial shot of the multitude arriving to Pueyrredón, 
and then jumps to an interview with an encapuchado, who begins detailing the events. 
This structure determines the short as analogous to broadcast news- its interviews and 
jump cuts to the events establish indexical authority, despite the interviews’ settings not 
being a newsroom. True to similarities that others note between Grupo Alavío’s works 
and the CNT’s videos, the short reports back on events as counter-information contesting 
the official narration.24 In a way opposed to Solanas, wherein the substance of expression 
was used to move attention away from his ideological construal, here the expressive is 
subsumed to an explicit, up-front ideological functioning, proper to a contestatory report-
back. Structured around these cuts, the short details the events, their motivations, the 
reasons for the hoods, and so forth. The field footage alternates between shots of 
individuals being physically harmed by police, the multitude engaging the police, and 
police reveling in violence. Insofar as there is narrative framing, the interviewees provide 
it- tellingly, and implying why the intercalated shots of repression and interviews do not 
clearly mark a temporal hiatus, an encapuchada recounts how she still wakes thinking of 
the violence. Contradicting the temporality associated with cuts between events and their 
supplementary re-telling, her testimony reframes these cuts as more spatial than 
temporal, destabilizing documentary narrative conventions in favor of the journalistic 
mode. Retelling events this way insists on their presence and lends the video’s 
indexicality a strange sense of affective iterability: as not relegated to the past but, rather, 
images whose intensity continues to affect the present of lived struggle. Neither eliding 
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repressive violence, nor the protestors’ (less) violent response, this short informs us of the 
events and their reasons, as opposed to only of tragic deaths.  
Moreover, re-presenting the interviewees’ effacement via masks renders the 
report-back collectively singular, retelling reality via a paradoxically polyvocal univocity. 
As told, the coverings symbolize their rebellion, and embodying that rebellion themselves 
and with clothing the individual faces bear rebellion together, becoming singular subjects 
in common and allowing rebellion to speak itself.25 These subjects’ facial coverings bring 
forward the existential threat to the Argentine state that these protests posed, akin to what 
Jacques Derrida refers to as the anarchivic or anarchy drive- the silent, imperceptible, 
archive-destroying drive at (state) memory’s instituting moment, thus also the moment of 
memory’s structural decomposition.26 Filming their effacement, that is, rendering 
indexable, specific and thus repeatable the bourgeois individual’s conceptual and yet 
paradoxically embodied death, the short assumes the metaphysical obscenity that André 
Bazin read in cinema- and then doubles it by appending collectivity’s birth to the 
individual’s “death”, birth being analogous to death (as specific, specifying and yet 
universal).27 Solanas mediates reality with a cyborgic extension, one so associated with 
his performative persona that they have fused, indissociably linking his vision to the 
reality it re-presents. This short’s collective force comes from its re-presentation of and 
from collective and collectivizing anonymity, diminishing the importance of any 
individual, or individual’s, perspective. Bourgeois history’s subject is undermined in the 
individual’s visual, and then technical, effacement, as no one voice is overprivileged, 
centered, nor even named. Reproducing their effacement in the substance of its 
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expression, aiding its ideological construal, the short formally necessitates the experience 
of what it indexes as of a common, thus im-possible, anarchivic referent. It allows the 
multitudinous manifestation’s concerns to be aired in solidarity, without encapsulating 
the many within a single spokesperson, nor face, in its present-ation.  
The discussion of Maxi and Darío’s deaths further reinforces this multitudinous 
solidarity- the latter of whom they indicate was killed tending to the former. Yet, instead 
of ascribing to Darío and Maxi martyrdom’s iconicity, they frame them as companions 
fallen in a collective struggle- not to be mourned, they are present in struggle’s 
commonality. While this does not obviate the possibility of their martyrdom, it renders it 
contingent upon others’ interpretations and extraneous to the short- thereby also 
ambivalent, undecided, deferred. Their deaths are not given a central nor prolonged role 
and are, instead, treated as another indexed contingency. While this may sound cruel, I 
would argue just the opposite- by allowing them to persist beyond death in common 
loving action, Grupo Alavío and the encapuchados render their deaths non-functional to 
any transcendental, moralizing narrativity as they carry on in friendship-as-love. They 
take pride in what they accomplished and celebrate their fallen comrades as continuing in 
rebellion’s present, otherwise than death. Not as martyrs, because martyrs are never 
present and must necessarily be referred to retrospectively through a supplementary 
iconicity, voiding for them any futurity. The short closes superimposing non-diegetic 
music onto shots of marchers and ends on a still of Maxi and Darío together. This is the 
closest it comes to any sense of martyrdom, but by ending with a photograph from behind 
them as they look to the horizon, it again structurally elides retrospectivity and ascription 
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of innocence, gone or to come. Instead, it formally reproduces their presence in a struggle 
to come, as they become symbols of the love driving their action, beyond death.28 The 
short presents struggle as a loving opening to coming radical being and new relational 
modes otherwise than what is now called the political. 
Contrasting these two filmic representations, I mean to pose a larger question, or a 
conjunction of questions. They pose a problem of continuity and historicization regarding 
these emergent subjectivities and their relationship to the last several decades of 
Argentine left political narratives- at least as far back as the 1955 coup against Perón. 
I’ve privileged their representation of Darío’s death because it brings into relief each 
film’s indexicality (thus historical legibility) as dependent on manipulations of the 
expressive substance and their content, and thus how they in-form non-state movements’ 
futurity through re-presentation. Solanas, an embodiment of left continuity and action, 
depends on a mythopoetic narrativization of the Argentine people that renders value unto 
death within a sacrificial economy trading in martyrdom as the basis for alternative 
national-political imaginaries. His negative affective investment of Darío as an iconic 
Argentine martyr fallen in struggle against a repressive State permits only a reactionary 
encounter with death and, as such, a reactionary imaginary that precludes both rupture 
and continuity. This despite adopting new expressive tools as a way of encouraging a 
fantasy of participatory reproduction, which ultimately only guides spectators into 
assuming his reactionary, national imaginary. Thus, narratively re-placing past over 
present by framing Darío as one martyr amongst others functional to hegemonic politics, 
he offers us not a generative understanding of changing politics that comprehends the 
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moment’s innovation and genealogically relates it to prior subjective modes, but rather a 
memorialized re-hashing of failures past. A martyr’s iconicity can only re-signify past 
political projects and constrain rebellious discourse within a revolutionary model 
dependent upon state language, obviating the post-saqueo moment’s exodic reality as one 
of fluctuating intensities and multitudinous affective investment in new relationality. 
I contend not that Grupo Alavío and the common subject of its short offer us a 
sense of pure rupture; instead, they are by far more faithful to a sense of radical 
continuity, both politically and cinematically. Much as MTD Solano and the piqueteros, 
the tomas de fábricas and the large scale popular manifestations evoke a legacy of radical 
action, Grupo Alavío and other collectives represent the outgrowth of the New Latin 
American Cinema (NLAC) named, here ironically, by Solanas’s generation.29 Continuity 
is not and cannot be simple repetition without difference, an impossible hypostasis only 
imaginable in gestures like Solanas’s; and yet, it must innovate without knowing nor 
forcing epistemic closure, which establishes temporality and inheritance. It’s the 
construal itself, and not the expressive substance and form, that strikes most poignantly in 
Grupo Alavío’s short- it does not economize death in a discourse nor a filmic modality of 
national-popular memory, nor does it negate it by perpetuating an unproductive 
forgetfulness. Death, violence and repression are constantly present alongside the to 
come, both literally as a pregnant encapuchada and figuratively as their report-back’s 
pride and forward-facing end. They carry forward out of a love born in encounters 
between friends and comrades, acting from and for the death that was, while never 
presuming to (representationally) contain it nor be caught in a backward flight propelled 
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by, and fixated on, past failures. In doing so, and in being forthright in representing that, 
they encourage us to, ourselves, adopt this model. That being said, there might be a role 
for Antonio Negri’s sense of ethicality when discussing the short’s treatment of death and 
action’s nature-to-come, as he says of death during post-modernity that: “individual death 
is only conceivable as the common decision of overcoming death, that is, as struggle 
against death. It is only in taking up this choice of overcoming that the decision can be 
called ‘ethical’” (245-6 my emphasis). Yet, this foregrounds tensions between my 
formulation of moving from and yet for death, out of love, in singular action, and Negri’s 
formulation of the common, key to his overcoming death.  
In the citation, individual death is only overcome as decided upon in common- an 
apt formulation for his project. But this presupposes the functionality of common 
generativity’s logically prior premises, including a constant positive generativity of love 
driving common innovation. I will explore this at length below, but this presupposition 
effaces negative affections and implies negative affect’s impossibility within and for 
radical action.30 To read this short, and the moment it synecdochally relates, through a 
strictly autonomist lens, we would have to ignore the complex affective state of both. In 
the profilmic and afilmic registers, this short, its common subject, and the historical 
moment are crisscrossed with not only love but anxiety, fear, hope, sadness, pride and 
countless other affections. I hesitate at calling this ethical in Negri’s sense, but I do see an 
ethical understanding, specifically in the common uncovering performed by the singular 
coverings- in the play of masks. By bringing many voices together as a common voice, 
the interviewees’ masks foreground the impossibility of encountering their rostro(s), an 
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exterior simultaneity of each body’s many, possible affective contortions or “face(s)”. 
The screen’s spectral logic of absent presences, which consistently undermines any 
complete archival consignation, then multiplies this impossibility beyond measure.31 The 
tension between rostro and cara(s), sheer communicable exteriority and uncountable 
interiority, forces us to take into account the masks effacing that exteriority, as if to 
remind us that to be in common, we are subsumed to a greater commonality as one, much 
as alone we are already the potential for that coming into common being.32 That assertion 
seems to coincide with Negri, but it is a deceptive similarity. I would instead emphasize 
that while a mask may conceal a singular rostro to bring forth a common one, it does not 
efface the face(s), the cara(s), beneath. To the contrary, it brings that plurality into relief 
along with its incommunicable affective complexity and excessive reality, without 
revealing that singularity as knowable. Its multiplicativity then enacts what I above 
referred to as the short’s strange, but not yet uncanny, affective iterability, in that it can 
only be understood as multiplying the affective register prior to signification. Masking 
adds texture to the rostro by effacing it, the presumptively smooth and impenetrable 
common surface, underscoring the incommensurability of rostro with cara(s). Their 
audiovisual iteration is the exterior re-presentation of exteriority’s effacement by 
exteriority, an effacement of exteriority in an exteriority coincident with and produced by 
the archivization due to its conventional legibility. Yet despite that legibility, their 
evident but unspeakable affective complexity makes these figures’ incorporation to the 
patriarchive as political or historical subjects impossible, except as the silent, 
destabilizing anarchivic drive.33 It highlights the possible failure of any autonomist 
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analysis by demystifying the common in its inevitable incompleteness, without 
discarding it; rather, it reminds us of each component singularity’s persistence, and the 
impossibility of totally subsuming them in the becoming of a paradoxically transcendent 
singularity plainly legible as the multitude, no matter the medium. But failure runs 
counter to the short’s futurity, and so the autonomist analysis appears frustrated. Failure, 
much like death, is present for us and moves us forward only as we move backwards, 
trapped in a retrospective on things past, the martyrs and failures of the once was. Only 
acting anew out of loving solidarity do we escape failure’s grasp; this is the short’s 
lesson. So, if I intend to salvage the common, I must confront the failure to allow singular 
love head-on, situating my discussion vis a vis the post-saqueo moment and its aftermath. 
The Violence of Failure  
 A question of scholarly work’s hermeneutic authority has pervaded my work and 
driven its interrogation of nomological authority, both of the auteur and the authoritarian. 
By making explicit divergent analyses, I have raised that specter again, as a critical 
framework forces the question of the patriarchive’s structuring of history and knowledge, 
given its intimate, foundational relationship to the State.34 Above I attempted to bring 
forth not only the films’ different aesthetic decisions but also their distinct relationships 
with death, memory, history and continuity. I am primarily concerned with maintaining 
the sense of loving solidarity I’ve elaborated- seeking out how to work in the spirit of 
anarchic subjectivities and with the encapuchado spirit that takes pride in action, moving 
forward from death. As a perverse allegory for an archive obsessed with failure, Walter 
Benjamin’s angel of history is to be avoided. We must ask how to avoid failure’s violent 
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ascription and life’s consignation to the archives of national politics and its halls of 
martyrs- in all authorial modes, including mine.  
Failure belongs to the teleological, to a politics overdetermined by absolutes and 
the law- and is only appropriately applied therein. An end must be set, a goal determined, 
the terms established and agreed upon beforehand. Expansive openings toward the to 
come cannot fail, if only given their inevitable movement toward, and saying otherwise 
violently and strictly delimits being, contrary to any generative expansiveness. My 
writing and the archivization it inevitably does (and hopefully undoes) while re-framing 
past events are striated by thematic tensions and their performative functionality to 
university knowledge production, so I hesitate before too eagerly adopting a 
hermeneutic.35 One must problematize even terms that they are fond of, settling only 
their own position vis a vis what intrigues them, without limiting its reality. Hence why, 
before, I conjoined the multitude to the sindicato real, attempting to destabilize 
autonomist univocity- and the same is due now, with a term from this more recent 
history. As I mentioned, Negri’s discussion of love and the common in the multitude 
retains the possibility of failure. But that would contradict the post-saqueo subjectivities 
and efface any singular persistence of coming radical subjects aligned with innovative 
groups’ sense of continuity. So, I again offer a term to tense the autonomist framework, 
discovering its limits and what they cover.  
Ana María Fernández’s work on the asambleas and the post-saqueo moment 
presents us a term. To explore the possibility of failure her term unveils in the multitude, 
I read her alongside Negri’s Kairós, Alma Venus, Multitudo, a theoretically rich 
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elaboration of the multitude’s logic that provides insight into his ontology of common 
being. I will address both his use of Spinoza’s thought of love and his tendency to 
subsume the singular to the common- here I will focus on love. But I ought to begin with 
Fernández. Her works dealing explicitly with 2001-2005, collected in Política y 
subjetividad: Asambleas barriales y fábricas recuperadas, are anchored by field work 
done at the time- interviews with members of and, modelling Colectivo Situaciones’s 
“militant intellectual”, participation in the asambleas.36 She stresses several key aspects 
of these emergent subjectivities, grounding her observations in, yet subsuming them to, 
the assemblies’ “situational logic”.37 That is, to the vertiginous immediacy of the to come 
in, or rather before, the void demanded by the slogan “que se vayan todos”, which drove 
these heterogeneous gatherings (Fernández 55-6). As she explains, this is fundamental to 
the assemblies’ constitutive action, being structured rhizomatically and characterized by 
incessant de- and reterritorialization.38 The assemblies were singularly plural in both 
composition and interactions, working towards an engaged, generative, and yet unknown 
to-come. 
 Emphasizing the resistance to homogenization inherent in the immanent work 
performed by being there, she summarizes the actions’ productivity as inventing modes 
of existing entre-muchos or, in an immediate appositive, entre-algunos (71). 
Simultaneously, she explicitly rejects the autonomist multitude, by name. She insists on 
the eminently numerable groupings’ strong particularization, effected in irreplaceable 
face-to-face encounters. The subtle perspectival inversion of the entre-muchos is due to 
this opposition.39 Fernández emphasizes the singularity’s constitutive, yet indeterminate, 
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ethical experience, comprehended by a human body encountering the face of another in 
situated action- undoing the common’s primacy vis a vis the singular in the multitude. 
Her preferential shift- for the many as one, as opposed to the one of many- opens a 
futurity which allows for but moves otherwise than failure, without discarding the 
common. Her inversion is also key to framing my disagreement with Negri. But this 
conceptual inversion’s importance is not initially apparent in that moment- rather now, 
because the State’s incorporative politics, affective and physical violence have dulled the 
brilliant optimism of the early millennium in the two decades since. Only understanding 
the need to trace radical persistence despite the various forms of violence against it do we 
further understand the shift’s import.  
In later essays, Fernández already begins to note a continual diminution of 
assembly participants, and she takes pains to explicitly attribute this. Reasons include: 
disruption by constituted movements, e.g. traditional left parties, with distinct agendas 
and goals; resolution of prior material difficulties; the continuance of precarious living 
situations whose resolution asserted its immediacy; and apathy, disillusion, debates 
around methodology, and so on. 40 Further, she is far from alone in noting this- a common 
thread in work on the following years emphasizes the role of Nestor Kirchner’s 
government in containing the energies of 2001/2, by placating the economic concerns 
motivating the middle-class to take the streets and then incorporating the more moderate 
piqueteros into his government.41 Key is that these conflicts were primarily affective and 
material ones that diminished singular subjects’ capacity to act, especially in common, or 
as part of a larger singularity.42  
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The multiple temporalities revealed in post-saqueo relational modes marked- 
commenced and made sensible- new emergent subjectivities, yes, but also a more 
concerted effort by constituted power in Argentina to implement global capital’s hyper-
individualistic control society. In a sense, this effort is a necessary step toward the real 
subsumption central to the multitude’s emergence in resistance to Empire. But these 
steps, and the neoliberal transitions’ inconsistency revealed by the State’s necessarily 
continual pursuit of its implementation, destabilize the broad temporal assertions 
fundamental to Negri’s work. This revelation, more apparent for the recent increasingly 
visible, strongly rooted times of production, is already reason to hesitate before the term 
multitude. To account for these ongoing struggles, we must emphasize the processual 
nature of both successive Argentine governments’ attempts to more thoroughly integrate 
capitalist production’s various axes to the State and the emergence of alternative 
subjectivities dependent upon, despite being both agonistic and antagonistic to, the 
State’s efforts. Totalizing flights of optimism tangential to struggle’s temporality will not 
do.  
Moving past Kirchner’s incorporationist policies, a core function of state 
institutionality, State resistance to new relational modes provides a lens for viewing 
various policies. See, for instance, the privatization of recycling, or Buenos Aires’s 
prohibition of dancing in unauthorized spaces- both restricting forms of sociality and 
work not easily contained by global capital and the neoliberal State. These actions, but 
more importantly policies and maneuvers during both Kirchner presidencies, accelerated 
a process of localized incorporation of Argentina’s domestic capital to global capital’s 
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functioning, despite or perhaps because of the complexities involved.43 By 2015, years of 
backlash at various levels lead to openly neoliberal president Mauricio Macri, who 
enriched himself throughout the previous decades by relying on his family’s ties to 
industry and politics dating to the Videla dictatorship, and manipulating public discontent 
to climb political ranks in Buenos Aires. Macri embodies the opposite of the hoped for 
emptying out of the political in “que se vayan todos”, being instead the reinstatement of 
prior political modes.44 Taking everything together, from police repression under 
Duhalde up to Macri’s presidency, we have what hegemonic politics would consider a 
sound defeat; a failure culminating in the assumption of power by forces diametrically 
opposed to the left, let alone alternative political being. And while the autonomist 
framework avoids acknowledging failure, it’s hard to see how constant, common 
innovation could account for these setbacks- that is, how the generation of the common 
can account for it as processual, and not always already given, in the face of capitalist 
repression. It doesn’t provide the tools to think these decades, especially if we hope to 
glimpse political continuity otherwise than the State, as Grupo Alavío’s short insists we 
can. I don’t want to discard the common, as a sense of it pervades rebellious continuity, 
but I must confront Negri’s thought as effacing possibilities of singular subjective 
persistence by eliding the irreplaceability of situated encounters. If I do not, I have no 
justification for reflecting on this past, as my reading could only ever be catastrophic, 
instead of generative and hopeful.  
 Not to malign his foundational reading of Spinoza but, his metaphorically 
overdetermined focus on a specific spinozian love denies the multitude affective 
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complexity. He sets out in Alma Venus to show that since Spinoza, “love is the desire of 
the common,” and it further “constitutes the dynamic innovation of being”, making a 
subject of common action as embodied by poverty (Kairós… 209). There are several 
conceptual leaps required to arrive here, which he details extensively in The Savage 
Anomaly.45 In brief, implicit herein is the primacy that Spinoza lends the affects caused 
by Reason and not as passions, being thus more perfect.46 This is crucial for Negri’s 
assertion of the positive, generative nature of love as innovation in common. Mahmut 
Mutman’s work on Negri illuminates this operation by tracing a specific sense of love in 
Spinoza- pietas or love of God- used by Negri, in translation, to aver that love as such 
drives each singularity to desire that all be in common.47 The slippage he effaces by 
choosing love to translate pietas without distinction, thereby still implying its other 
meanings, capacitates much of his argument- and undermines it. Negri says, 
“’[g]eneration is love that follows the thread of time from its beginning and so weaves its 
fabric in the common;” and further, “[t]here is no solitary love: love constructs tools, 
languages and politics of being” from the standpoint of the singular (Kairós… 211). He 
asserts love’s persistence through time into the common and a necessary, social 
constancy for that generativity. But his failure to account for its intensity, which 
fluctuates with affective interplay and the possibility of the body’s capacity to act 
decreasing due to a negative affection, is only tenable accepting his translation, as pietas 
is not subject to the passions’ fluctuation.48 His is an idealized affect dependent on an 
always already predefined reason’s unchallenged predominance and, frankly, seems not 
154 
 
to have discarded a metaphysical tendency to overdetermine multitudinous social action 
and inter-singular relations.  
While his assertion about love’s social character is accurate to a point, denying 
solitary love errs by effacing the possibility that the imagination reproduces love’s 
external cause after loss, or in solitude. Allowing this, cases of which I examined in 
Gelman and “Crónicas de Libertad”, allows for love’s persistence in a singular human 
body despite a setback in the common’s generativity caused by a strong negative 
affection. Maintaining these effaced complexities rescues a politics of love in forms 
beyond pietas and its transcendental tendency- forms I call “love(s) of the particular”. 
Despite having just named them, this name is of course excessive, and not only because 
of what always escapes a name. No, far more simply- all love is always a particular love. 
Even insofar as a singularity is in common, it is always the singular that loves, and loves 
a particular other singularity- even without assurances of its im-possible reciprocity. It is 
the singular experience of the other acting in me that permits me persist in love, ethics 
and politics, beyond death and toward the to come, despite negative affections. Attempts 
to socialize that, even mine, cannot avoid some representational flattening, nor the 
tension of the force field marking the impossibility of that translation’s adequation to the 
excessive life experienced in love and im-possible faithfulness. Its translation to a social 
force cannot but be an experience of impossibility entailing some flattening of 
intersubjective social space, which, left unchecked in Negri, makes his theorizing 
somewhat naïve.49 So, we must hesitate before presuming a generalizable, therefore 
transcendental, love- but Negri does not.50 He effaces any decrease in love’s intensity 
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and, therefore, anything other than constant common generativity. All without 
elaborating the sexual-social metaphor inaugurating love’s function in building 
community, effacing his translation’s repression, that is, the subsumption of 
multitudinous forms of love to a term overdetermined by intertextual usage. 
 He comes closest to explicating love’s productive functioning when discussing 
love in space, or co-operation. Love constructs space because it “seeks the common, both 
the eternity of the common (i.e. the already generated) and the to-come of the common 
(i.e. that which is to be constituted on the edge of time)” (Kairós… 212). Again, love is 
an exclusively social force at being’s threshold seeking cooperative networks of inter-
singular relationality in the eternity of space, that it also constructs. And if love’s 
progress pauses, without diminishment? Or cooperative relationality’s possibility is 
quashed? Does space vanish, retreat, when we’re forced apart? Or is it emptied, leaving 
us alone and loveless; that is, undoing us? To what extent does this cooperation presume 
a subjective determination and fixity that calls back to the tension between immanence 
and transcendence, reproducing the metaphysical suppositions Negri claims to be 
challenging? He reinforces this dilemma defining co-operation as “love that proceeds by 
making itself common among multiplicities […] [as] the space constituted by the 
common and so […] multiplied in its productivity- productivity: nothing other than the 
capacity of the common to become increasingly common” (Kairós… 213). Compounding 
the problems- love is always only common, being produced in the common space that it 
produces, and which is presumed productive.  
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Key to the above disagreement, this productivity is always only actualized 
towards greater commonality. Presuming this actuality causes the above grave problems; 
what’s more, while it produces its common space, it also has not exited the space 
overdetermined by the State’s productive spatial practice, which actively opposes 
alternative, common relational modes. The events indexed by the above videos are proof 
enough of the conflict’s violent intensity, regardless of modifications to their indexicality 
due the respective productions’ cinematographic decisions. While one assumes this 
would be accounted for in a resistant subjectivity whose productivity is explicitly 
opposed to another, it is not. For Negri, “politics is a daily task revealed by love as the 
productive power of the present. It is the quotidian responsibility for the generation of the 
eternal” (Kairós… 214). In short- while I also insist on suturing love and politics, this 
metaphorical and narrow deployment excludes difference and difficulty. One could argue 
that love’s task ideally continues despite difficulty, but that ignores the extent of 
capitalism’s capacity to negatively affect common singularities, making only the most 
strained persistence possible. Which may be enough! But it is an unnecessarily myopic 
optimism, bordering on quietism, to assert the multitudinous telos’s ineluctability in 
Argentina, especially given global capital’s violent and incomplete localization, which 
either impedes or incorporates resistant productivities. If in Negri’s paradoxical non-
teleological teleology we must necessarily activate singularities “in view of the 
construction of the common- which is what the finality of the singularities themselves 
consists in,” we must ask after those singularities’ persistence when facing 
insurmountable capitalist resistance or other, competing universalities (Kairós… 215 my 
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emphasis). As these singularities’ presumed finality, if their political activation must be 
horizontal, spontaneous, constitutive- therefore, common-, facing momentary faltering 
one can only think of deactivation, or failure. A lack of faith, perhaps. As we’ve seen in 
the Argentine videos, this is an unacceptable imposition on their futurity. Negri might 
never support that, but his insisting on love’s necessarily generative nature leaves little 
room for singular persistence, despite the impossibility of common advances. Yet, the 
cacophonous burst of video and documentary post-saqueo shows us, entre-muchos, how 
that can/not be. 
A Cacophonous Chorus 
 As insinuated, the prior discussion is material to the audio-visual tensions I 
explored above and demands a return to that analysis. But I do not intend to again 
contrast the NLAC dinosaurs with newer video productions. Rather, I’m interested in the 
contrasts and tensions within what Jessica Stites Mor has termed the third generation of 
transition cinema, primarily as part of the documentalismo movement that begin during 
Menem’s neo-liberal politicking.51 I focus on representativity’s tensions in this audio-
video constellation for several reasons, the first due to how these filmmakers frame 
themselves as an innovative continuation of NLAC politics while positioning themselves 
alongside the current political moment, denouncing the violent and repressive nature of 
neoliberalism in Argentina. To renew a go-to-the-audience ethos in the neoliberal era, 
they eschew authorial narrative imposition via re-socialization, relying on epochal 
solidarity to horizontally (re)authorize their work, as one voice amongst many.  
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Beyond mimicking earlier documentary’s somewhat auteur style, they adopt a 
fuller ethos of participatory production that complicates any complete attribution of 
authorial intent to the directors. Performative documentary’s technics demand they 
highlight their presence as filmmakers but given the subject matter, they thereby 
subordinate their participation to the filmed sites’ situated organization. While they still 
retain control over editing and dissemination, somewhat, the material arises from and 
returns to the polyvocal moment of emergent, horizontal subjectivities that it relies upon 
for recognition. Of further interest are the effects of technological advancements and 
Argentina’s 90s economic bubble for proliferating filmmaking materials and schools, 
including in historically impoverished areas like the Avellaneda neighborhood (locale of 
the Pueyrredón bridge). According to Mor, the 90s introduced key technological 
advancements- widely available hand-held camera technology, easily reproducible VHS 
recording, digital technology, and so forth- and social changes- an increase in spending to 
open film schools and training centers and growing informal markets for video that 
bypassed traditional, heavily regulated official markets.  
 This surge generated two tensions that interest me. We see that promoting 
neoliberal models of spectacular audio-visual production, a culture industry tactic for 
capitalist identitarian subjectivation, ultimately produces the rebellious subjects it hopes 
to elide. Echoing Negri’s assertions around becoming common, by facilitating oppressed 
groups’ acquisition of tools to produce and disseminate “camera as a gun” denunciatory 
cinema, these policies produce the arms to be used against them. Hence the first tension- 
imposing neoliberal socio-economic policies to subsume civil society to the State, as a 
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method of control and subjectivation, capacitates the excesses that become sites of 
rebellion. Incapable of containing the fluctuating intensities and excessive common life 
characterizing an increasingly interconnected global population, in their attempts the 
neoliberal State and global capital end up providing the technology and knowledge 
required for emergent self-reflexive, collective, ethico-political being to increase 
cooperative relationality and better practice the autodidactic pedagogy of radical love 
inherent to continuity with past rebellion.  
I can know groups like Grupo Alavío, Ojo Obrero or Cine Insurgente because of 
this paradox, all cinema of solidarity that arose not from without but within social 
movements, attesting to state repression of the excessive life beyond the subjectifying 
capacity of its nomos. Despite the contestatory mode’s legible engagement with the 
State’s patriarchive, as its obverse, they still undermine that archive in ways anterior and 
excessive to their contestatory engagement. Their solidarity and re-socialized production 
allow them to function at the limit of state language. As an example: while “Crónicas de 
libertad” provides a reproducible and therefore archivable text, by filming encapuchados 
the text also disseminates and puts a face to an effacement of the bourgeois individuality 
necessary for legible, subjectivizing archivization.52 Productions of this sort add texture 
to the political’s limits, attesting to life’s un-repressible affective reality as otherwise than 
state subjectivity. 
 The second tension is not explicit in Mor’s text. It arises from her book’s 
historical framing and, perhaps necessarily, its expansiveness regarding film around the 
2001 crisis. Beginning at that statement’s end: discussing transition cinema’s third 
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generation videos and documentaries, she folds into one category multiple styles, from 
independent video to documentaries (including the texts I discuss). She structures her 
argument around social networks and productive relations during certain political 
moments, which legitimates this leveling. But while this captures the broader cinematic 
moment, it elides economies of scale that do not factor into her analysis, particularly 
relating to social capital and the prevalence of the projects’ respective ideological 
tendencies. For all the period’s technological advancement, it is dishonest to say that 
works by Solanas and Grupo Alavío have the same opportunity to be screened, 
reproduced, or even brought to potential audiences’ awareness. Newer platforms like 
Youtube, which post-dates most of her texts, have leveled the playing field somewhat, 
but auteur name recognition as manifest social capital still determines much awareness of 
a work. Moreover, while Solanas did adopt hand-held digital camera technology, that 
Mor can attribute to his work a growing critical acceptance of low cost, DIY approaches 
furthers the point. Production modifications do not obviate cinematographic and narrative 
decisions, and no amount of participatory intent and fantasy can equate his ideology with 
Grupo Alavío’s. All of which also holds for directors and producers more aligned with 
emergent, singularly plural relational modes, like Ardito and Molina, insofar as they 
cleave to conventional documentarian tropes by persisting in non-innovative stylistic 
continuity with NLAC documentary. 
 Which brings us to the first half of the phrase, concerning the text’s historical 
framing. Again, it is in no way a failing that Mor sets the upper limit at 2004, when 
Kirchner begins codifying long overdue changes that permitted independent cinema to 
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thrive. Yet, as I’ve explored and as historical, political and sociological texts insist, 
Kirchnerismo was not nearly as benevolent as it may appear, from a perspective of 
rebellion and radical thought. Nestor Kirchner began to incorporate more moderate 
groups to the State, while simultaneously banning more radical, autonomist 
organizations- in short, he disabled prior large-scale movements by placating the middle 
and working classes. While there are scant documents attesting to effects on the 
production of denunciatory video, Ojo Obrero’s prolonged silence (before returning in 
2016 with a film about abortion and femicides, La cena blanca de Romina) and the later 
debates around funding cuts and machinations in INCAA under Macri remind us of the 
State’s power to limit unaffiliated, contestatory groups’ capacity for action.53 The State 
can negatively affect these movements, decreasing their capacity to act in various ways: 
fracturing a movement’s ranks by encouraging identitarian chauvinism, overriding 
solidarity in difference; eliminating their subjects, both those producing them and those 
centered by them, via economic or political means; and preferentially adjusting legal 
mechanisms to impede independent groups’ access to funding, limiting the ability to 
cooperatively produce their work and reach those who re-make it, the audience. We must 
always ask why some persist and others not; or rather, why we still know of some and not 
of others. Who is recognized and whose works get passed around- and what does that tell 
us about them as archival texts? Recognition and dissemination are, thus, concerns 
intersecting ideology and aesthetics- requiring a return to the textual analysis beyond 
Mor’s work. But this time, instead of Solanas, we’ll see representations of one event in 
Corazón de fábrica and later in independent video.  
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 Near the end of Ardito and Molina’s work they document a Ska-P concert at and 
in solidarity with Zanón. The scene is fairly conventional concert documentation: 
alternating mid-range shots from the stage wings with several from immediately in front, 
we see the band’s interactions with both the audience and the factory’s representatives as 
they speak and are spoken about in terms encouraging solidarity with their struggle. What 
is interesting here is not their ideological construal, per se, which is consistent with my 
above comments on third generation transition cinema’s performative embeddedness, but 
how the film positions its audience vis a vis the spectacle and, more importantly, the 
spectacle’s primary audience, in a doubly representative act. Primary is very intentional 
here. A concert, even one documented audio-visually, generally has an immediate 
intended audience: the group of people attending. This doesn’t preclude deferred 
audiences, but the primary is an integral part of the event. That audience’s audio-visual 
treatment, particularly in the context of anti-capitalist solidarity, is key to the dual 
representation’s allegorical functioning. The film’s audience is given preferential access 
to the stage, encouraging identification with the workers central to the event’s 
organization and the documentarians reproducing it. The concert’s audience, however, 
whose presence facilitated, formed and gave sense to the concert, is visually 
homogenized. Instead of being imbedded within the concert’s multitudinous audience, 
the cameras have preferential access for filming and, thus, re-produce, thereby doubling, 
the film audience’s distance from the concert audience. We either look out over them or 
are made to perceive them as unified within the camera’s, that is, our perception. The 
expressed fantasy is of unitary subjective perception, wherein the we implicit to a 
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collective spectacle, participation in which is proffered audio-visually, is subsumed to the 
I by the presumed transparency of the univocal perceiving subject that the camera 
becomes.   
Despite the main ideological gesture- the film is in solidarity with the workers and 
does not do them a disservice-, by cleaving to this style of spectacular documentation, it 
highlights the tension I mentioned regarding audio-visual productions in solidarity and, 
moreover, solidarity from and for love. A visual analog to the difference between 
Fernández and the autonomists, we are made to see the multitude, the one of many, as 
opposed to seeing from the many as one, the entre-muchos. When we’re shown them, 
countless audience members are already one, accounted for by and subsumed to the shots 
presenting a unique spectacular vision. The composite singularity emerges in the 
spectacle’s situation, and yet the multitudinous singularity is presumed as logically prior 
from and by our point of view, making sensible the experiences of each singular human 
body retroactively composing it. Their love and solidarity are only (technically) legible 
insofar as they are subsumed to a greater project and process, here Zanón’s which is, in 
turn, subsumed to Ardito and Molina’s in our later viewing, due its effective iterating of 
contingency. They are sensible only in service to a revolutionary telos overdetermining 
representation of the moment and the experience. A telos framed as legible, with the 
effacement legibility implies, according to a theoretico-political logic necessarily 
determined, as we’ve seen, by the capitalist State’s bourgeois, mythopoetic historicizing. 
Despite, or because of its intentions, this documentary is a product, reproducible and 
consumable regardless of any immediacy in the spectator’s relationship to the events 
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represented. This is both its strength and its weakness, depending on your purpose- its 
iterability re-presents the event for affective purposes, moving us (to act radically) just as 
the event moved others, but is also part and parcel of its archival legibility as indexing a 
historical event. Leaving me with the question, as I am interested in the audio-visual’s 
viability as rebellious documentation, of whether it can participate horizontally as radical 
indexicality in a way that does not appertain to the State’s archive. Briefly, the answer is 
both yes and no. Because of this, I will focus on a series of videos attesting to the same 
spectacle. 
 While the amount of video produced at that concert is likely uncountable, we do 
have some examples in the collection Argentina Arde. If I posed a terribly obnoxious 
conundrum to end the previous exposition, it’s not too difficult to unpack. Yes, of course 
I can offer these videos as documentation of the post-saqueo moment’s cacophonous 
visuality as manifest at that concert but, no, they are not as such functional to the 
hierarchically determined archivization of reality as it is re-presented by audio-visual 
material. If film’s indexical strength, which I’ve been exploring, is due its relation to 
contingency and, as Mary Ann Doane states, “cinema has also historically worked to 
make the contingent legible”, we have to ask (230): what do these videos index and are 
they at all legible as such? The latter first, with a quick answer- no, as such they are not, 
as they do not do the work of framing, thus contextualizing, themselves. Their legibility 
is entirely dependent on supplementary archivization and interpretation- they are only 
contextualizable as part of the anthology, and their identification as documents of this 
event, indexical to it, originates in my cinephilic association of the concert with footage in 
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Corazón de fábrica.54 And so, to return to my comments on digital video’s dual 
indexicality as determined in questions of construal and expression, the video itself lacks 
a determinate ideological construal, other than supplementary critical approaches and 
anthologizing. Moreover, its substance of expression takes Solanas’s fantasy of 
participatory reproduction to its aporetic nexus by allowing spectators only the fantasy of 
presence: of being there, wherever there may be. These videos only index a having 
happened: sheer contingency, the vertiginous being there of a singularity already entre-
muchos, commonality’s kernel. Here, more than analysis I offer celebration: of each 
video’s cacophonous singularity, for “videographer” and for spectator.  
First, the noun. Each video is fundamentally singular yet produced in common. 
Lacking universalizing pretensions, each video, filmed from the concert audience and at a 
distance from the stage, does not pretend to encapsulate the audience’s entirety nor the 
concert’s essence and is not marked by montage. Much like contemporary hand-held 
cellular phone video, each registers the “videographer’s”, if I am still permitted the term, 
affective experience as one amongst, or of, many. Video quality and perspective, as well 
as what is (not) included, bear traces of singular decisions taken without concern for the 
final “product’s” reproducibility or marketability, which as the scare quotes suggest, is 
barely such.55 While they do circulate through unofficial channels, that is a secondary 
effect of the multitudinous singularities gathered in loving solidarity with these rebellious 
acts. We cannot confuse capitalist market forces as determinate of these admittedly not 
aesthetically pleasing pieces’ dissemination. But that’s not to deny indexical functioning, 
given that singularity is a core aspect of contingency, as Doane insists in the above cited 
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chapter. Rather, its indexicality follows Jane M. Gaines’s understanding of evidentiary 
indexicality, wherein as moving image, videos can provide a microcosmic, object lesson 
in determination within a given mode of production.56 Attesting to the emphatic 
relationality of the post-Fordist mode of production increasingly relevant in and 
determinate of this millennium, these videos are an early index of its determination of 
sociality, later more fully realized by social media algorithms, etcetera. Yet, they resist 
any facile extractive attempts in the sheer plurality of the media’s singularity, and the 
archival impediments implied by that ambivalence.57  
So, then, second- they do not situate the always unnamed and unnamable 
spectator in an authoritative position; rather, they submerge us in the cacophonous reality 
of the entre-muchos. Cacophonous in the sense that Merriam-Webster lends the term, 
defining it as a “harsh or jarring sound” (my emphasis). Their singularity is cacophonous, 
a harsh and jarring sound, because it is always and necessarily illegible to the archivist 
and the researcher (re)turning to that archive- sound and fury, signifying nothing. Always 
out of place, always interfering, always disrupting signification; each video’s 
cacophonous singularity submits the spectator to the ambivalent reality of the entre-
muchos without universalizing itself. If Philip Rosen is right in characterizing the 
archivization inherent in the process loosely written event-document-documentary as “the 
ongoing project of conversion of a relatively unbridled visual indexicality into sense”, 
then we must recall these cacophonous videos’ demand for supplementarity when he says 
that “the closer the image comes to being reduced to pure presence, the more it threatens 
to become unreadable and requires explanation” (63-4). In each person, in any moment of 
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and surrounding the video, an excess of decisions re-signifies constantly, refusing to be 
named and refusing to name; instead, it demands the fantasy of constantly folding our 
effort in to the cooperative experience of a love of the particular, such that it folds out 
into radical action’s persistence. Unlike its documentary cousins, this video does not 
reject, but rather embraces the potential in/of early film’s specter “of comprehension of 
the real through a decentralized, potentially free-floating spectatorship” (Rosen 75). 
Again, a paradoxical auto-didact’s pedagogy, through which we learn and teach in turn 
and simultaneously, in, out of, and from faith to the situation whose image flits before our 
eyes.58 Rejecting any sense of catastrophic history told through bourgeois mythopoetic 
incorporative narrativization, these videos register without capture an insuperable act of 
loving solidarity.  
 The videos’ supposed aesthetic deficiencies are what allow us to register the past 
situation’s plurality in our supplementary analysis and categorization. This analytic 
doubling of plurality’s register adds discursive texture- both to authorizable aesthetic 
production concerning that moment and our conceptualization of it, meant to provide 
legibility yet inevitably presuming the legible’s form. While it is somewhat apt to say that 
so-called “videographers” “eschew” the aesthetically pleasing, our awareness of its 
minimal presence foregrounds how structures of authorization and archivization 
overdetermine, on the superficial level, documentary production, and on a deeper level, 
our preemptive expectations and demands of said documentation. The contradictions and 
confusion of the intellectual feedback loop this produces is what reactionarily grants 
centrality to texts a là Corazón de fábrica when discussing radical documentary and 
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documentation, and thus to the theoretical-political underpinnings that I’ve highlighted in 
that work. However, a plurality of visual registers indexing a situation but barely 
capacitating their own legibility, restores in the present the past situation’s vibrant and 
overwhelming- thus cacophonous- potential. Without excluding the participants, the 
“documentarians”, the spectator, or the unknowable others that may come across them at 
a later juncture. We later participants can at once associate ourselves with jubilantly 
documenting solidarity while also understanding another’s act as radically distant. We 
can understand that our solidarity is messy, singular and perhaps too often elided, without 
for that being less important than spectacular acts that circumscribe situations and cast 
them forward in time by reducing them to a legible, archivable form.59 Despite historical 
failings, the videos overflow any supplementary stabilizing role in their affective 
capacity’s iterability; in their digital reproduction. 
 Further, this ability to be widely disseminated, due prior digital technology and 
social advances, allows them to exist in a space both precarious and resilient. Lacking the 
production and distribution of larger films, as well as institutionalized intellectual 
“property” protections that coappear with archivization, they thus lack some of the 
cultural durability attributable to conventional documentary. However, their incidental 
spectrality means that they can time and again reappear, as my commenting them years 
after and in a different situation bears witness to, permitting them a resilience and 
continuity beyond and otherwise than more staid persistence(s). While digital media’s 
indexical permanence is in perpetual beta, the ability of the people that produced and 
propagated these videos, and others, to re-access them means they maintain their 
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cacophonous presence as a fleeting yet recurrent force for destabilization and plurality, 
despite any political actor’s fixation or totalization of the past. The textured register that 
they (re)present persists beyond their emergent situation, constantly recontextualized as 
testifying to and complicating a singularly plural rebellion against capitalism’s ebbs and 
flows.   
 And yet, as I emphasize, we are filtering this through the retrospective of history, 
of time, of the archive attempting to constitute itself. The contrast that I set up among 
examples of documentary and documentation signals what escapes that framework- the 
singular’s sense, before and beyond common cause without, for that, ceasing in its 
ambivalent commonality. Seeing the massive manifestations that characterized the 
millennial moment in Argentina die down, it is difficult to prevent a certain sense of 
fatalism from creeping in- a sense of failure, regardless (or rather because) of the 
framework through which we appraise the moment. To escape this, we must understand 
that in the singular’s indeterminate movement towards the to come, the common is never 
effaced. As the affective escapes repression as an incontrovertibly singular and embodied 
register, continuous only in its differential re-intensification, the singularity through 
which it enters the knowable is the only vessel through which any sense of persistence 
can be traced. Holding as much for bodies as for videos, this links the audio-visual to our 
embodied singular plurality and forms the core of my disagreement with the multitude, 
towards which I have gestured. Without grasping how a shared affective imagination, 
which is to say commonality, might be carried forward with(in) the singularity and 
despite common generativity’s repression, thinking a rebellious continuity cannot but fall 
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into bourgeois historicity’s fatalistic mode. But, as events emerging in 2016 made 
abundantly clear, we cannot, in good conscience and solidarity with Argentine lives, deny 
that commonality’s persistence.  
or the Failure of Violence 
 Since 2016, in Argentina (and across the globe) large-scale social movements 
have emerged, most notably women’s mobilizations. One of the post-saqueo video 
groups, Ojo Obrero, has come out supporting them, releasing their first film after several 
years of mainly hosting workshops and talks in Buenos Aires. Moreover, in the last 
months of 2017 there was a massive, common uprising against Santiago Maldonado’s 
disappearance by the gendarmería during a mobilization in solidarity with Mapuche 
communities- an uprising which joined movements denouncing the disappearance of 
indigenous activist Milagro Sala.60 Both these instances and others function dispersedly 
and horizontally, manifesting a commons that traverses the walls of the State’s social 
sphere, resisting even nominal capture by capitalist apparatuses. They avail themselves of 
all the current modes of communication- from graffiti to digital presences- and striate 
neoliberal sociality at its boundaries and in its contradictory unity. Seeing this, one may 
ask: where were these people and doing what, if not producing a visible, that is 
spectacular, commonality?  
Again, the tensions between the entre-muchos and the multitude underscore our 
limitations. Multitudinous logic is inadequate when accounting for the common’s 
persistence in the singularity, rather than the singularity’s determination by the common’s 
generation. To accept that the common is produced in and by the action of singularities, 
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we cannot efface the simultaneous inversion: the common must necessarily exist in its 
entirety within, as constitutive of, each singularity, regardless of the status of its 
(re)production. But with this inversion, the commonality that becomes, or has been, part 
of interiority’s construction is inaccessible to systematized epistemic apparatuses by 
virtue of interiorization. Even amongst those engaging the co-constitutive ontological 
emergence (im)proper to collective being- e.g., Jean Luc Nancy’s singularly plural- the 
action of representing, thematizing or knowing interiority is kept in suspense as im-
possible.61 Maintaining interiority beyond our knowledge systems, these authors 
(un)wittingly emphasize the politico-ontological juncture’s core aporia: the singular 
experience of moving through ipseity towards collective action that, despite its 
commonality, always fails at adequation to excessive life and, thus, the common root of 
ipseity. This marks any project’s limited ability to articulate or name what is central to 
discussing collective politics. One might suggest that therefore Negri turns to Spinoza- he 
wishes to refrain from transcendentalizing the singular in a knowable generality, 
texturing the multitude’s surface but not subordinating it to the logic of sameness. 
Despite protestations, I would disagree. Just as Pierre Macherey notes a certain dialectical 
reading in The Savage Anomaly, I argue that despite, or because of, an insistence on the 
singularity’s ample sense- a body composed of singular parts, allowing it to signal both 
multitude and human body- Negri still ends all but subsuming the singular’s power, 
particularly regarding the human body, to the common’s necessity.62 His philosophical 
gesture resembles, in this, Corazón de fábrica’s audiovisual one.  
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Preferring the multitude’s logical priority over the embodied, singular experience 
of a human working in common, Negri, too, proffers the legible subjectivity I highlighted 
in Ardito and Molina’s film. In the final analysis, its collective contestation of common 
space and spatial practice is unavoidably saturated by state power, which translates 
capitalist modes of production into individuals constructed by the law around illusory 
privacy and self-constituting being. Without formally enacting generative, alternative 
relationality, nothing else is viable. Overdetermining singularities’ actions by the 
common, not allowing for the conflictive constitutions of space over time that generate 
collective action, Negri’s thought theoretically mirrors the assumption of archivable 
legibility driving production of and demand for contestatory documentaries. The film and 
Negri miss the opportunity to significantly challenge capitalist spatial articulations 
determinate of its relational modes. There is no pre-existing place for the cacophonous 
singularities’ divergent potential emergent in Argentina arde, nor for the polyvocality of 
rebellion and persistence signaled, yet never totalized, by Crónicas de libertad and other 
Grupo Alavío videos. The videos comprehend the interweaving of singular subjective 
experiences as collectively constituting movement in common from within and alongside 
their cacophonous reality. Without presuming the movement’s telos or consistency, nor 
the meaning and delimitation of where singularities come together. Neither they, nor I, 
pretend to negate the affective force and love generating common movements, nor 
presume their inevitability and constant generativity. Rather, they center the action and 
struggle of singularities as producing a commonality immanent to action, which may yet 
cease existing or shrivel before the violence of the law- except as it persists in the 
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singular subjects, logically prior to multitudinous expression. The videos (re)produce 
both their modes of commonality, allowing constantly differentiated movement outward 
from them as singularities, and each common emergence’s unique spaces and spatial 
practices (whose representations become the videos). Much like the concert videos’ 
cacophony signals an active coming together that preempts the documentary project’s 
prioritization of a homogenized multitude and persists beyond both documentary and 
concert, the singularities Negri subsumes to the multitude are logically prior to it and 
persist beyond, perhaps despite, any repression it faces. Life is cacophonous, and the 
singularities emerging from it do nothing to diminish that- they rather adjust to the 
sounds around them, coming together and moving apart, without abandoning what is 
common within them.  
 While I cannot completely detail Negri’s singular subordination, I will sketch its 
broad movements. Occurring throughout Kairós, Alma Venus, Multitudo, it is most 
extensive in Multitudo. The first key is during an exposition of “constellations productive 
of subjectivity”, synonymous with dispositifs or assemblages, when he affirms the 
constellation’s increased productivity relative to its co-operative singularities as the 
production of (communicative) surplus value. He asserts that “the singularities 
themselves would not exist without co-operation” and that the spontaneous multitude is 
“the power of the singularities that are brought together within co-operative 
constellations; and the common precedes production” (Kairós… 229 emphasis mine). His 
structure logically prioritizes the common’s production before the singular’s possibility 
and renders the productive cycle singularity-constellation-common circular; that is, 
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tautological. To reiterate, including my prior discussion- the common produced in co-
operation between singularities is also productive of singularities, necessarily potentiating 
the productivity of the constellations (re)producing it. Here he also suggests terms of the 
multitude’s failure, acknowledging possible impediments to its loving militancy: 
postmodern exploitation as deflation, or limiting the multitude’s expansion. A problem 
that, as I’ve insisted, only exists when ontologically prioritizing constant common 
generation through a universal love that effaces its necessary singularity by relying 
overmuch on slippages in meaning, both of “singular” and of “love”. 
 Repeating this circularity while discussing a micropolitics of bodies, Negri insists 
on bodies “as plurality and as relation” such that “the multitude reveals itself as an 
ensemble and an interweaving of corporeal singularities agitated in the teleological 
crucible of the common” (Kairós… 234). Several conceptual leaps necessitate the 
multitude’s revelation in and by the common, forcing a processual subsumption of the 
corporeal singularity (i.e. human body) without acknowledging the process’s multi-
directionality. For him, the singular multitude is greater than its parts, without 
abandoning or homogenizing them, and yet, confusedly, cannot be thought as 
transcending them.63 Because of this transvaluation, “[t]he political decision is always 
solely the decision of the multitude” which, while emphasizing the decision’s singularity, 
still renders logically impossible any corporeal singularity’s decisive difference by 
subsuming it to the multitudinous surplus produced by and yet determining it (Kairós… 
236 emphasis mine). One might argue here for a certain similarity with Derrida’s thought 
of the decision of the other in me, particularly as per my previous chapter, but this would 
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be to irremediably confuse the ontological and the political. While I agree that coming 
into being is as collective being- or as Nancy says, singularly plural- the decision’s 
impossible passage is always a uniquely singular experience pertaining to the folding-
back of/into ipseity. One cannot prioritize the decision of the multitude as common 
singularity because that presumes the corporeal singularity’s constant, decisive passage 
into being. Born of the face-to-face encounter with the Other, this passage is only 
experienced in the folding of intersubjective space prior to, yet determined as articulable 
in, the common. Here is where his explication of love would enter, as Negri attempts to 
retroactively determine singularities’ coming into being as an effect of the common; but 
his articulation of commonality presumes an event of naming that makes commonality’s 
logical priority impossible. I and the other coemerge, coeval in singular plurality, before 
and so that it is possible to speak of a we which always presumes- destabilizes and yet 
potentiates- I and Other.  
 The final section, on the Decision, most effaces the singular as an impossible 
instance of responsibility. His reasoning’s, and this effacement’s, culmination is given 
thus: “[t]he decision is always multilateral, ‘impure’ and monstrous, because the singular 
is always an immeasurable determination of bodies, of languages and of machines” 
(Kairós… 244 emphasis mine). He proceeds by clarifying that the decision is “an event 
that involves the common, that decides upon the common. But every decision that the 
singularity takes involves the common in some way” (Kairós… 245). His savagely 
effaced inversion resurfaces in this logical plenitude, in the decision’s force(s). There is a 
similarity to Derrida here, but only when the necessity of the singular human body’s 
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experiential persistence is reasserted against the common’s preeminence and alongside a 
refusal of the bourgeois individual’s continued subjective functioning. The passive 
decision’s heteronomy is thus complicated by the singularity’s plural constitution in and 
by the common, because the decision on the common in-volves the common and renders 
its identity within and without the singularity impossible. Common production may, or 
must, occur but cannot be known as common given that only within the singularity does 
the common other decides on itself, beyond the singularity it has determined yet which 
decides upon and generates it in the singular decision. I do not reject the common and its 
tensions; rather, I force those tensions to re-assert the persistence of a singular corporeal 
experience containing the common’s entirety as it decides, as much as it necessarily 
decides on, and with, the common itself, re-producing it. This is the core import of 
Fernández’s inversion, key to understanding the common project’s persistence, despite 
the diminished capacity for action engendered by a negative, affective exploitation of the 
communicative power produced in and producing the common. Without realizing the 
potential for radical persistence and for faithfulness to the loving friendship engendered 
in the mutually impossible responsibility of the face-to-face encounter, we wither in the 
face of death and exploitation, and the common withers with, or in us. 
 As mentioned, this is the theoretical equivalent of the audiovisual gestures. Both 
trace tensions between a common vision and the irreducible, singular ethico-political 
experience- which is at most a sensible, affective texture behind the cacophonous 
defacement of individual exteriority effected by a common refusal of individualism in 
favor of a coming politics. I have worked to trace alongside Argentine video and 
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documentary an anarchistic understanding of the singular’s necessary role in common 
continuity, without assuming its formal legibility for the patriarchive. One must 
recognize that all that is common is common only in singularities, themselves in common 
and common in themselves. Subordinating or subsuming the singular to the multitudinous 
project (be it political, philosophical or epistemo-historicist), and effacing the site of 
love’s and responsibility’s affective experiences, only invites failure. This holds not just 
in theory, but also in the representations that we make of political rebellion. Audiovisual 
and academic, sociological or philosophical- any grasping at a moment that presumes a 
consistency of what it grasps at will fall apart, as the life that compose a moment slips 
through our fingers.  
While Negri sets aside both Derrida and Levinas-in-Derrida as, respectively, too 
literary and too mystical, these objections seem to me, rather, strengths when 
approaching the multitude to recover something otherwise than Negri’s mystical, pauline-
inflected spinozian materialism.64 He includes them amongst thinkers of love, solidarity 
and friendship, that lack a thinking of subjectivity- a charge that unfairly understands 
their works and those of the others included with them, a group that mostly does not 
pretend to think militant subjectivity, unlike Negri (and myself). As I aim to retain Negri 
for thinking what’s to come through any situation or object, I must insist that love, art and 
solidarity necessarily rely upon the singular ethical experience as an indivisible part of 
the common’s broader ethics- especially after the euphoric optimism of the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries, captured in these documentaries and videos. For this, the 
deconstruction of the bounded individual is, and pardon the term, essential for 
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investigating the singularity-in-common that fulfills, we might say, Walt Whitman’s 
prophetic line: “(I am large, I contain multitudes)” (74). In my understanding, it corrects 
a tendency, ironic in Negri given his critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s opposite 
tendency, to favor the common and leave the singular ethical-political experience for the 
to come, as though it had not been thought by others.65  
Having moved further toward, or into, the to come of the emergent post-saqueo 
subjectivities, if we are to persistent in our singularly plural solidarity with what has 
been, we must make it impossible to think of failure while reflecting on hopeful 
affections. While the deconstructive gesture might not strive toward militant subjectivity, 
no textual gesture can- only the realization of horizontal left praxis can construct 
rebellious subjects. So, these tensions must be thought and explicated for consistency and 
to avoid effacing horizontal politics’ inherent ambivalence. For me, only in (the) 
common(s) can modelling singular action motivated by love and solidarity be thoroughly 
realized: it is struggle’s continuity and, re-presenting it here, audio-visual materials that 
most effectively comprehend the cacophonously singular experiences of affective 
complexity, resituating it in our present mo(ve)ments. Functioning according to these 
currents of solidarity and love, while also representing them, the burst of audiovisual 
production encompassing video rebelde carries those lessons out, to recontextualize- that 
is, re-produce- their commonality, time and again, with greater and greater force and 
despite unforeseeable capitalist resistance. 
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To see what is to come 
 If my constant theme has been the persistence of radical thought and subjectivity 
through time, I have pursued its elaboration by discussing audio-visuality because of the 
recent resurgence of this rebellion against the State. During increasingly ubiquitous 
digitalization, these movements exceed purely presentist spatial practices of territorial 
occupation, overflowing the digital sphere, wherein writing and the audio-visual 
intermingle on equal terms. As I explored with Grupo Alavío’s work and Argentina arde, 
these video forms don’t simply facilitate (albeit incomplete) representations of emergent 
singularly plural subjectivities, without presuming to archive some impossible totality; 
they spectrally persist beyond long standing hegemonic left politics, which centered the 
assumption of State power. Indexing a continual resurgence of rebellion in Argentina, 
they are points amongst others, registering a persistent radical subjectivity common as 
long as the singular composes and contains our commonality, carrying it forward.  
A conjunction of contestatory materials, they not only allow for a plurality of 
easily accessible documents indexing struggles past to facilitate those continued and 
those new; they also trace an anarchic drive that disassembles any attempted 
archivization of a life excessive to the State’s individualizing subjectivation. Both 
legalistic political subjectivation and multitudinous discourses of paradoxically 
transcendentalizing singularization are inadequate to life. These videos’ eternal (for now) 
return belies the political’s predetermined fixities at the moment of their failure to contain 
excessive life’s radical persistence, regardless of the State’s attempts to overdetermine 
subjective existence. They are testament to, and participant in, the escape of alternative 
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forms of being (political) from the bounds of previously convenient categories, to which 
the left so often subsumes its cacophony of voices. And, although figures like Solanas 
may continue cleaving to national utopian imaginaries, these videos and the movements 
they participated in re-present alternative relational modes beyond state bounds, even 
when it seems we might be ever mired by them.    
They also provide us with a strong sense of innovative continuity when 
approaching contemporary, lived rebellions. Particularly as regards Santiago Maldonado, 
disappeared while acting in solidarity with the Mapuche near the Chilean border (who are 
an originary threat to the colonial, capitalist State’s spatial practices and territoriality), the 
ability to escape, exceed, or move otherwise than the literal and figurative boundaries of 
State sociality and politics is a precondition of common continuity. Situating rebellious 
video within a larger continuity of writing and acting in loving solidarity with the 
unnamable excess within and without statist political subjectivity allows us to better 
sense what is to come by proliferating singular expressions of these tendencies- un-
countable voices speaking cacophonously beside and amongst one another. By preserving 
for the singular a role in common projects we also understand the limit case at which a 
common project might fail, particularly in being known but, more importantly, also as 
regards the question of its commonality.  
 That is, this discussion of commonality, expansive as it may be in theory, has so 
far obviated certain questions of recognition. To ask seems to contradict the thought I ask 
it of, but: which bodies can be in common, thus be singularly plural, in a practical sense? 
For instance, when we speak of ethical encounters in loving solidarity, but confine 
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ourselves to spatial practices more often than not urban, how does even this framework 
hold up beyond the urban? Does it function for subjects formed on the fringes of, but still 
central to, the neoliberal State, its changing mode of production and its relational modes? 
More importantly: to what extent does it account for impossibilities proper to a 
limitrophe experience of recognition, that of a subject continually but incompletely 
arriving to the common, cleaving to an arrival that cleaves them in turn and never permits 
the plenitude of singularity, as paradoxical as that may sound? As forms of being 
otherwise than state subjectivity flourish, further questioning the State’s assumptions, the 
question of commonality itself must come upon the originary limit of any American state 
discourse- the indigenous communities that have long superseded hegemonic politics. 
But to pretend that they can be wholly excluded from it would also be an error, as that 
line can never, neither in theory nor practice, be firmly drawn. Indigenous subjects have 
often participated in or formed part of hegemonic political and cultural practices, as much 
as they can and do produce forms of radical action both legible and illegible to 
apparatuses of authorization and recognition. A constant tension pervades the figure of 
the indigenous/subject when discussing radical politics in Latin America, strung out over 
the bar between indigenous and subject- a gap impossible to bridge completely, the point 
of failure for many politics of solidarity and any attempt to decide a common subject to 
come. So, I close this chapter with this open note - to what extent do the Mapuche, who 
already undermine the territorial distinction between the Argentine and Chilean states, 
and the modern State form as such, bring to their limits the questions of solidarity, love, 
failure, academia and the order of the law that I have, up until this point, explored?  
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Endnotes
                                                 
1 Here and throughout, my usage of the term “patriarchive” refers to the work of 
Jacques Derrida, specifically his Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, Trans. Eric 
Prenowitz, (Chicago: Univ of Chicago Press, 1998). 
 
2 Antonio Prado, amongst others, distinguishes both Bruckman and Zanón for 
their horizontal organizational methods in his article “Anarchism and Counterinformation 
in Documentaries: From Civil War Spain to Post-2001 Argentina,” Latin American 
Perspectives (2013 40.1) 50-59, which also details the similarities between video groups 
such as Grupo Alavío and Spanish anarchist cinema, and their relation to the style of 
Russian cinematographer Dziga Vertov. 
 
3 While there are countless sources attesting to this tendency, the following 
provide excellent overviews of the moment: Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin, 
“The Crisis of 2001 and Argentine Democracy,” Broken Promises; The Argentine Crisis 
and Argentine Democracy, Ed. Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2006) 3-26; Guido Galafassi, “Para Una Relectura De Los Procesos De 
Conflicto y Movilización Social En La Argentina De Inicios Del Milenio (2001-2003),” 
Revista Mexicana De Sociología (2012 74.1) 69–98; Olga Onuch, “’It’s the Economy, 
Stupid,’ or Is It? The Role of Political Crises in Mass Mobilization: The Case of 
Argentina in 2001,” Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming 
the Future, Ed. Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, & Christopher Wylde (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2014) 89-114; Christopher Wylde, “Continuity and Change in the 
Interpretation of Upheaval: Reexamining the Argentine Crisis of 2001-2,” Argentina 
Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, Ed. Cara Levey, 
Daniel Ozarow, & Christopher Wylde (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014) 23-44; 
and Maristella Svampa, “Revisting Argentina 2001-13: From “¡Que se vayan todos!” to 
the Peronist Decade,” Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming 
the Future, Ed. Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, & Christopher Wylde (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2014) 155-73.   
 
4 This, in turn, complicates the observations of Jean-Louis Baudry in "Ideological 
Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus," Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A 
Film Theory Reader, Ed. Philip Rosen (New York: Columbia UP, 1986) 286-97. Michael 
Renov, in the Introduction to Theorizing Documentary makes the essential point, 
regarding any privileged representative authority, that the main distinguishing mark of 
documentary vis a vis fiction is the historical status of its referent. Yet, despite this, as he 
says “[e]very documentary representation depends upon its own detour from the real, 
through the defiles of the audio-visual signifier (via choices of language, lens, proximity, 
and sound environment). The itinerary of a truth’s passage (with ‘truth’ understood as 
propositional and provisional) for the documentary is, thus, qualitatively akin to that of 
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fiction” (7). In the following, exactly those detours, and their slight returns, are what will 
interest me in this, nominally, documentary material. 
 
5 In this way, I respond to a similar demand as that of Paula Rabinowitz in her 
They Must Be Represented: The Politics of Documentary as concerns what subjective 
agency these texts seek to or might produce, but now in a moment beyond the centrality 
and assuredness of representation.  
 
6 A tendency to play with indexicality in post-200 Argentine films forms a central 
thematic in Verónica Garibotto’s excellent recent book, Rethinking Testimonial Cinema 
in Postdictatorship Argentina: Beyond Memory Fatigue- see especially Chapter 2. While 
I am here interested in the indexicality of these videos and documentaries, I leave aside 
any strong stance on the ontological debate around the shift from film to digital. I am in 
general agreement with Frank Kessler, particularly his “What you get is what you see: 
Digital images and the claim on the real” in Digital Material: Tracing New Media in 
Everyday Life and Technology, wherein he highlights how much of this concern hinges 
on the inherent manipulability of digital images- which, as he says, has long obtained 
regarding all forms of images and does not by necessity diminish the digital’s capacity to 
materially attest to an event’s having been. Acknowledging new ontological implications 
of the digital, I would like to sustain its indexical functioning, with a caveat- as Kessler 
says, “the ‘claim on the real’ no longer depends on the indexical image but on the status a 
viewer ascribes to that discourse” wherein audiovisual and photographic materials are not 
merely documents of, but discourses on what they happen to index (192). Hence my later 
turn to the substances of expression and content, and the fantasies they enable, to 
determine these materials’ status and functioning- and how the contingency of any 
captured image affects this play. Moreover, I would here highlight a fundamental 
misunderstanding in critiques of digital indexicality, one I return to below- its implicit 
dematerialization performed in the eulogies for film. Digital files are also profoundly 
material- those famed 1s and 0s are physically inscribed on the hard-drive that stores 
them and, as anyone with rigorous digital hygiene is aware, are significantly more 
difficult to eliminate than, say, a photographic negative is to burn. 
 
7 For a canonical exposition of the politics and place in global cinema history of 
classic argentine documentary, see Michael Chanan, The Politics of Documentary, 
(London: British Film Institute, 2007). Moira Fradinger, in her “Revisiting the Argentine 
Political Documentary of the Late 1950s and Early 1960s,” Latin American Perspectives 
(2013 40.1) 37-49, also offers a reflection on some classic documentaries through the 
lens of the contemporary resurgence of documentary and video.  
 
8 While my usage of this term was originally a reference to a conversation I had 
long ago with a good friend about lingering massive ideological tendencies, Paul A. 
Schroeder Rodríguez, in “After New Latin American Cinema” also highlights its use in a 
talk by Paul Leduc and explicates it, in relation to the many “lizards” of today, as 
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opposed to and, in its death, signaling the emergence of the video forms that I explore in 
this chapter. 
 
9 I owe this point to Alejandro Grimson’s “Spatial Politics and Urban Borders: A 
Study of Buenos Aires,” The City is the Factory: New Solidarities and Spatial Strategies 
in an Urban Age, Ed. Miriam Greenberg and Penny Lewis (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ 
Press, 2017) 178-96. 
 
10 The chapters by Edward Epstein and Maristella Svampa & Damián Corral in 
Broken Promises; The Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy, Ed. Edward Epstein 
and David Pion-Berlin (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006) explicitly link MTD de 
Solano with Aníbal Verón.   
 
11 For a detailed exploration of these continuities, see the chapters by Christopher 
Wylde and Cecilia T. Lanata Briones & Rubén M. Lo Vuolo in Argentina Since the 2001 
Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, Ed. Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, & 
Christopher Wylde (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014) and those by José Nun and 
Jorge Schvarzer in Broken Promises; The Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy, 
Ed. Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006). 
 
12 I am referring to the work “Police, Politics, and Society in the Province of 
Buenos Aires,” Broken Promises; The Argentine Crisis and Argentine Democracy, Ed. 
Edward Epstein and David Pion-Berlin (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006) 53-72.  
 
13 My usage of the necro-political here is entirely indebted to Achille Mbembe’s 
"Necropolitics," Public Culture (2003 15.1) 11-40.  
14 I borrow the term from Sayak Valencia’s Gore Capitalism but reject the 
paradoxically invisible spectacular visibility she ascribes to its role in contemporary 
capitalism. Despite its prominence, I see it as being a secondary function of 
contemporary capitalism and not a new form of primitive accumulation, as she intuits. 
 
15 I refer the reader back to the Introduction. 
 
16 As concerns the text’s nature as performative documentary, I again refer the 
reader to Veronica Garibotto, ibid. But, where she sees a tendency in this moment 
towards an almost absurd parody of testimonial documentary, Solanas’s performance 
here is decidedly overdetermined by his reasserting his authority in a testimonial mode 
associated with New Latin American Cinema- a movement he is strongly associated with. 
So, his performance is doubled, then- he is performing the conventions of performative 
documentary, while still falling back on a primary, mostly uninterrogated testimonial 
mode. More importantly, the emphasis I place here on the substance of expression and of 
content as facilitating fantastic identification and ideological construal are explicit 
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references to Paul Willemen’s “Idexicality, Fantasy and the Digital”, which informs their 
usage throughout. 
 
17 I owe this observation to Laura Podalsky’s The Politics of Affect and Emotion 
in Contemporary Latin American Cinema: Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, and Mexico, in 
Chapter 1 where she discusses NLAC tendencies. Also, this fits into what Philip Rosen 
says in “Document and Documentary: On the Persistance of Historical Concepts”, about 
the earlier, Griersonian schema wherein “the Griersonian conceptualization of 
documentary film is a theory about the function and duties of elites with respect to the 
mass of the population, not just as political leaderships but as ‘educators’ who, among 
other things, are urged to work as productive agents of the media” (80). Yet, as he adds 
shortly, complicating that point and moving us towards the following note, “Intellectuals 
are said to construct the mass in order to have something to direct information toward, as 
an addressee that can be moved to the end of promoting the good (liberal or 
revolutionary) society. Any such version of the mass, whether as the potential site of 
social harmony or revolution, becomes a fantasmatic social unity and directionality 
because it now stands revealed as a product of the delusory self-identifications of the 
intellectuals” (82).  
 
18 The purely negative version of this point is made most succinctly by María 
Belén Ciancio and Rachel Grace Newman in the article “Labyrinths and Lines of 
Memory in Documentary Film: Memoria del saqueo and Los Rubios from a 
Philosophical Perspective”.  
 
19 From now on, I will refer to them by their first names, as their comrades did, to 
not alienate their lives excessively in my writing. 
 
20 As Podalsky, ibid., says: “Instead of examining how films organize or fix the 
spectator’s visual apprehension of the profilmic space or how they deploy moral 
distinctions to align us with particular characters rather than others, we need to 
acknowledge and account for the myriad touch-points through which films and situated 
audiences encounter each other” (14).  
 
21 Concerning the general structure and tendencies of the melodramatic as a mode, 
and not a genre as such, see Linda Williams’s “Melodrama Revised” in Refiguring 
American Film Genres: History and Theory. As concerns the function of the 
melodramatic in driving active political radicalization, see Jane M. Gaines’s 
“Documentary Radicality” (which will return later). Finally, as regards emotional 
response/closeness as grounding representative reality/real-ness, see Gabriel F. Giralt’s 
“Realism and Realistic Representation in the Digital Age”.  
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22 When I refer to the invisible or invisibilization, I am referring to Michael 
Chanan’s piece “Filming ‘the Invisible’”, which was for him supplementary to the above 
The Politics of Documentary. 
 
23 In this way, the body is neatly fitted into the trifecta of corporeal representations 
that Bill Nichols highlights in the above cited chapter, “’Getting to know you…’: 
Knowledge, Power, and the Body”. To gloss, he sees the three orders as: 1) the social 
actor, subject of historical action and events, 2) the narrative character, object of actions 
and enigmas in the narrative and, finally, 3) a “mythical, ahistorical persona, type, icon, 
or fetish” (184). Here we clearly see Darío as construed visually within the third 
category- cast backward into the mythopoetic narrativization with which Solanas 
attempts to ground the Argentine people, and which he (perhaps ironically) shares with 
the Argentine state. This highlights the valence of the iconic, as opposed to solely 
symbolic or indexical, in Paul Willemen’s piece, ibid.- its referentiality as being 
fundamentally retrospective. That is the functioning to which he subordinates 
indexicality- and I would argue that the symbolic is nigh entirely effaced, as any 
(interpretive) futurity proper to it is always already of a future past.  
 
24 Concerning Grupo Alavío participating in an act of anarchist counter-
information, see Antonio Prado, ibid. While his exposition of stylistic similarities may 
present a weak linkage, based on the elevation of violent resistance to police repression 
and the politicized aesthetic decisions at play in the short, I am strongly inclined to agree. 
In another framework, Marita Sturken asserts that “independent video constitutes a field 
of cultural memory, one that contests and intervenes with official history” in a piece that 
opposes video memory to cinema as history (2). 
 
25 My preference here, and throughout, for the term “rebellion” or its variations is 
an explicit homage and reference to Albert Camus’s The Rebel, Trad. Anthony Bower 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1959). This despite his distaste for violence and my support 
for it, in certain instances, as well as various other philosophical disjunctions. 
 
26 Derrida, ibid., 10-11. 
 
27 This is, of course, referring to Bazin’s beautiful “Death Every Afternoon”, 
printed in translation in Rites of Realism: Essays on Corporeal Cinema. As he says, 
“Death is surely one of those rare events that justifies the term […] cinematic specificity” 
(30). 
 
28 As before, I use symbols conforming to Willemen’s, ibid., understanding of the 
symbolic as invested with futurity. 
 
29 While this point is oft repeated, for an interesting, tensed articulation of it, see 
the cited works by Colectivo Situaciones and the later, collective work by MTD de 
Solano and Colectivo Situaciones, composed as a corrective to the first. This pairing, 
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particularly in the framing by Colective Situaciones provided at the beginning of the La 
hipótesis 891…, in the hiatus between the words of the militant intellectuals and the 
piqueteros themselves across which both reach, serves to set up both a sense of continuity 
as well as innovation in the autonomist piquetero groups, impossible to do justice to, 
whatever that means, in those, my, or any text. 
 
30 My understanding of the distinction between affection and affect in Spinoza is, 
much like Negri’s, explicitly due to Gille Deleuze’s work, in particular his Spinoza: 
Practical Philosophy, Trad. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights, 1988). 
 
31 For an excellent overview and discussion of Latin American thought 
concerning television and the screen, see Patrick Dove, Literature and “Interregnum”: 
Globalization, War, and the Crisis of Sovereignty in Latin America (Albany: SUNY 
Press, 2016), predominately Chapter 2.  
 
32 With rostro, I refer to Giorgio Agamben’s writing on the face in Means Without 
End, but I have consciously chosen to maintain the Spanish translation for “face” in the 
title. The Spanish terms mirror what he does with “volto” and “visi” in the original 
Italian, and, aside from the Spanish term being subject appropriate, I prefer it to the 
rendering as “face” and “visage” in the English, which presents what I feel is the opposite 
of the terms’ usages.  
 
33 In a certain sense, this video structures and produces the event of the archive’s 
destructuration, given that “the technical structure of the archiving archive also 
determines the structure of the archivable content even in its very coming into existence 
and in its relationship to the future. The archivization produces as much as it records the 
event” (Derrida, ibid., 17). 
 
34 In a rather characteristic move, Derrida makes this point in a footnote near the 
beginning, conventionally understood, of Archive Fever, which I quote here at length, 
highlighting his assertion concerning measurement:  
Of course, the question of a politics of the archive is our permanent orientation 
here, even if the time of a lecture does not permit us to treat this directly and with 
examples. This question will never be determined as one political question among 
others. It runs through the whole of the field and in truth determines politics from 
top to bottom as res publica. There is no political power without control of the 
archive, if not of memory. Effective democratization can always be measured by 
this essential criterion: the participation in and the access to the archive, its 
constitution, and its interpretation. (4)  
 
35 My thinking of the state of the university and its function in the (post-)modern 
moment is heavily indebted to Willy Thayer, La crisis no moderna de la universidad 
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moderna: Epílogo de El conflicto de las facultades (Santiago de Chile: Cuarto propio, 
1996).   
 
36 The idea of a militant intellectual is most thoroughly explored at the beginning 
of the joint work by MTD de Solano and Colectivo Situaciones, La hipótesis 891: Más 
allá de los piquetes (Buenos Aires: ED Mano a Mano, 2002).  
 
37 I must admit here that, while my work and in many ways that of Fernández 
stresses autonomist elements of the moment, that is not to say that all assemblies and 
piquetero groups can be characterized as such. In fact, that very diversity and 
fragmentation plays a key role in the coming years’ dissolution and diminution of the 
energies of this moment. For an excellent look at the composition of the masses in 2001 
and 2002, see the chapters by Maristella Svampa & Damián Corral and Edward Epstein 
(2006), ibid. 
 
38 Concerning the literality of these -territorializations, see Galafassi, ibid., 
Grimson, ibid., and Svampa (2014), ibid. 
 
39 This point is particularly salient given the relevance that autonomist thought had 
in Argentina at the time, as noted by Scorer, ibid. It is worth noting that I, as will become 
apparent, am inclined to disagree with his heavy-handed application of autonomist 
concepts, at times without modification, to the Argentine situation, which leads to what I 
feel are mis-readings of several historical texts and overdetermined discussions of various 
events. 
 
40 These weren’t new difficulties even then, as evident in the MTD de Solano and 
Colectivo Situaciones’ La hipótesis 891: Más allá de los piquetes, which discusses them 
from the crisis’s outset by recalling long standing left schisms, reinforcing continuity 
without effacing the moment’s unique aspects, nor the specter of failure. While recalling 
to mind my discussion of the Montoneros and the left in the previous chapter, I would 
like to append a citation James McGuire’s Peronism Without Perón: Unions, Parties, and 
Democracy in Argentina (Stanford: Stanford Univ Press, 1997). While this is not his 
goal, the machinations and infighting that he details, particularly amongst the various 
unions associated with Peronism, does an excellent job of demonstrating why the 
working classes that might otherwise rely on the unions found themselves somewhat 
abandoned to their fate, particularly in the two decades leading up to the 2001 crisis. 
 
41 On Kirchner’s policies/politics regarding the piqueteros, see the chapters by 
Epstein and Svampa & Corral, ibid., as well as those by Svampa and Dinerstein in 
Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, Ed. Cara 
Levey, Daniel Ozarow, & Christopher Wylde (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014).  
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42 These various conflicts offer one well tread disagreement with the multitude by 
complicating almost to the point of annulling Negri’s universalizing assertions about real 
subsumption, destabilizing its temporality. For an excellent discussion of this and other 
debates concerning Marxist concepts and their use in Negri, in the context of a defense of 
Negri, see Kenneth Surin, “’Now Everything Must Be Reinvented’: Negri and 
Revolution,” The Philosophy of Antonio Negri, Ed. Timothy S. Murphy and Abdul-
Karim Mustapha, Vol. 1 (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2005) 205-42. We could follow with a 
discussion of primitive accumulation and extractivism in Latin America, as he does in a 
2011 interview with members of Colectivo Situaciones. The interview with these 
members can be found at https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/dialogos/21-208601-2012-
11-26.html 
 
43 In addition to the many previous cited works, see also Miguel A. Rivera-
Quiñones’s chapter “Macroeconomic Governance in Post-Neoliberal Argentina and the 
Relentless Power of TNCs: The Case of the Soy Complex” in Argentina Since the 2001 
Crisis: Recovering the Past, Reclaiming the Future, Ed. Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, & 
Christopher Wylde (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014) 67-86. In it he provides a 
strong analysis of this rocky transition during the Kirchner years, using the role of Trans-
National soy processing corporations as a case study. 
 
44 Concerning the political and economic machinations of Macri during this era, 
see the piece “Argentina's Main Opposition Figure Faces Multiple Legal Challenges” by 
Andrés Gaudín, as well as several previously cited works. In Marcos Novaro’s Historia 
de la Argentina contemporánea: de Perón a Kirchner (Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2006), a 
serpentine recounting of the political machinations over several decades in Argentina, the 
Macri family also receives special mention as one of few business groups favored by the 
dictatorship. Heike Schaumberg’s thinking of the Kirchner years as a crisis intermezzo, 
or a break between crises, in “Argentina Since 2001: From Spontaneous Uprising to 
“Transition,” or a Crisis Intermezzo?” Argentina Since the 2001 Crisis: Recovering the 
Past, Reclaiming the Future, Ed. Cara Levey, Daniel Ozarow, & Christopher Wylde 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014) 135-54, becomes frighteningly prescient in the 
2016/17 moment. 
 
45 He follows the logic: appetite as man’s essence, pursuing perfection in an 
indefinite time-desire as appetite accompanied by its idea-joy as the passion through 
which mind passes to greater perfection-love as joy accompanied by an idea of external 
cause. See his The Savage Anomaly pp. 144-7. 
 
46 While Spinoza begins to set up his discussion in part IV of the Ethics (see, for 
example, IV P59, 147) it comes to a fuller articulation in part V, Of Human Freedom, 
principally between P7, 165 and P16, 169. Reading these propositions alongside Negri’s 
thought of the multitude makes it immediately apparent that they are of principal 
necessity to his thinking of the affective state of said multitude, despite his hesitancy in 
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The Savage Anomaly to consider the fifth part finished, perhaps due to a certain 
dialectical tendency of his reading, to which we will return. But, to further support a key 
assertion of my own, one might understand his reticence before passages such as 
Proposition 9: “If an affect is related to more and different causes which the mind 
considers together with the affect itself, it is less harmful, we are less acted on by it, and 
we are affected less toward each cause, that is the case with another, equally great affect, 
which is related only to one cause, or to fewer causes” (166). Spinoza makes this point 
specifically to assert the diminution of harmful affects, but it also serves to emphasize the 
importance of maintaining a strong thought of the singular in discussions of the affective, 
as opposed to granting preeminence to the multitude or the common, to allow for 
continued action despite negative affections- something Negri does not do, as I will 
attempt to show as this chapter progresses. 
 
47 The centrality and importance of pietas is made most clear by Spinoza in Part 
V, Proposition 20 (170 in the cited text). Mutman makes these points in “Difference, 
Event, Subject: Antonio Negri’s Political Theory as Postmodern Metaphysics”. 
 
48 While this tension plays a central role in determining the discussion in the 
passages cited in the above note, it is played out mainly in part IV and is the driving force 
for his shift towards the preeminence of Reason, the nonetheless imperfect understanding 
of which man might have he states most clearly in the Scholium to Proposition 62 (149).  
 
49 Mutman makes this point most succinctly on pages 155-7. 
 
50 In this he contradicts a reading of Spinoza understanding the affects’ intensities 
and the in-dissociable imaginations they inspire, as Spinoza even suggests negative 
affections’ utility as a check to excessive love, despite love’s primacy. What interests me 
in Spinoza’s discussion begins in part IV at propositions 43 and 44 (139) and continues 
until proposition 58 (146), with the conjunction of proposition 47: “Affects of hope and 
fear cannot be good of themselves,” and the scholium to proposition 54, which presents 
how those affects, and others, may come to be good, being of particular interest to my 
disagreement with Negri. 
 
51 While my most explicit engagement with Mor appears in this section, my 
thought on this period of audio-visual production in Argentina and its politics is more 
than heavily indebted to her work Transition Cinema: Political Filmmaking and the 
Argentine Left since 1968, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012). In truth, my 
work could not exist without hers, and for that I am deeply grateful. 
 
52 Horacio Legras discusses similar issues of legibility as concerns the emergence 
and activities of these groups in Argentina in a piece entitled “Insurgencia popular e 
inscripción soberana en las mobilizaciones populares del año 2001 en Argentina”, which 
he was kind enough to share with me and for which I am very thankful. While his 
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discussion centers the ways in which the physical occupation of urban space by these 
groups’ manifestations, which took as their central referent(s) spaces established by and 
inscribed within the national imaginary, thus (re-)incorporating them into hegemonic 
political flows and lending a historical coherence to the moment, my centering of audio-
visual material and archival questions is meant to underscore similar dilemmas in 
discussions of audiovisual representation and subjectivity.   
 
53 Some introductory discussion to this event can be found in the cited articles 
“Marcha en defense del cine nacional: Los directores, contra el ajuste del Incaa” and 
“Más ajuste: el INCAA anunció que en 2018 no dará créditos al cine argentino” and 
several pieces discussing this can be found on Ojo Obrero’s blog, available at 
http://ojoobrero.org/wordpress/textos/. 
 
54 This cinephilia is a strong presence in Doane’s piece and debates around 
Willemen’s work. For a lovely elaboration of these debates’ theoretical kernel as they 
relate to indexicality, see André Habin’s “Reel Changes: Post-mortem Cinephilia or the 
Resistance of Melancholia”.  
 
55 As such, they embody something alluded to by Monica Frota in her “Taking 
Aim: The Video Technology of Cultural Resistance”, that is, that the political efficacy of 
video as such can be processual, as opposed to product-oriented.  
 
56 This point comes almost directly from Gaines’s excellent “Documentary 
Radicality”, especially comments on p.13.  
 
57 In referencing the media’s singular plurality, or plural singularity, I am 
referencing the excellent talk given by Samuel Weber at USC as part of the “Media, 
Form and Thought” lecture series on March 18th, 2019, entitled “The Mediacy of the 
Media: A Psychoanalytic Account”. While the talk is unpublished, he was kind enough to 
provide me with the text afterwards, for which I am immensely grateful. 
 
58 And this pedagogical slant is not at all foreign to video. As Ron Burnett points 
out in his contribution to Resolutions: Contemporary Video Practices, entitled “Video: 
The Politics of Culture and Community”, “perhaps the most important is that the 
electronic image can be an effective tool to teach and inform both practitioners and 
viewers. This is, in a sense, the philosophical and ideological basis upon which the video 
movement has built its credibility” (283).  
 
59 Although, we must always keep in mind that supplementing their indexicality 
has had and continues to have a stabilizing role in modernity. As Doane says in another 
piece, “[t]he isolation of contingency as embodying the pure form of an aspiration, a 
utopian desire, ignores the extent to which the structuring of contingency, as precisely 
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asystematic, became the paradoxical basis of social stability in modernity” (“The 
Object…” 87). 
 
60 For some introduction to and analysis of these different movements, see: 
Andrés Gaudín, “Argentina Riled by Case of Missing Activist,” NotiSur, 13 October 
2017, ladb.unm.edu/notisur; Andrés Gaudín, “Calls for the Release of Jailed Activist Go 
Unheeded in Argentina,” NotiSur, 13 January 2017, ladb.unm.edu/notisur; Johanna 
Marris, “Mass Condemnation of Gender Violence Leads to Regional Protests on 
Unprecedented Scale,” NotiSur, 18 November 2016, ladb.unm.edu/notisur; Constanza 
Tabbush and Melina Gaona, “Gender, Race, and Politics in Contemporary Argentina: 
Understanding the Criminalization of Activist Milagro Sala, Leader of the Organización 
Barrial Tupac Amaru,” Feminist Studies (2017 43.2) pp. 314-47. 
 
61 Here I restrict myself to commenting the ontological work of the titular essay in 
Jean-Luc Nancy, ibid. 
 
62 I refer here to Pierre Macherey, "Negri's Spinoza: From Mediation to 
Constitution," The Philosophy of Antonio Negri, Ed. Timothy S. Murphy and Abdul-
Karim Mustapha, Vol. 2 (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2007) 7-27. 
 
63 On the confusedness of this gesture, see again Mutman, ibid., p. 153-7. Doing 
nothing to help, Negri, on p. 240 of the text, negates the singularity’s negation in the 
common, insisting that therein it is somehow posited again- without difference- while the 
common is also always already constitutive of it. 
 
64 For Negri’s extended commentary on Derrida and the other thinkers, see 
Casarino and Negri, ibid. 86-9. Mutman, ibid., also points to this assertion in Kairós, 
Alma Venus, Multitudo and succinctly points out its strange hypocrisy in note 17 of his 
piece (166). 
 
65 As concerns the elucidation of his divergences from and commonalities with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking of multiplicity, and his passing commentary on their 
emphasis on the singular, which I am referencing here, see Casarino and Negri, ibid. 123-
9.   
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Chapter 4 
 
In the folds of a blue dream:  
Elicura Chihuailaf and his Impossible Place 
 
Power does not deprive or strip freedom from the person; 
freedom establishes those categories of persons 
who will be prohibited from the concerted exercise 
which, alone, constitutes freedom. 
-Judith Butler, Who sings the nation-state? 
 
 I ended the prior chapter with a damning question; damning for my own work, 
surely, but also for the discourses of left politics I have engaged and that pervade the 
histories of the works I have chosen so far. And so, it’s fitting that the question is 
reiterated here, to leave little doubt of my final inquiries’ tone. Given that relations, or 
lack thereof, with the various peoples subsumed under the term “indigenous” are 
foundational to the development of the Latin American state, in the plenitude of the term 
foundational that brings in the threat, the promise, questions of hospitality and 
recognition, the economic bases for development and much more- to what extent can we 
speak of indigeneity using state language? Even when those terms emerge from thinking 
non- and anti-statist subjectivities, persisting in common as an escape from the capitalist 
State’s apparatuses of economic and epistemic capture, can they ever truly arrive at a 
recognition and speaking of the Mapuche, who I will take as exemplary for this chapter, 
in Chile and Argentina? Or rather, to fold the problematic over itself, can they ever 
permit that the Mapuche arrive, completely, if I might foolhardily use that word, to the 
language of a politics determined by or in conflict with the (always already colonial) 
capitalist State and its law as inscribed in and inscribing its language? This problematic 
brings to bear everything I have explored up to this point: the patriarchive as determining 
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the legibility of subjectivities and aesthetic objects; the ethical experience of a 
responsibility engendered in the loving face to face encounter with the other, before the 
law, and carried out despite the comrade’s absent presence; and the structures of 
recognition and authorization determining the limits at which one might, or must, act out 
(of) a solidarity without nomological pretense. That, instead, we must write only so that 
others may continuously be capacitated to bear loving solidarity forward in the iterability 
of a politics that refuses to capture the unknowable other by any given, or received, 
concept.  
 There is an immense temptation, constantly present when discussing Latin 
American leftism, to take for granted that the way left politics are formulated will equally 
well serve the colonized populations of the continents, who are, to date, undeniably ill 
served by all forms of dominant, State politics since European colonization. I share this 
temptation as I attempt to trace alternative ways to conceive of what, perhaps, straddles 
the limits of the political in Argentina and Chile, with an eye towards establishing a 
loving sense of friendship and solidarity amongst the cacophonous singularities that 
constantly emerge as an escape from the State’s language. But, and I ended the last 
chapter with this qualification, even the most horizontal movements for singularly plural 
being are only just now, it seems, truly coming upon the originary limits of State thought; 
nay, the thought of Latin America as such. An encounter that can only reinforce that, best 
intentions aside (best being perhaps too generous), they did not yet include the 
indigenous peoples in their relational modes. At least, not in such a way as to allow that 
both parties acted and increased their capacity to act, mutually- something I consider an 
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effective baseline for measuring solidarity beyond any production of abjection or 
spectacular redemption on the part of whomsoever assumes it.1 As such, this will tense in 
the utmost all thought of solidarity, love and unity that may arise in these encounters- or 
rather, may have arisen beforehand. Which is exactly the problem.  
At the moment of writing this, in early 2018, beyond five centuries of colonial 
violence, there have been almost three decades of renewed resistance by the Mapuche in 
both Argentina and Chile, coinciding approximately with the end of their respective 
dictatorships. The incidents in Argentina have brought forth the recurrent cries of anarchy 
and lawlessness that characterize the capitalist State’s response to challenges to its 
sovereign authority to dispose of all that falls within its bounds- lives and land alike. This 
has signaled a surprising resurgence in awareness of and debate concerning the Mapuche 
in Argentina. Chile, on the other hand, is at the point of closing a third decade of 
outspoken activism by Mapuche and non-Mapuche alike, against repressive state politics 
regarding the indigenous inhabitants of Chile, insofar as the State chooses to 
acknowledge their existence. Along with the unique history of persistent resistance by the 
Mapuche to Spanish colonial rule, this forceful continuity is why I focus principally on 
the Chilean context. But let it be stated without hesitation- these conflicts belie the very 
territorial distinctions upon which the two States attempt to geographically distinguish 
themselves and, moreover, deeply engage them as the re-emergence of a profoundly 
existential threat.  
 A geopolitical, territorial distinction with colonial roots, the name “Chile” also 
demarcates the region within which the most innovative and internationally recognized 
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Mapuche figures have been working to assure autonomy and pluricultural recognition for 
their people- many of whom are also poets and public figures.2 The tensions within the 
work, both poetry and prose, of renowned Mapuche poet and activist Elicura Chihuailaf 
Nahuelpán will allow me to tentatively offer some answers to the questions with which I 
open this chapter. In short, I find that from between his prose and poetry emerges what I 
would call, following Jacques Derrida, a hypermnesic poetics that coextensively marks 
the success and failure of his articulatory project, meant to situate the Mapuche in 
dialogue with the Chilean people- although, we may ask, speaking whose language?3 
This lingering question should unsettle, given my earlier exploration of how failure and 
success are overdetermined by the bourgeois State’s language and history, in their 
contemporary colonial and capitalist forms.  
Chihuailaf’s project is articulated from within the bounds of its subject matter, 
which lends it both its possibility of success and the inevitability of failure- and is also 
what renders it an effective, legible act from which we might learn. In this sense, I re-
emphasize the need for what I previously called an auto-didactic pedagogy, in this case in 
what could be fairly called a modality of subalternism- or, at least, a certain strain of it, 
retaining some aspects and eliding others. Two assertions, each concerning a different 
subalternist group, will clarify my situation regarding this mode of reading. Following 
Dipesh Chakrabarty, I would (re-)affirm that “subaltern is what fractures from within the 
signs that tell of the insertion of the historian (as speaking subject) into the global 
narratives of capital…for subaltern histories [or, and also, in my case, letters] do not refer 
to a resistance prior and exterior to capital” (“Marx after…” 1096 my emphasis). To this 
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remark I would conjoin Alberto Moreiras’s metacritical observation, concerning 
explicitly latinamericanist subalternism, that “debería hablarse de un retrazamiento de 
fronteras epistémicas más que de un cambio paradigmático radical en el modelo 
subalternista” (“Elementos…” 879 my emphasis). The tensions and encounters between 
these two observations of the always already extant inclusion of the subaltern in the 
functioning and epistemologies of capitalism, and thus the nation-state, trace the 
problematic that Chihuailaf forces recognition of by exposing, within his work, his own 
incomplete positionality.4 To pose this tension within the terms of his project, when at the 
end of De sueños azules y contrasueños he destabilizes any faulty hermeneutics of 
solidarity by subverting the presumptions of origin and target languages- such that 
“Caminata en el Bosque” which reads “Ebrio de Azul voy / entre el follaje / de la taberna 
sagrada” precedes and thus is posited on the verso as the original form of the 
Mapudungun text “TREKAYAWVN MAWIZA MEW” which reads “Amulen ñi 
golliñgen Kallfvlelu mew / ragi pu row / gollipeyem gillatuwe mew”, on the recto (De 
sueños… 130-1)- we are also made to reject any simplistic establishment of the I/Other 
distinction which would abject him by virtual incorporation to an academic, thus 
capitalist and colonial, framework. That is his work’s call- a demand that we constantly, 
almost programmatically, do away with our presumptively transparent and bounded 
positionality and, thus, the presumed accessibility of his as determined by colonial, 
capitalist discursive frameworks. This chapter’s question, and thus work, will be to trace 
that call in the two works I have chosen- Recado confidencial a los chilenos and De 
sueños azules y contrasueños.    
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So, moving away from the hasty presumptions of dominant analytic tendencies, 
and toward the ambivalent duality of Chihuailaf’s oeuvre, will allow me to demonstrate 
how it is marked by a constancy of (incomplete) arrival, in place of positional fixity. That 
is, being composed entirely of languages of arrival, subjective plenitude in both the 
colonial language and the colonial vision of a nostalgic mother tongue being for him 
interdicted, it demands an interrogation of the limits of even anti-capitalist discourses, at 
least in their more traditional mode. Of course, this bears such weight specifically 
because it is at this limit that we must, therefore, act in solidarity. Tracing these tensions 
in his work, I will demonstrate that, in the final analysis, there is nothing that even the 
most common sense of emergent subjectivity can say about the Mapuche who, for all 
their apparent and self-shown plenitude of existence and thought, exist in the colonial, 
capitalist discourse that overdetermines even my work only in their historically 
determined, virtual incorporation to and by the same. They are to any winka discourse 
arrogant enough to try naming, therefore fixing, them, only specters returning time and 
again as an anarchivic force within state memory. One that can say nothing about the 
lived experience of the Mapuche themselves. Specters that only speak a colonial 
memory’s failings, infinitely distant as they are from lived Mapuche reality. This chapter, 
picking up where the prior left off, will not so much be about Mapuche activism more 
broadly, which would require far more space than I can devote to it here. Rather, I will 
emphasize how one Mapuche poet-activist’s work teaches the winka (wherever we may 
be) our own failings from within the system that produces them, so that we might stand in 
solidarity from our failure, to recognize and speak alongside him without presuming to 
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(re)capture the sundered singularity that he is, as we are.5 That is, how Chihuailaf 
formulates his project not as attesting to some outside, and thus not as testimonio, but 
rather as a formal reproduction of the subjective excision performed on the Mapuche by 
the capitalist State to found and reproduce the same/different divide necessary to its 
functioning, thus making opaque the presumed transparency of winka positionality that is 
the epistemo-ontological blockage in the capitalist knowledge structure.6 
Selecting for the same 
 Given that one of my work’s binding themes has been the spectral influences of 
non-statist left politics on emergent subjectivities and their manifestation as acts for the to 
come, selecting Chihuailaf as point of inflection for my conclusion may seem doubly in 
error. He is a prominent Mapuche spokesperson, or in Mapudungun werken (messenger), 
navigating an endlessly complex relationship with the Chilean state and its politics, 
epistemologies and ontologies; and amongst the political mapuche poets, although they 
are all in greater or lesser measure political, he seems less militantly aligned with 
disjunctive autonomist projects that more closely parallel the type I explored before. In 
terms of content and subject position, David Aniñir, or perhaps even Jaime Huenún, 
would seem significantly more in line with radically exodic movements that distance 
themselves from the overdetermined apparatuses of state law, and thus more readily 
dialoged with concerning those themes.7 But that, as is oft said, makes all the difference. 
As I will examine further when we discuss literary criticism’s fondness for narratives of 
hybridity and resistance, which I reject for various reasons, the contestatory mode still 
serves in many ways to engage and reinforce the structures that it legitimately opposes, 
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albeit by serving as vessel for and target of a negative identification. We saw this before, 
with the modes of contestatory documentary still circumscribed by the law and state 
power, despite not being less valuable for that fact.  
 Rather than those poets, I chose Chihuailaf because as regards the Mapuche’s 
engagement by the State’s authoritarian and authorizing apparatuses, that is, by state 
recognition via repressive and aesthetic mechanisms, he fills a role similar to Parra and 
Gelman for those who hope to better think solidarity with Mapuche struggle. Chihuailaf 
offers a recognizable figure with whom to dialogue- acknowledging his own singularity 
within a people of which he is a well-known member, he still writes such that the walls of 
the Chilean state bear the marks to be read of what lives beyond them.8 He constantly 
challenges the Chileans to act out of loving solidarity with a group rendered impossibly 
inarticulate within institutional language. As he says, he strives to establish “puntos 
comunes de conversación, en la dualidad del acuerdo y del disentimiento” (Recado 10). 
Transiting that duality, he traces the duality of his own gesture’s continuance as both 
success and failure, coetaneous with each other in a certain measure. In his anti-capitalist 
and anti-state writings on Mapuche history and actuality, as well as his more personal, 
but not less political, poetry, he highlights the Mapuche plight before global capital’s 
rapaciousness and, moreover, evidences the impossibility of a significant and sensible 
incorporation of Mapuche life to the Chilean state’s epistemo-ontological functioning. 
This ambivalence is key to my reading. He simultaneously inscribes the Mapuche’s 
current, and historical, plight within a public discourse marked by a complete erasure of 
their being, while also forcefully signaling to the Chileans that when they speak of the 
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Mapuche in the State’s language, they only ever speak to the spectacular incorporation of 
colonialism’s displaced violence, in a distorted return. The State cannot speak the vibrant 
Mapuche culture of which he writes, as it is inaccessible to its knowledge systems and 
language. This sets Chihuailaf apart from other poets and activists, for better and for 
worse.9 My assertions about the spectacular, and thus spectral, incorporation of the 
Mapuche figure to the Chilean state’s founding narrative(s) present a strong break from 
tendencies to view them as an anachronistic colonial relic or as a backward rural 
population, despite or perhaps because of their periodic participation in State efforts, so a 
brief historical exposition is overdue. I will also elaborate the first sense of Chihuailaf’s 
work, specifically his prose- that of success- before moving on to his poetry. 
 Pretending to make a totalizing gesture that summarizes the historical encounters 
between the Mapuche and the colonizers would be absurd and, in my case, profoundly 
contradictory. Not to mention that, as is oft insisted upon by Mapuche and winka 
academics, while they may be broadly subsumed under the name Mapuche, the reality is 
heavily marked by geographic distinctions within the larger community.10 Historically 
and into the present day it has incorporated several different toponymic groups- 
Lafkenche, Pewenche, and the newer Warriache being three examples of many (the suffix 
-che means “people” and the preceding word indicates, to a greater or lesser extent, 
region).11 While they currently broadly conceive of themselves a unitary but 
differentiated pueblo, that, of course, does not preclude conflicts and tensions among the 
groups. Here I’ll broadly sketch their unique history as an indigenous pueblo not 
conquered by the Spanish. The point is not to write a consistent history, or even to 
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genealogically link the indicated points, beyond statist historicity. Rather, I offer the 
following observations as referents for my analysis and conception of Mapuche-Chilean 
(non)relations- both concerning the quantifiable history and, further, historical 
methodology.  
Colonial encounters 
When Spaniards arrived to what is now South America, the Wallmapu (Mapuche 
lands) extended from the river Copiapó to the Island of Chiloe and included broad swaths 
of what we now understand as Argentina.12 Primarily an agricultural society, it was 
nonetheless split into several distinct social and spatial organizations which, as Pablo 
Marimán explains, included functions, functionaries and spaces for politics, religion, 
education, health and the many other things we currently associate with established social 
and political environments. Of its general tendencies, he says “generó unidades 
territoriales (Wichan mapu) que se entendieron para una gobernabilidad más extendida 
que concentrada, que los terminó haciendo actuar como un cuerpo, aunque sin presentar 
una cabeza aparente” (Escucha 66). What we now call the Mapuche people, as far back 
as we may understand, operated without either a sovereign or, as Marimán puts it, a 
“pyramidal” state organization determining distribution of power and resources. This 
general mode of organization held during Spanish colonial presence due to a successful 
and hearty series of ongoing conflicts that included, early on, the defeats and deaths of 
two governors (Pedro de Valdivia and Martín García Oñez de Loyola) and later 
encompassed a series of parlamentos, the first being held in Quilin in 1641 and the final 
in Negrete, in 1803. That’s not to say that incursions, attacks and horrors were not 
203 
 
concomitant features of Spanish presence but, rather, the Mapuche beat them back so 
consistently that the boundary established at Quilin, the river Bíobío, was fairly stable.  
 But here we are due a first caveat. As I implied in the previous chapter, armed 
conflict’s ups and downs provide some of the finer material for a bourgeois mythopoetic 
narrative of the people. Thoroughly appropriated, structurally, by the capitalist nation-
state’s self-narrativization, it should inspire caution when it appears in narratives 
divergent from the State’s. Regarding the Mapuche, despite prominent, epic retellings of 
their bellicose heroism in, for example, Alonso de Ercilla’s La Aruacana, this always 
only past “heroism” is a product of colonial contact and a burgeoning chileneidad.13 Not 
to claim Mapuche insularity or anterior passivity, baseless given the evidence of 
intergroup contact; rather, I wish to highlight the problematic universalization of a 
particular history.14 Lucía Guerra-Cunningham refers to this pervasive post-colonization 
militarism as a “bellicose contagion [contagio bélico]”, a useful phrase for thinking the 
spread of social re-organizations seen in the work of Guillaume Boccara and Luis 
Cárcamo that details how colonial contact- for instance, the introduction of the horse- 
altered Mapuche society.15 Epic histories, then, are the late colonial discourse’s 
incorporation of its own distorted tendencies, reflected back by a people that it construed 
as a mirror for itself. When winka history speaks of the Mapuche, it is legible only as 
speaking of a colonial desire’s spectral (re)incorporation, a desire projected onto the 
Mapuche by colonizers to ground and define themselves as a consistent culture. As the 
alternate histories that inform me emerge, they make (re)emerge the obviated figure of 
the Mapuche’s spectacular incorporation/construction by and to State language and law.  
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Accumulating independence 
 Keeping that caveat in mind, the early Chilean state’s relations with the Mapuche 
grew ever tenser while it, simultaneously, waged war against its new neighbors. This was 
due to a variety of factors, including immigration, internal migration, and a re-organizing 
of the frontier administration along the border with Mapuche lands.16 After victory in the 
War of the Pacific in 1879, the government used new coastal railroads to shift soldiers 
southward, culminating in the campaign of Lonkimay in 1884, precipitating Mapuche 
capitulation before independent Chile. Virtual incorporation of the mythopoetic, warlike 
“araucanos” became necessary for the bourgeoning capitalist nation-state’s historical 
narrative- which further demanded the literal and figurative elimination of the Mapuche 
from the space and spatial practices of the new nation, a demand motivated by a second 
spectral incorporation of the Mapuche as indigent campesinos. Aside from these dual 
specters, the process took a variety of forms over the next several decades (all tantamount 
to slow-motion genocide). These included: parceling up of land to facilitate re-settling 
European farmers and destabilizing, to later deny, communal Mapuche organizations; 
forced relocation of the Mapuche onto reducciones, furthering the prior point; and 
various legal maneuvers and behind-closed-doors business deals, dispossessing them of 
what little remained. All of which paralleled several concurrent global efforts, 
prominently in the United States and Argentina. Coetaneous, then, with the mythopoetic 
incorporation facilitating an ongoing disavowal of alternative histories, the State required 
the Mapuche’s physical dispersal or outright elimination to make possible the primitive 
accumulation of the nascent bourgeois State’s capitalist project.17 Any remnants of the 
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Mapuche pueblo’s society represented an existential, if not properly ontological, threat to 
the Chilean nation-state, so the Mapuche are relegated to a geographic feature to be 
levelled. Ceaseless violence is wrought unto the pueblo’s body(s) while, and because, 
their image is virtually incorporated to the State’s public discourse. And yet their constant 
presence belies that spectacle, embodying specters that have long haunted the national 
myth of whiteness and uniformity, forcing the aporia at the heart of Chilean (and 
Argentine) national identity that carries over to and problematizes their economic 
systems’ functioning. 
Twentieth century ghosts 
 A deceptive Mapuche spectrality, then. This specter, the paranoid imagination of 
Chile’s disavowed other reflected back on its discursive apparatuses upon encountering 
their other’s very much living body by their side, motivates many a twentieth century 
conjuration- often captured by the left-right political paradigm. The mainstream left 
attempted to bring them into the fold as proletarian allies (none too gracefully) and the 
right, best exemplified by the Pinochet dictatorship, denied their existence outright and/or 
attempted to violently finalize their conversion into small property owners and good, 
obedient bourgeois individuals.18 Following the 1988 plebiscite, these policies are 
effectively folded into one another, as the explosive articulations of previously verboten 
identities flourish within the bounds of capital’s ideology of “multiculturalism”. They 
manifest as a series of tensions around race/ethnicity/subcultures and the definitions and 
place allowed one within global capital’s hegemonic framework(s), tensions deserving 
brief comment. While the racialized character of many Chileans’ engagement, when they 
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engage indigenous presence at all, is undeniable, one must again remember that that is 
also a colonial discourse and, therefore, still results an imposition on, and thus an 
impediment to, a study of the Mapuche as opposed to Chilean racism towards the 
Mapuche.19 Subordinating an entire people to the category of an “ethnicity” within the 
law’s individuating archival structures serves a similar function- it makes logically prior 
the assumption that the Mapuche have always already been a part of “Chile” and now 
they might more openly express themselves within the new multicultural paradigm. This 
strain of thought is common, or rather, dominant, in criticism of Mapuche poetry- which 
does not make the claims any less absurd nor less characteristic of a bourgeois liberal 
mindset functional to capitalism, as its forefather was to colonialism.20 An absent 
Mapuche legality accompanies this, such that when they, or the State’s imagination of 
them, are to be legislated, the process is absent memory or consistency of laws and 
lawmakers.21 As if to say, “I’ve seen this ghost before, but I can’t for the life of it recall 
where I put my notes from last time.”    
The unthinkable now 
 I will return to these themes below. For now, I again highlight the insuperable 
hiatus and duality signaled in the excessive work done by the word Mapuche within state 
institutionality, now as in the past. The preceding historical sketch is meant to signal the 
extent to which the State developed around an elision of another pueblo within and beside 
it. An elision that has formed an epistemo-ontologic blockage delimiting attempts to 
speak to and of the Mapuche within and for capital’s knowledge systems, bound by state 
historicity- my own work being somewhat included in this recrimination. “Chile as 
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nation-state” is an auto-referential discourse, speaking to the inverted projection of its 
desires and failings, which return each time its archives attempt to account for the 
Mapuche. The State has made nigh impossible not only its own attempts to speak of the 
Mapuche, but also its attempts to speak to them, or even to speak to itself about their 
lives, when those are nominally the subject at hand. As it stands, there can be no 
authorized recognition of the responsibility engendered in an encounter with a Mapuche 
singularity, and thus no speaking of a Mapuche subject as such within the law. Which is 
not to say that there is no encounter- recognition’s refusal is always posterior to an 
ineluctable encounter with the Other and, therefore, does not retroactively efface it or the 
hope it might generate. Rather, the internalized social conceptualization of the Mapuche 
interposes itself in the instantaneity of the folding of intersubjective social space, 
rendering impossible the (re)formulation of a hospitality that would extend itself to the 
Mapuche. This process doubles again in the encounter between Mapuche and state 
functionaries, who embody the face of the State itself- an internalized prohibition, 
externalized. A recent example from repression of Mapuche activists will clarify this, 
allowing me to segue to Chihuailaf’s success before this faceless presence.  
 While the preceding seemed to establish two periods, and at least three 
problematics, they are both coetaneous and sequential, in various combinations and 
together. To give a sense of the recent repressive juncture, I draw from the proceedings 
around Mapuche resistance to the illegal, and yet unimpeded, logging across southern 
Chile.22 Since at least the late 1990s, transnational logging interests have taken advantage 
of the Chilean state’s lax or absent enforcement of territorial delimitations, at all levels. 
208 
 
This has involved prolonged violence by both state and private forces and open or barely 
concealed complicity between them. So blatantly flaunting any pretenses of separation, 
the actions signal a flourishing of the State as translation machine between global and 
domestic capital. Further, this point is not mine alone- it is widely understood and 
asserted by Mapuche activists, as well as actors in solidarity with them.23 As one might 
expect, the Mapuche have engaged in various forms of resistance against these incursions 
by ouroboros capital, so intent on consuming itself along with the world.  
 Well understood by sources outside of the Chilean state and its associated media, 
the standard method for persecuting Mapuche who attempt to prevent the extrajudicial 
incursions on their land- violently or nonviolently, it does not matter- is to pursue cases 
against them according to the country’s antiterrorist law. Again unsurprisingly, the 
charges brought against them and the proceedings themselves, when they arrive before a 
judge, are so farcical as to even draw the attention of international human rights 
organizations (duly ignored by the decidedly uninterested Chilean authorities). But rather 
than pursue a problematic discussion of human rights decrees, of more interest is one of 
the prosecutors’ preferred tactics: the “testigos sin rostro”, i.e. faceless or anonymous 
witnesses. Allowed for by other legal measures, these witnesses are consistently called to 
testify against the Mapuche and, even when they offer blatantly false or uncorroborated 
testimony, are, ironically, taken at face value.24 As Paula Vial Reina describes in an 
article for Le Monde Diplomatique entitled, appropriately, “Juicio a mapuches desnuda 
las deudas de la justicia”:  
Los testigos sin rostro, personas fantasmas que no se hacen responsables de sus 
dichos y que, con la excusa de su protección, reciben incluso en algunos casos 
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emolumentos y apoyos económicos, no sólo persisten en la ley sino que se 
refuerzan. Su existencia ya no se discute, ni durante la investigación ni en el juicio 
mismo. Y no pueden ser contrainterrogados para determinar su idoneidad, como 
ya ocurrió en el juicio de Cañete. (Rebelión… 40) 
 
Bold faced, or rather faceless, this tactic and its effect of distancing and negation manifest 
at the neoliberal State’s center, at the limit where it might be expected to come upon the 
face of its Other per necessity. They are the fullest implication of the epistemo-
ontological impediment I have traced. As the title of the article aptly states, it denudes the 
law for what it is, generally and particularly when facing the Mapuche- a faceless 
manifestation of the needs and desires of the conjunction State/international capitalism, 
interceding in the proceedings by way of a faceless body. A complete absence of 
singularity, the faceless witness loses all functional communicability that would pertain 
to the encounter between two, from whence spring the infinite ethical responsibility and 
the possibility of a politics to-come. Become an absent presence- but inverting the 
phrase’s common usage, such that the witness’s presence is effaced by forceful 
intercession, rendering the body without face infinitely distant- it is through a farcical 
singular that neoliberal capitalism’s totalizing pretensions are translated into situated 
struggle. Where before I examined the effacement of exteriority (the rostro) by exteriority 
(the mask) in an exteriority (the video) as a method through which a common rebellion 
might speak and the singularity’s unspeakable affectivity might be traced, this is entirely 
other. Judicial processes as state interiority become the scene of the neoliberal state’s 
prime role in navigating its place in global capital’s order. Again, the state as a translating 
machine that might at any moment, in any situation, sequester the body of the bourgeois 
individual to bring forth unto its pseudo-exteriority the core truth it holds within: that it 
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always only speaks the State’s language and merely awaits a venue in which to be heard, 
as it is effaced, rather de-faced, to reinforce the internal and external bounds and 
bounding of statist reason. 
 That it be brought forth in the process of a “judgment”, in brackets because the 
State’s judgment was determined beforehand and so deserves not the name, adds a 
second, crucial layer. As I have insisted, at the heart of Chilean national identity and its 
narrativization there exists the foundational impossibility of establishing a face-to-face 
encounter with and recognition of the Mapuche as legitimate subjects of the law- for all it 
may claim otherwise. A state of facelessness, or better, defaced-ness, aptly describes the 
way the law as mediating force intercedes via interdiction in the encounter- be it 
collective or singular. Within the judicial system’s justifications and labyrinthine 
mechanisms, the state paints an astounding metonym for the greater discursive process 
that has accompanied hundreds of years of winka presence- the multiply effected 
effacement of the Mapuche within the law’s order of legibility. In this painting, we see 
the Chilean state and its capitalist appendages speaking only to themselves. Hence the 
lack of any cross-examination or efforts at establishing these faceless witnesses’ aptitude, 
defaced as the nth face of this discourse as it speaks to itself, of itself, before the law. 
Ironically, the tool used by state and capitalist forces against people that are an existential 
and functional threat to them both unmasks the individual citizen-subject’s incapacity for 
recognizing the face of the other. Unmasked in media res, seen as they are- swaddled, as 
in the father’s arms, by statist reason. The literal law answers the unasked question of the 
law’s actual being, bringing it(self) forth to be interrogated. Thus, the insistence by 
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Mapuche activists upon their recognition by the Chileans is of an imperative mood- it 
demands that the bourgeois subject steps out from this swaddling and climbs the walls 
around them, or at least reads the writing therein etched. Already constructed by other 
efforts, this is the stage from which Chihuailaf speaks in his prose and activism, 
encapsulated in Recado confidencial a los chilenos, which I read as his success. 
Success, on the face of it 
 I say that I read the Recado as a success in a double sense: it inscribes within the 
Chilean national archive what was previously illegible, a Mapuche voice (albeit, and 
necessarily, in translation) speaking to and from the historical and the situated Mapuche 
perspective(s); and, in doing so, accomplishes goals that it sets for itself. Now, those two 
conditions must be understood in their full ambivalence- as I have asserted, Chihuailaf’s 
hypermnesic project inscribes both success and failure, and so each success brings with it 
its corresponding failure, a point which I will elaborate below. For the moment, the case 
for its success. Since its publication in 1999, comfortably after the so-called transition to 
democracy, the book has become a widespread and recognized reference, both within 
Chile and without, that places into a productive dialogue Mapuche and Chilean cultures. 
Although, as the title suggests, the dialogue’s directionality is from former to latter, and 
delivered in the latter’s language and style (as written text) such that it may be heard. 
Awarded the award for best literary work in the category of essay by the Consejo 
Nacional del Libro it was, after various reprintings, republished in 2015 in an augmented 
version that itself was reprinted in 2017. A wide sampling of works make reference to it, 
including, amongst many, the notable winka historian of State-Mapuche relations, José 
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Bengoa; the collected Mapuche historians who authored …¡Escucha, winka!..., despite 
their more oppositional stance towards their named interlocutor; and the Mapuche 
historian and activist Fernando Pairican does not hesitate to reference it.25 But beyond the 
intelligentsia on both sides of the overarching encounter, even Mapuche students in 
Chilean schools, where it is oft taught, have found in its inscription in Castilian of a 
Mapuche voice a way of (re-)situating themselves vis a vis Chilean society- as attested to 
by the letter of a young Mapuche student and activist, Ailyn Lucía Ludueña Collinao, 
entitled “Recado confidencial a Elicura Chihuailaf”, included in the extra sections of the 
augmented second edition.26 
 More than an emergent legibility of a Mapuche voice in Castilian, the Recado’s 
own terms establish conditions for success, which its ubiquity can be said to have 
accomplished. The entire text is, according to its explanation, structured as a werkv, 
approximately translated as (oral) message, delivered by a Werken, or messenger, who is 
invited to another space and in the process of delivering the message follows certain 
consistent practices, all reproduced in it.27 So then, the immediate goal would seem to be 
the delivery to another pueblo of a message that contains within it, as a crucial formal 
aspect, the state of the messenger and the pueblo from which he is arriving. And yet, 
beyond the given form, the message’s content bears forth several salient points meant to 
be carried to this other pueblo. Not simply Chihauilaf’s understanding of the Mapuche 
cosmovision but, further, a re-situation, from within the culture that the Recado makes 
legible, of the ongoing deterritorialization to facilitate extractivist economic models so 
harmful to that same culture.  
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Two moments seem most relevant for his, and my, overarching projects. First, 
while discussing the Itrofil Mogen, which he says can be approximately translated in “el 
mundo contemporáneo y científico” as “biodiversity”, he asserts that “se refiere al 
conjunto del mundo viviente, comprendiendo e insistiendo en su unidad”. Moreover, 
concerning development in Mapuche territory, he conveys the words of the Mapuche 
lafkenche, who teach us that the Itrofil Mogen as a concept insists that “el motor de la 
sociedad no es la búsqueda de un crecimiento económico o rentabilidad extrema, sino el 
equilibrio que solo puede entregar una interacción de reciprocidad económica, cultural y 
social” (Recado 50 emphasis mine). Articulating at once how the Mapuche see nature 
and how both humanity and human interaction are complementarily situated within a 
unitary whole, this selection succinctly presents one of the message’s core points- how 
Chihuailaf’s lessons can, from within winka discourse, re-think our relationship to the 
earth and each other, in a forward minded vision of a dialogic future relationality 
(amongst not only peoples, but also nature’s many aspects).28 
 As to this vision’s futurity, and how it may be shared, he is no less clear and 
direct. After taking to task any who might consider writing a mark and measure of 
Mapuche acculturation- affirming that if that is so than it will have been so for all 
societies, everywhere, ever since the Phoenicians invented written text, and is thus a non-
point- he directs himself toward the future, in which a set of hypothetical students comes 
to inquire after the Mapuche’s future. Reaffirming the previous citation’s implications, he 
clarifies that the future is part of the Earth’s, and thus humanity’s, totality and that “se 
completa de manera dinámica con el pasado, pero desde un esencial estar (continuar) en 
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el presente, del que depende lo que podamos desear y lo que nos sea posible hacer en este 
mundo” (Recado 60-1). Combined with later, explicit statements asserting a necessity 
that Mapuche movements be anti-capitalist, anti-State and globally minded, as well as 
repeated statements acknowledging and advocating for regional autonomy, this seems to 
clearly situate Chihuailaf’s understanding of Mapuche futurity within a constellation that 
includes the autonomist and anarchist perspectives I have examined throughout my work- 
despite the fact that this vision might be contentious for other Mapuche.29 Chihuailaf 
seems to share a vision of a loving, generative common to come that exceeds and escapes 
the bounds of a global capitalism regionally mediated by state institutionality, in which 
autonomy and cooperation in solidarity are guiding social mandates. There are 
necessarily serious disjunctions between the perspectives- aside from originating in 
distinct cosmovisions, they are at odds over the formation of a pueblo (wherein the 
autonomists reject its ties to the Sovereign form and the Mapuche, who formed and 
persisted as pueblo without a sovereign, claim it for debate and resistance) and the utility 
of the nation (there are many debates about the validity or utility of the term in anarchist 
thought whereas, again, the Mapuche see it as a crucial point in articulating their struggle 
against the Chilean state). Despite these missed encounters, there is a case to be made for 
this message as a form of bringing together Mapuche and Chilean perspectives, against a 
common foe. But it is at this perceived convergence that I pause, as it is here that the 
failure behind this success begins to emerge, upon closer inspection of the text. What it 
says and, more importantly, how and where it says it forcefully remind us of the 
patriarchive’s operations of consignment. This inscription’s legibility within that archive 
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does not, necessarily, over-write the interdiction against actual Mapuche presence, as 
opposed to its virtual double, in the Chilean state’s language. 
 The question is not so much whether Chihuailaf is heard- he obviously is, to great 
effect- but rather, what is spoken, and to whom, when he speaks? What is the status of 
Chihuailaf as speaker when he chooses to translate his lived experience into written 
Castilian and how does that affect, if not determine, the deeper message he conveys as 
Werken? What is he saying when, through this book, he addresses us? In various ways 
and at various points, throughout this text and his hypermnesic project, he is consciously 
and clearly communicating the limits of the presumptively universal winka episteme, 
regardless of the more immediate content of any particular work. While his personal 
history entails various literal, physical displacements, for an equally varied number of 
reasons, this text and his broader project are further inscribed under the sign of 
displacement, physical as well as epistemo-ontological- it is from interminable 
displacement that it speaks.  
The text proper opens with a bipartite exergue that establishes its position and 
mission. The latter being the communication of the Mapuche experience as indicating 
potential points for dialogue, within Chilean Castilian and according to Chihuailaf’s 
understanding; the former lays in and between the lines of these exergues. The first is 
written as though it were spoken to the reader. It establishes both what prompted his 
interrogations and what to do about them, while it also registers the text’s main subjects: 
usted, Yo, nosotros and los chilenos. The singularity that is Chihuailaf has departed from 
the common we of the Mapuche to, perhaps, arrive at such a point in which he might 
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speak to a singular reader, perhaps Chilean and perhaps not, about the Mapuche and the 
state of things in Chile. All four terms are isolated as distinct, despite the text retaining 
the singular/collective link between him and the Mapuche while allowing for a more 
ambivalent relationship to obtain between the reader and the Chileans; he also marks 
himself as equally apart from his subject matter, both in writing and as Werken.30  
 Displacement and distinction from, a having left, are fundamental to the text’s 
articulation. Were his dual displacement not immediately clear from the first exergue’s 
positioning, in the second he begins by repeating a lesson he gave to students concerning 
the Mapuche country of “yesteryear”, and then rhetorically turns to address the Mapuche 
people whose presence authorizes his speaking in the first-person plural. In plain sight, as 
it were, he has turned and made clear that he occupies authority in both worlds- he speaks 
fluently of them both, and can cite Jaime Valdivieso and Gabriela Mistral to the Mapuche 
as easily as he shares the words of the Mapuche lafkenche to the Chileans, techniques he 
employs regularly throughout. Chihuailaf has departed from the land of yesteryear by 
speaking to the Chileans, without for that having truly arrived in the Castilian that they 
speak, within the order of their law. He displaces himself within language to speak of that 
from which he draws the authority to speak of displacement as such, and he does this in 
the language of the interdiction issued against the infinite responsibility before the 
Mapuche, at a remove wherein his words are already caught within the law that makes 
representations of Mapuche being impossible. More clearly, again: when he speaks of 
himself and, moreover, the Mapuche, within the Chilean state’s legible order, the only 
thing he can be understood to be speaking of is the impossibility that he speaks- doubly, 
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as a Mapuche and as someone speaking of them. A realization that pervades the entire 
text, beginning with the first section following the exergues, entitled Sueño Azul. This is a 
transcription of a poem from De sueños azules y contraseuños and while I will comment 
below the poetic functioning of its repetition in relation to criticism of his poetry, it’s 
worth mentioning here the main point I will elaborate. This work, while often read as a 
nostalgic reflection on the Mapuche’s idyllic past, can only in that way be misread. The 
piece’s sequence, and the temporal transitions within it, clarify that the speaker and 
Chihuailaf are eminently aware of the distance from his dream- in the word’s dual sense, 
strung out between Castilian and Mapudungun- and the constant arrivals characterizing 
his current reality. Ending with a displaced address, from Amsterdam to all Chihuailaf’s 
comrades elsewhere than Chile or the Ad Mapu (Mapuche territory), to open a book that 
folds the addressee’s language back on itself, Chihuailaf immediately belies pretensions 
of reading or writing this text from anywhere but a state of constantly deferred arrival; 
complete displacement. 
 All of this is not to say that Chihuailaf is at any point speaking only one language; 
rather, he is caught speaking at least two, and both bi-directionally, having left his own to 
speak of and in another to which he can never entirely arrive and which, in turn, interdicts 
his return and arrival (anew- or for the first time?) to his so-called mother tongue. 
Rodrigo Rojas has, referring to his work translating fragments of Neruda into 
Mapudungun, framed Chihuailaf’s as translator-cum-resistant facilitating an inversion of 
the esteem allotted within a colonially instituted cultural hierarchy, from what Homi 
Bhabha refers to as a third space.31 But while I do see a certain utility for discussing 
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translation in Chihuailaf’s greater project, I find Rojas’s unquestioning usage of the third 
space to be entirely too direct and misleading. His situating of a third space neither 
colonial nor colonized too easily fixes the points of arrival from which one is, in that 
conception, translating to and fro. Moreover, in the same gesture, it comprehends the two 
languages, be they target or original, as determinable and essential in a way that separates 
them entirely, facilitating an economy of translation that would be fitting to his particular 
assertions concerning inverted hierarchies- effectively reproducing in place of escaping 
the spectacular relations between the Chilean discourse and its saying “Mapuche”. To 
borrow a reminder from Jacques Derrida, “[d]esde el momento en que se renuncia a esta 
equivalencia económica, por otra parte estrictamente imposible, puede traducirse todo, 
pero en una traducción laxa en el sentido laxo de la palabra ‘traducción’” such that “[e]n 
un sentido, nada es intraducible, pero en otro sentido todo lo es, la traducción es otro 
nombre de lo imposible” (80).  
So, everything, even a culture, can be translated, but only in the sense that it is an 
entirely new inscription, in the Borgesian mode (of which Derrida was, of course, so 
fond). Seen from this angle, as it passes us by, this recado is translation only insomuch as 
it is an inscription in Chilean law of its foundational lack, done in the law’s own 
language. Its articulation marks therein the question that went unasked before the letter 
was sent- what does “Mapuche” mean to say when we say it in Castilian? Chihuailaf 
inscribes a knowledge meant to super-impose itself over what was presumed already 
there, albeit without a concomitant effacement: a re-writing of the word that, in the best 
of cases, should (re)embody it and open a space for Mapuche to speak, and be spoken of, 
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in a reciprocal play of recognition generative of an ethical responsibility and a political 
subjectivity. Yet this act of writing- cultural translation, (re)inscription, or whatever you 
might call it- reveals the cacophonous singularity that he would be as multiple and 
uncontainable by the institutionality determinate of what, how, and from where he writes, 
and to which his writing must ever and only return. He may approach, and in his 
approach give his word, but only barred by an interdiction against his word ever but 
belonging to the very order from and to which he directs himself, regardless of what he 
may say with it. 
 But before I be accused of the same misreading of others that take it upon 
themselves to write on Chihuailaf, and the Mapuche in general, it is worth seeing exactly 
what the poet has to say concerning what I refer to as the patriarchive’s apparatuses of 
authorization. In a longer section of the Recado criticizing the “dead letter” of the law, 
while reflecting on the growing facility of Mapuche self-identification in Chile, he closes 
by bluntly taking the neoliberal university structure to task for its role in Mapuche 
territory. As he says,  
…han sido las universidades las que han permitido el empobrecimiento del 
territorio mapuche, porque han sido ellas las que han hecho estudios de 
factibilidad y de implementación de que en estas regiones es posible reconvertir la 
economía agrícola, ganadera, en economía de forestación- con pino y eucaliptos, 
ahora-. Son estudios encargados (el autofinanciamiento universitario) por la 
empresa privada, y para sus beneficios, desde luego. (Recado 163) 
 
Now, while he is clearly discussing the university’s function structuring the knowledge 
production required to advance foreign capital’s extractivist economic plans, I would 
assert that it’s more than fair to read an extension of that to the university model as a 
whole. To reserve a special place, or special treatment, for other disciplines would 
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assume of Chihuailaf an incredible naivete, thoroughly belied by his collected works. 
And, as I’ve insisted on throughout, the functioning of the various disciplines within, and 
beyond, the neoliberal university are an integral part of the reproduction of both the State 
and the mode of production of which it is part. As he asserts elsewhere, concerning the 
possibility of intercultural dialogue within literary criticism,  
[e]l que esto sea posible en el plano literario implica también una mutual 
compulsación crítica. Tendrán que aparecer…traductores y críticos mapuche que 
no se ocupen únicamente de los textos escritos en mapuzungun, sino también de 
aquellos que surgen de las vivencias de nuestros hermanos que han desarrollado 
su escritura comiendo su ‘obligado pan en castellano’, en las ciudades y campos 
de nuestra y otras regiones y en el exilio. (Crítica 243)  
 
That is, the critical literary apparatuses that developed to discuss Mapuche literary 
production are inadequate to the dialogic task, unless they are expanded to include a 
broader, and broader minded, spectrum of Mapuche critics of Mapuche works. Barring 
that, the university (as part of the capitalist State’s ideological system), can only 
rhetorically reproduce the Mapuche’s historical treatment and, thus, constrain any 
production within its purportedly sovereign bounds. On this note, Derrida, in another 
passage of the previously cited text, adds a pertinent reminder concerning the apparent 
monolingualism that Chihuailaf must navigate:  
[e]l monolingüismo del otro sería en primer lugar esa soberanía, esa ley llegada 
de otra parte, sin duda, pero también y en principio la lengua misma de la Ley. Y 
la Ley como Lengua. Su experiencia sería aparentemente autónoma, porque debo 
hablar esta ley y adueñarme de ella para entenderla como si me la diera a mí 
mismo. (58)  
 
The State’s false univocity is constructed in and as the law with the support of the 
Mapuche’s virtual incorporation, which denies their autonomy or persistence apart from 
and within the territory Chile usurped from them- and it is this language that Chihuailaf 
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enters, albeit adversarially. Using his words as he tells the story- “[l]uego, llegamos a las 
ciudades, el exilio…en nuestro propio territorio” (Recado 81).  
 As he discusses how one might begin to reclaim a space in this “desert”, he makes 
one of his more often misunderstood gestures- one that establishes the counterpoint to his 
project’s success, the failure thematized most explicitly in his poetry. I would argue that 
this is his most often miscited assertion, almost always in a mercenary way- that 
concerning the importance of Mapuche identity for (re)establishing their place. In the 
Recado he posits its importance as such: “la identidad, me parece, determina qué es lo 
que se ama- con sus aspectos positivos y negativos- y cuánto se ama. Por lo tanto, 
determina la aceptación que se pueda tener del sí mismo y, en consecuencia, la caloración 
y el respeto que se tenga del ‘otro’”, a point that refers not only to the Mapuche but- 
perhaps more so- to the Chileans that elide their identity’s complexity (83). Already in 
the ambiguous double tension he establishes by asserting its importance, it would seem 
clear, or at least implicit, that the concept he is working with can be distinguished from 
the bourgeois liberal usage of the term. But, should doubt remain, in the other piece I 
cited above, he asserts that  
Cuando nuestra Gente levanta las banderas de nuestras respectivas identidades, 
los Estados- a través de sus medios de comunicación y de sus estructuras 
educacionales y legisladoras excluyentes- intentan moverlas según sus intereses. 
Surge de este modo un nuevo dogma: el de la identidad. La identidad 
confeccionada como un traje talla única que ajusta nada más a sus inexistentes 
elegidos. (Crítica 235 my emphasis) 
 
While these citations and the, rather writerly, ambiguity within them (which Carmen 
Godoy highlights as one of Chihuailaf’s strengths and sign of his conceptual subtlety) are 
more than enough to support Joanna Crow’s scathing critique of the various, and 
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seemingly willful, essentialist misreadings of Chihualaf’s project by many of his Chilean 
critics, it is worth maintaining another of Crow’s points.32 She warns that his alacrity in 
managing Mapuche identitarian tropes within an order of legibility facilitated by the law 
allows the State, and its “critical” proxies, to further the above incorporative discursive 
gestures, this time under the aegis of multiculturalism. This being opposed to a 
pluriculturalist position that acknowledges and respects the autonomy of the cohabitant 
pueblos within the territory deceptively known as “Chile”, for which Chihuailaf 
advocates. Nothing about this potential danger can excuse the various, again one must 
assume willfully, selective and reductive readings of this project, but it bears underlining 
as bringing to light the functioning of his work on which I have insisted. Articulated 
within, and using, the language of the State, that is, the law, it is bound primarily to make 
legible the law’s lapses by inscribing within it the structurally prohibited being of its 
other.  
 My understanding of Chihuailaf’s project as a hypermnesic one springs from 
these conditions. As Derrida says of displacement’s effect on writing,  
[l]a ruptura con la tradición, el desarraigo, la inaccesibilidad de las historias, la 
amnesia, la indescifrabilidad, etcétera, todo esto desencadena la pulsión 
genealógica, el deseo del idioma, el movimiento compulsivo hacia la anamnesis, 
el amor destructor de la interdicción. (100)  
 
One could think of few better descriptions for what seems to motivate Chihuailaf’s 
project in the face of the history I trace. But one must account for where this project is 
undertaken (as Derrida himself does, elsewhere), in order to understand its goals and 
limitations. Because this is not being done in Mapudungun, and is directed as a 
confidential letter to the Chileans, not knowing if it should ever arrive, nor to where, one 
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cannot but understand this project of inscribing the Mapuche’s past, present and future 
within the archive heretofore overdetermined by winka epistemologies and ontologies as 
simultaneously inside and outside of them. Hence its deeper gesture of addressing not a 
localizable error, but rather a structural absence- but also its ambivalent status as both 
success and failure. For such a project, success is as I’ve shown: a growing awareness of 
another pueblo’s, another culture’s, recognizable face, thriving alongside and within 
winka culture. And moreover, the tentatively asked questions within that culture of what 
it means when it says, and to what extent the saying is possible, “Mapuche”. The 
project’s failure is here, as well- by making legible for, perhaps, the first time, the 
foundational lapses in the ongoing colonial project of sensibly grounding the colonizers’ 
culture and identity, it also reinforces the insuperability of the hiatus that yet exists 
between colonizer and any ethical encounter with the colonized other, concealed by the 
perversely reflected image that the colonizers projected onto the Mapuche to negatively 
establish themselves as being. Regardless of political affiliation or good intentions. To 
better understand this point, we ought to turn to the other form of Chihuailaf’s work, 
which more thoroughly thematizes its obverse aspect- his poetry.  
A mirror that reflects nothing 
 By now it should be clear that my usage of success and failure are, as before, 
heavily qualified, for being overdetermined by the totalizing arche-narrative of bourgeois 
historicity. Following this, insomuch as I say failure, that word is entirely determined by 
the bounds of the colonial, capitalist State and its law. The only failure of the project was 
an impossibility from the start, given the language required for it to be carried out. It 
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could never truly hope to make a place for a dissident Mapuche identity within a State 
predicated on the simultaneous invisibilization of that life and the incorporation of its 
spectral form to the mythopoetic narrativization of the Chilean nation-state’s past. Still, I 
feel that this point is more clearly made in his project’s poetics, whose themes and role as 
poetry cannot but fail within the State’s language, until the State ceases to be; in the to 
come, when it ceases to overdetermine these marks’ iterability. By its nature as a written 
work and, further, because Chihuailaf himself cannot be completely established in 
subjective plenitude by Chilean law, it both thematizes his displacement and constant 
arrival and refuses to foreclose the future and present as sources of rebellious hope. I will 
approach this topic through his 1995 text De sueños azules y contrasueños for several 
reasons, all of which destabilize official state and critical narratives about the Mapuche 
and Chihuailaf, respectively. The following are important to my project: its distance from 
his first widely known text, En el país de la memoria, allows that it speak to a more 
developed aesthetic and social project; its intimate and explicit linkage to the Recado 
through an act of auto-citation as auto-translation demystifies the relationship and 
tensions between his poetic and prosodic pieces; and, through formal experimentation, it 
eschews an unidirectional perspectival authorization that would allow us to essentialize 
either of the perceived “mother tongues”/target languages. To clarify these points, I will 
proceed through a close reading of oft-cited portions of the text, accompanied by a 
critique of the main strains of criticism on Mapuche poetry and Chihuailaf, in particular.  
 Immediately apparent upon even a superficial reading of the text is how it, too, is 
thoroughly inscribed under the sign of displacement, deterritorialization, desterramiento- 
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which is not to say that it’s a simply superficial theme. What remains less clear are the 
speaker’s status and the perceived, or inherited, purpose that he assumes in displacement. 
Picking a few examples to illustrate the point should suffice to convey the overarching 
presence of absence and distance. Ending “El río que suena, sueña”, a poem rife with 
images of blue and water so central to Chihuailaf’s Mapuche cosmovision, the speaker 
conveys “Mi corazón sediento sueña / con las aguas del arroyo / pero mi espíritu perdido 
/ no puede callar la angustia / de su lecho” (51). Interlinking references to thirst and 
misdirection, soul and land, the final ambiguous genitive reveals a “bed” that could be 
both that of the river or of the soul- and, in keeping with Chihuailaf’s explanations of the 
Mapuche cosmovision, would in truth be both. But that association allows us to note two 
distinct phenomenon that, when articulated together, posit a third. First, the speaker is 
insuperably distanced from the land and the water, wandering lost and far from its bed, 
wherein it may both rest and be at home. The world is, to this figure, fundamentally 
inhospitable and foreign- and he wanders thirsty and without a space to lay his head. 
Moreover, the ambivalent duality of the final line allows us to read an anguish of the 
river- which brings to mind the leeching off of waters in Mapuche territory by foreign 
originating coniferous trees that international, extractivist capital interests imported to the 
Ad Mapu. Read together, then, they propose the third reading in their conjunction- the 
solution to both the anguish of the speaker and the river is the re-placement of said 
speaker in the lost territory. But in its very proposition, that possibility is foreclosed as 
impossible- and the poem ends.  
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 The poem immediately following the former, “Gran Tigre Nahuelbuta”, both 
reinforces and complicates this sense of displacement and directionless-ness. It opens in a 
straight forward enough way, establishing distance and a directionality that only leads to 
greater distance from the speaker’s land- “Me encuentro lejos de mis / padres y de mis 
hijas / y no sé aún cuando volveré” (53). The first few words- me encuentro lejos- hide a 
rather elaborate set of possible meanings: the simple meaning of localization, being no 
longer lost, but also the paired meaning that signals the coming to oneself of self-
discovery in an ontological, rather than pseudo-psychological, register. And building on 
the second meaning, the fact that that sentiment is articulated in Castilian and, perhaps, a 
perhaps whose resolution is barred to a large portion of his readership, is less than faithful 
to the Mapudungun. The self speaking of finding itself can speak the self only in the 
language that is, literally and figuratively, far from his family- Castilian. But rather than 
dwell on that distance, the poem then has the titular tiger remind the poet of what, 
exactly, he is (doing) so far away- “Por nuestra gente estás ahí / hablando en esa tierra 
lejana” (53). A fairly uncomplicated statement, it nonetheless carries all of the weight, in 
two lines, of the points I’ve elaborated so far- his speech’s duality, his role as Werken and 
its relationship to the pueblo, and the impossible fold that separates the two registers in 
which he speaks. These lines and more, throughout the book, lend sense to several others 
in his famous rewriting of a Jorge Teillier poem, “La llave que nadie ha perdido”, in 
which he says: “La poesía es el hondo susurro / de los asesinados / el rumor de hojas en 
el otoño / la tristeza por el muchacho / que conserva la lengua / pero ha perdido el alma” 
(59). But the very ubiquity of this piece also allows me to highlight one of the erroneous 
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critical junctures, mentioned above when discussing the legibility of Chihuailaf’s work- 
the possibility of its incorporation, through misreadings of its nostalgic elements, into a 
neoliberal identitarian matrix in which, as Joanna Crow again asserts, he could be read as 
an “indio permitido”.33 But, as she notes, that would always only ever be a misreading, 
and the same poem offers up disagreement, in the titular lines. “Y no digo más, porque 
nadie / encontrará / la llave que nadie ha perdido” (59-61)- to read those lines, knowing 
of the explicit intertext with Teillier (Chihuailaf is never shy about his respect for the 
Chilean), and not understand from their citational nature and negation of a loss a further 
negation of an essentialist, solely nostalgic understanding of Mapuche identity, seems to 
me a willfully foolish error. But, nonetheless, the forces behind it merit further, explicit 
comment.  
 Joanna Crow, in her excellent article “Mapuche Poetry in Post-Dictatorship Chile: 
Confronting the Dilemmas of Neoliberal Multiculturalism”, which I have already 
referenced several times, is explicit in ascertaining the principle critics responsible for 
these readings. Linking both the assertion of an inherent “culture of resistance” and the 
quest for an, always vaguely defined, ancestral memory to Hugo and Iván Carrasco (and 
implicitly, those who followed in their wake), she then summarily dismisses both 
approaches. The first for fundamentally obviating the central role of state action in 
fostering said resistance- the historical basis for which I explored above- and the second 
for similar reasons but, further, also as being a way of de-politicizing the explicitly 
political Mapuche poetry such as to reify a (neo)liberal identitarian position (Crow 227). 
While her analysis suffices to clearly elaborate the points, and thoroughly aligns with my 
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own, I would like to further highlight how these particular critical gestures serve to, in the 
sphere of literature and literary criticism, re-create the same incorporative mythopoetic 
excision that separates the lived experience of the Mapuche from their virtual 
incorporation within the nation-state’s self-narration. Further, she later explicitly 
contradicts assertions, again by a Carrasco, of some inherently European-ness of writing 
that would taint Mapuche culture- using statements by Chihuailaf that center the 
importance of writing as a tool in political struggle, no less (230). This brings forth an 
important point for my work- the rejection of any supposed naivete on the part of 
Chihuailaf (or other Mapuche writers) that would essentialize his work as 
“ethnoliterature” or presume to exclude it from the more rigorous political analysis that it 
demands. As she points out, the oral/written divide, central to much argumentation in 
favor of “ethnoliterature”, is hardly unique to indigenous cultures (a point that arose in a 
citation from Chihuailaf, above), and while she centers the ambivalence inherent in a 
troping of this divide, I find it to be much less grey.34 The temporal placement of orality 
versus writing that Chihuailaf establishes in an interview leaves little room for doubt:  
…me asumo como un oralitor, porque viví mi infancia en la oralidad, pero 
despues salí al exilio de la ciudad y entré al mundo de la escritura y de la 
literatura (el grafema, el artificio del artificio)…[e]scribo a orillas de la oralidad 
de mis Mayores, intentando dialogar con sus cadencias y con sus relatos, desde la 
visión de mundo mapuche en la que nací y que dialoga constantemente con la 
visión de mundo occidental (chilena) que nos impusieron. (Sebastián 128 my 
emphasis)  
 
Far from unaware of his positioning vis a vis both languages, and their respective 
principal mnemonic modes, he states very explicitly here what I’ve been highlighting. He 
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has left one, but not arrived to the other- in addressing both, he never completely arrives 
at either, but this displacement is of fundamental importance to his project.  
 But my recourse to an interview raises both another common critical trope and a 
problematic, which will allow us to return to De sueños…. In the same interview with 
Teresa Sebastián, Chihuailaf makes a revealing statement about his poetry and its 
connection to his politics, seeming to lend reason to the discourse of nostalgia above 
rejected. If I may be permitted a second long quote,  
…mi poesía es sobre todo una conversación conmigo mismo, mas también con 
mis hijas y mis hijos y con sus hijas e hijos, y así sucesivamente. […] Pero mi 
Conversación, a mi pesar, es -en gran medida- nostálgica, así cuando quiero 
protestar, manifestar mi enojo y mi impotencia por los atropellos que sufre mi 
Gente de parte del Estado chileno y la prepotencia de los latifundistas y 
comerciantes y sus leguleyos, sólo se me aparecen los esteros, los ríos, los 
bosques, las nubes, las flores, las aves, etc. de mi comunidad. Pero el nombrar 
reivindica y devuelve el brillo, su sentido, me digo. (135 my emphasis) 
 
A selective reading of this will all too easily focus on the centrality of the nostalgic 
affirmation of his poetry’s role, as opposed to his prose, but that would too easily elide 
the way in which he situates it at the cusp of a political desire that remains frustrated, it 
would seem, in the poetry. But immediately he contradicts that- reserving for poetry the 
role of naming the violated natural to restore sense to it- something undeniably political 
in the context of Mapuche struggle in Chile. The question is, instead, to what extent the 
tensions between the two forms of writing allow the realization of a political desire 
shared between them, while refusing to establish one as a metalanguage separate from, 
but key to the interpretation of, the other.35 The citational coupling of Recado 
confidencial a los chilenos and De sueños azules y contrasueños through the poem, and 
later prose piece, “Sueño azul”, further illustrates the unfolding of this political desire and 
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return us to the poetry as its originary index- and addresses the nostalgia discourse’s 
inadequacy for capturing Chihuailaf’s project. 
 While “Sueño azul” is oft cited within analyses that center the nostalgic longing 
that the aforementioned critics read in Chihuailaf’s work, the connection with its later 
prose citation is, to my knowledge, never highlighted; moreover, the poem makes that 
reading inadequate, if not impossible. While its preterite situating of his reminiscences 
lends a certain touch of the nostalgic, an ambiguity in line with what Crow highlights 
about his appropriation by the Chilean neoliberal multiculturalist discourse, from the 
second stanza, Chihuailaf states plainly: “Hablo de la memoria de mi niñez / y no de una 
sociedad idílica” (25). While that point alone may not suffice to conjure away the 
nostalgic specter that the poet himself has recognized in his poetry, the tendency to select 
only from the sections that reflect on said childhood obviates the poem’s fuller workings. 
That interjection of a present tense qualification to the poem’s preterite content, 
interrupting the reflections always already under way, is buttressed by a continued usage 
of the present perfect throughout the poem (and his larger body of work- it seems a tense 
he favors). Functioning to re-place the past in relation to the present, befitting the 
inscription of Mapuche thought, which allows for a temporal folding of past, present and 
future that establishes them as coterminous, the present perfect belies any undue 
emphasis on a totalizing sense of loss required for a metadiscursive reading of these 
poems through a lens dependent on the nostalgic. But again, throughout, he emphasizes 
his distance and separation from that upon which he reflects, and from which he 
continues to learn; as he avers parenthetically, regarding his apprenticeship with the land, 
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“(en eso ando aún)” (37). It is with the “aún”, the still, the present perfect condensed in a 
word, that he jumps to the present and, in doing so, reveals the poem’s double register, 
contained in the title, the word “sueño”.  
 As he says later, in the poem “El canto triste de la separación”, “Ya canta mi 
sombra en sus orillas / el triste canto de la separación: / Me voy mamá; me voy papá / 
Hermanos, hermanas: Si vengo otra vez / nos veremos” (121). I have insisted on exactly 
this displacement, distancing, and impossible return (or arrival) to the too-glibly referred 
mother tongue; a distance inscribed in his work and emphasized in the latter part of 
“Sueño azul”. He dedicates the last two stanzas to the unequivocally present, directing his 
words to his friends and family scattered across the world- Italy, France, Sweden, 
Germany all appear, as does Amsterdam, from where he writes. Just as these toponyms 
interrupt as Castilian in the Mapudungun, forcing us to account for the impossibility of 
translating his new location into a language past, it in turn requires us to account for the 
dream’s double register in this poem and throughout his bilingual oeuvre. While, as 
Chihuailaf explains of Mapuche cosmology, the Blue Dream accounts for the totality of 
existence- spatial and temporal- at play in our present lives, in Castilian the phrase most 
strongly indexes the emergence in sleep of the unobtainable unconscious. The poem, 
then, in a bilingual reading, is recounting the already past childhood and registering its 
repressed status within the state language inscribed in and by the usage of Castilian- and 
its interruption by geopolitical markers, the toponyms locating the Mapuche diaspora. 
But as he makes apparent in two later poems, both referencing his distance and leaving, 
one cannot set aside the impossibility of either arrival when approaching his work, 
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especially from Castilian. In “La luna puede tener tu nombre”, which analogizes his pain 
in the Castilian with a reference to Hiroshima that does not appear in the Mapudungun, 
speaking to himself by staging a conversation with the moon, he plainly states that “[t]al 
vez nunca podré hablar / de tus visiones / al otro lado del oeste” (65 my emphasis). 
Paired with the entirety of the following, “Podría ser inmensamente feliz”, which reads 
“Podría ser inmensamente feliz / me digo / Pero cómo, si tú- lejana- estás / llorando?”, 
the implication is clear: while he masterfully manages the language he heads towards, 
that language impedes any total return to Mapudungun, just as the tearful distance from 
the latter impedes any total arrival to Castilian and the State’s law (69). However, this 
state of constant arrival without the arrival-event is better materialized in a later poem in 
this text. 
 That poem, which I would argue is both the hinge and the highest 
accomplishment of his text as marker of his hypermnesic project’s dual status within the 
state language that determines its legibility, is “Es otro el invierno que en mis ojos llora”. 
The poem begins by invoking a ceremony in which Genechen, a prominent Mapuche 
spirit, speaks to the poet, recounting the language and knowledge of the Mapuche people- 
another apparently essentializing reference to the nostalgic version of Mapuche culture 
and mythology. But after a stanza break, marking the insuperable hiatus, the title arrives 
to insinuate the fundamental dislocation of the poet who hears from where the spirit 
speaks. It reads, “[l]lueve, afuera seguramente llueve / pero es otro el invierno que / en 
mis ojos llora / Hacia los días venideros vuelvo / entonces la mirada” (93). Without 
hesitation or ambiguity, the poem’s text performs a double gesture- it breaks any 
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definitive link between enunciatory and memorial spaces and, more positively, indicates 
the forward-facing futurity of Chihuailaf’s work, realized as action in his prose and 
advocacy. Neither the winter past nor the winter lived by the speaker holds his eye; 
instead, he looks towards the future he works for and a day that may not, perhaps, be so 
rainy. But the actual content of the poem is the lesser aspect of its functioning- far more 
significant is the formal experimentation of its presentation on the page. While 
throughout the text, the verso presents the Mapudungun and the recto Castilian, in this 
poem the verso rejects this formatting to instead re-present a mirror-image of the 
Castilian text- each page with its own modification. On the first page, the mirrored text 
intertwines a series of capitalized words in Mapudungun unaccounted for in the Castilian, 
so as to render the two languages almost illegible where they overlap, with the Castilian 
words “el espíritu” and “el agua” oriented vertically near the page’s edge. On the second, 
the text overlays a pencil sketch of a Mapuche resembling Chihuailaf (which is replaced 
in the second edition with a photograph of him) and includes the Mapuche terms “ñi ko” 
and “ñi Pvllv” in a vertical orientation, corresponding approximately to “agua” and 
“espíritu” in Castilian, but in reverse order from the latter’s appearance on the prior page. 
Both the Mapudungun and the image of the Mapuche man appear behind and yet 
intercalated with the inverted Castilian, denying the possibility of any translation of one 
to the other and the accessibility of the Mapuche to the colonial reader who, as I do, 
approaches this text as a legible object through the colonial, capitalist state language that 
simultaneously strives to efface the real of the Mapuche while still maintaining a 
permissible image of them within the order of its law.  
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 But, as may by this point be expected, I would like to highlight a more radical 
gesture within this poem. Reflecting on the assumption of the subject’s capacity to say 
“I” necessary for any identitarian discourse, Derrida reminds us that first  
[e]s preciso […] que esté resuelta la cuestión de la unidad de la lengua, y dado el 
Uno de la lengua en sentido estricto o amplio, un sentido amplio que se extenderá 
hasta incluir todos los modelos y todas las modalidades identificatorias, todos los 
polos de proyección imaginaria de la cultura social. (46)  
 
Given that the Chilean multiculturalist discourse demands the identitarian locatability, 
that is, legibility, of the Mapuche subject, Chihuailaf’s poem destabilizes the law’s 
presumed unity by forcing from between its lines the presence of the disavowed, 
unknowable other. So, coupled with the content’s affirmation of the speaker’s 
fundamental displacement from his childhood land and mother tongue, the formal 
presentation of this poem denies the possibility of a true arrival of the Mapuche as subject 
to the State’s law by forcing the dissonant absence of contact between the two languages 
that the poet, and this book, manage. Here, on these pages, Chihuailaf announces his state 
of constant arrival without arrival, without an event that would allow him to be accounted 
for and counted on, fixed within the language with which he addresses his other. He 
speaks only languages of arrival, both for him under interdiction, and blurs the 
presumptive tidiness of any differentiation or categorization of himself, his work, or any 
other Mapuche that the State, or any political discourse derived from or in dialogue with 
it, seeks to incorporate.  
Finally, as the book’s last poem and as a closing point for my analysis, his poem 
“Caminata en el bosque” drives home the ambiguity, if not impossibility, of any attempt 
to pursue a “real” Mapuche identity through this text. While the content speaks of an 
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inebriation in the blue so sacred to the Mapuche, the presentation again signals the radical 
necessity of a continuous rereading of the poet’s work. Rather than simply denying the 
possibility of translation between the two languages, it inverts the entire assumption of 
destination languages that drives it- on the verso, where the “original” is expected, 
appears the Castilian and on the recto, the “translation” is to Mapudungun. This book 
closes with a demand that is also an aperture toward a measureless future- a demand that 
we reread the entire text again, in reverse, reflecting on our assumptions of essentiality, 
legibility and linguistic hierarchy, by confusing simple presumptions about its 
directionality from its end- which is also, therefore, its beginning. The tools of poetry and 
translation undo the stability and unity of the State’s language, which so many of us 
abuse to speak of something it can never contain, and render always already failed any 
project that seeks, through this medium, to derive an essential identity in its attempts to 
found a (neo)liberal capitalist subject.  
 Herein, at the frustrated end of my analysis, arises again the Janus-esque specter 
of Chihuailaf’s hypermnesic project- both failed and successful, but only insofar as it is 
by necessity inscribed within the archives of the State to and of which it speaks. If, as I 
have been exploring, what we might say of this poetry’s politics is that it is a dialogue, a 
recognition, unaccomplished and impossible in the poetic form due to tensions arisen in 
the ample sense of its translation; then in the prose we see the successful realization of 
that desire as articulating the plurivocal reality of the contested territory we refer to as 
Chile and Argentina. But, again, those are terms that can be grounded only under the 
aegis of the colonial, capitalist state’s patriarchive and, as such, leave off any pretenses of 
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articulating a “true” Mapuche subject both differentiated in and legible to the law. By 
rendering more legible, embodying, the Mapuche for the law, beginning an ongoing 
process of destabilizing the spectacular virtuality of that incomplete signifier within the 
state’s order, this project accomplishes not a true pluriculturality but, rather, marks the 
still extant insufficiency of the language through which it is articulated, without ever 
completely arriving in it. Despite its apparent content, not for this being less important, 
its most significant work lays in the way that it highlights the colonial necessity of 
establishing the fixity of an other against, and through, which the colonial can claim for 
itself univocity. I can only hope that that work finds fertile ground upon which to grow 
into the future. 
Our bounds and theirs 
 As a final chapter, my analysis of Chihuailaf is meant as a coda in much the same 
way that he uses the final poem of De sueños azules y contrasueños- closing it, but re-
opening it, as well. I opened this chapter by averring the similarities that Chihuailaf has 
with my readings of both Parra and Gelman, while also insisting that his project puts 
mine and those I have been analyzing into crisis- and I will close by insisting that we 
return to constantly reread the very terms in which we posit divergent and anti-state 
movements in Latin America and abroad. Our goal cannot be to simply produce an 
idealized knowledge around subjects we choose as worthy- and thus limiting their 
capacity to be and act by constricting them with(in) our overdetermined expectations. 
Rather, we must understand a fundamentally imperative note rung in every reading in 
solidarity, such that we act, in the sphere within which we are given to act, in such a way 
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as to increase the affective and ontological capacity of not only ourselves, but also those 
we act beside, with, and for. While Chihuailaf does allow for what I have called an auto-
didact’s pedagogy of love and solidarity, we must understand the inverted directionality 
that his project assumes. If Parra teaches us to work in solidarity from the limits of the 
State’s language, we can also realize that even the most autonomist or anarchist inflected 
social or political project, insofar as political remains an appropriate term, still exists both 
in dialogue with the State and bound by the language through which the State articulates 
its laws and history. As we enter a moment of neoliberal politicking and the transition of 
the State to a role as translating machine for the movements of global capital, and thus 
see the concomitant divergences from statist politics that seek an alternative form of life 
characterized by an exodic movement beside and away from colonial, statist spatial 
practices, we are bound to encounter the presence(s) that have long existed in a mode of 
formal displacement from the apparatuses of epistemic capture that found nation-state 
discourses’ ontological presumptions. By signaling from within this language the 
fractious nature that the State attempts to veil through totalizing narrativizations of 
history and identity, Chihuailaf provides apertures toward a to-come in which singularly 
plural subjectivities- subject only to their co-emergent state of infinite responsibility- 
might radically distance themselves from the law, such that they effect a rupture with the 
foundational terms of epistemo-ontological plenitude based, in the final analysis, on 
deception and intellectual dishonesty. He signals, to even the most sympathetic winka, 
that there is still much work to be done before the discourses that underpin radical 
propositions for autonomy allow that conjunction of terms its fullest articulation. 
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 I wish to say this in another way, but my tongue holds me in thrall. We must undo 
the knowledge systems and power structures that the various modulations of the capitalist 
mode of production have overdetermined, such that they in turn overdetermine the 
subjective we of which I speak. To work from a position of solidarity and love is to 
recognize the limits and permeability of the narratives through and around which the 
spectacle (historicity, the law, neoliberalism- however you may say it) has constructed a 
we composed of alienated individuals. Fundamental to the process of coming to a 
(re)realization of our singularly plural emergence in the uncountable ethical encounters 
with other embodied lives is the requirement that we interrogate the terms through which 
even the left, in its manifold forms, has allowed for the determination of freedom and the 
lives that deserve and may embody it. Chihuailaf, although he may have yet to arrive in 
our order, so masterfully speaks its language that we cannot be deaf to what he reveals to 
us- the questions unasked for which he provides answers, the narratives unacknowledged 
that determine who might be friend, and who foe. We must return, I must return, to the 
uninterrogated terms of a debate that, even as it attempts a divergence from, is bound by 
the State’s language. An inheritance which can only be that of violence, coloniality, 
metaphysics, and capitalism. For all the work already done, there is ever more to come. 
And that is a lesson we might all approve. 
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Endnotes
                                                 
1 I borrow the final two terms and their elaboration from Alberto Moreiras’s 
chapter “The Aura of Testimonio” and Gareth Williams’s further usage of them in his 
chapter “The Fantasies of Cultural Exchange in Latin American Subaltern Studies”, both 
of which are included in the book The Real Thing: Testimonial Discourse and Latin 
America, edited by Georg M. Gugelberger. Their discussion of subalternist work and 
solidarity in Latinamericanism, particularly as practiced in the US, will haunt my work in 
this chapter much as it has throughout this dissertation. 
 
2 While this is not the space for an exhaustive list, key authors whose works I will 
be referencing or have influenced me directly and indirectly include: poets Lionel Lienlaf 
and Jaime Huenún, and historian-activists Luis Cárcamo-Huechante, Pablo Mariman 
Quemanado, Héctor Nahuelpan Moreno, José Millalen Paillal and Fernando Pairican 
Padilla.   
 
3 When referring to this project as hypermnesic, I am borrowing the term from its 
usage by Jacques Derrida his The Monolingualism of the Other: Or, a Prosthesis of 
Origin, in which he identifies it as one variety of memory deployed by the colonized- one 
marked by an anamnesis that borders on genealogical, and strives to inscribe this 
excessive remembering in the (colonial) language of the (colonial) state, the law, with an 
eye towards a possible arrival to subjective plenitude by the colonial subject, using his 
life as a Franco-Maghrebi as example. The version I cite is in Spanish and, as such, so is 
the listed bibliographical reference. 
 
4 It would be accurate to say, then, that I am attempting to take up the call of a 
deconstructive tendency within subalternist readings, specifically as Gayatri Spivak 
identifies it in her engagement with the work of the initial subaltern group in “Subaltern 
Studies: Deconstructing History”. That is, I wish to situate my work as setting out from a 
recognition of the double movement of the subaltern as supplementary to the hegemonic 
system- supplementing a lack but always marking, and marked as, failure, due to 
operating within the system of alienation inscribed in the work of “reason” proper to 
history and literary studies as fields derived from western traditions. My question would 
be, then, to what extent can we work from, through and past failure to persist in a 
generative practice of reading that effects change from where we, the hegemonic reader, 
are situated, thus destabilizing that same situation/situatedness?  
 
5 In this sense, I would again echo Chakrabarty, or one Chakrabarty. In “The 
Death of History?: Historical Consciousness and the Culture of Late Capitalism” he says 
of Guha’s “methodological innovations” that they “are not so much aimed at renovating 
‘history’ as they are at critiquing the hermeneutic aspects of the practices that constitute 
‘doing history’ in the academic context…as a deliberate work of ‘reading’ [and thus, 
teaching and learning] the archives on which his narratives are based” (53)- and I cannot, 
as my aside implies, but understand that project as a pedagogical one that demands of its 
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student-readers that they be teachers, in turn, and that its process be endless. That seems 
to me the same lesson Chihuailaf offers, in different terms- one of the impossibility, at 
least in the present, of any hermeneutics or archival consignation, both necessarily 
predicated on epistemic centrality of critical apparatuses that demand and/or create the 
I/Other distinction to (re)authorize themselves. Or, as Chakrabarty avers shortly 
thereafter, that we register “the inadequacy of both the categories as well as the rhetoric 
of all emancipatory political philosophies in satisfactorily conveying the texture and the 
specificities of the different and often contradictory that are entailed in processes through 
which relationships of power, i.e., domination subordination and resistance, are produced 
and experienced” (54).  
 
6 I wish here to preempt any hasty association of his work with the extensive 
discourse on testimonio in latinamericanism as practiced, at least, in the US, for both 
stylistic and teleological reasons. Stylistically, it conforms strongly to aesthetic standards 
associated with more “traditional” literary endeavors and, as such, does not exhibit what 
Moreiras, in the previously cited article on testimonio, refers to as a “subdued sublime”- 
that is, it does not enact a liminal experience of the literary that gestures towards any 
possibility of the real attained through lived experience. Moreover, while it does share 
some affinity with what Gareth Williams says of Rigoberta Menchu in “Translation and 
Mourning: The Cultural Challenge of Latin American Testimonial Autobiography”, in 
that it manifests oral/written tensions, Chihuailaf’s paradoxically doubly singular role as 
auto-translator between and because of his modal mastery of both styles, and thus 
embodied/virtual subjective split, complicates to the point of nullity any attempt to apply 
to his work Williams’s assertion that testimonio “effectively insert[s] its enemy- the 
metropolitan notion of ‘progress’-into itself” (87). Chihuailaf himself is already always 
arriving to his own insertion into metropolitan notional progressiveness, not as lesser but 
as a, albeit incomplete, constitutive element. This is a strength and a weakness, as we will 
see, but it nonetheless distances his enunciatory position from those common to 
testimonio. For further reading on testimonio, see the cited volume that includes the 
chapter by both Moreiras and Williams. 
 
7 David Aniñir Guilitraro is a Santiago-born Mapuche poet, artist and activist, and 
coined the term “mapurbe” made famous by his poetry collection Mapurbe: venganza a 
raíz. Jaime Luis Huenún is a Valdivia-born Mapuche-huilliche poet and activist, author 
of several books of poetry, many translated into various European languages, and editor 
of poetry collections that include Epu mari ülkatufe to fachantü/20 poetas Mapuche 
contemporáneos.  
 
8 In this sense, he fills a similar role to that that Luis E. Cárcamo-Huechante 
identifies in the poetry of Lionel Lienlaf, in his article “No + Wingka Word: Sounds of 
Mapuche Resurgence in the Poetry of Lionel Lienlaf” (2016).  
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9 When I here, and throughout, refer to spectacular incorporability or the spectacle 
in general, it is an explicit reference to the work of the situationist Guy Debord. While the 
citation may seem anachronistic, given Debord’s periodization, I insert it in a logic of the 
specter that itself references Jacques Derrida as a way to assert that, despite our 
association of the spectacle with tele-technologization, it’s logic has long held sway over 
all cultural representations- historical, poetic, narrative, painting, etcetera- insofar as they 
deal with any subject barred from the dominant social structures of their period. Thus, as 
the Mapuche have, for the most part, been so barred from all colonial modes of 
production and cultural forms since the arrival of the Spanish, they have long prefigured 
the post-modern tele-technics of the contemporary spectacle.  
 
10 For a long elaboration of the ontological implications of this situation, and an 
attempt at synthesizing the broad strokes of a Mapuche ontology, see Marcelo González 
Gálvez’s Los Mapuche y sus otros: persona, alteridad y sociedad en el sur de Chile. 
While it reproduces some of the translational problematics key to my criticism of winka 
work on the Mapuche, it is a compassionate and respectful work in collaboration with 
Mapuche communities, and its elaboration of what he calls a singularismo radical sheds 
a fascinating light on the difficulties of any attempts both to define the term “Mapuche” 
from the Mapuche perspective and generalize about the Mapuche pueblo, from any 
perspective. 
 
11 As the following sketch is not exhaustive, I will not be discussing texts at 
length. Nonetheless, I’d like to include here a list of works that have been useful to me, 
the full citations included in my bibliography, to which one may refer themselves for 
further elaboration of these points. In history, see: the collected works in both Ta iñ fijke 
xipa rakizuameluwün: Historia, colonialismo y resistencia desde el país Mapuche and 
Awükan ka kuxankan zugu wajmapu mew: Violencias coloniales en Wajmapu; José 
Bengoa’s Historia del pueblo Mapuche and Mapuche, colonos y el Estado nacional; 
Adrian Moyano’s De mar a mar: El Wallmapu sin fronteras; Alejandro Saavedra 
Pleáez’s  Los Mapuche en la sociedad chilena actual; ¡…Escucha, Winka…! by Sergio 
Caniuqueo, Rodrigo Levil, Pablo Marimán and José Millalén, as well as each 
contributor’s own works; Florencia Mallon’s Courage Tastes of Blood: The Mapuche 
Community of Nicolás Ailío and the Chilean State, 1906-2001; Joanna Crow’s article 
“Debates about Ethnicity, Class and Nation in Allende’s Chile (1970-1973)”; José A. 
Mariman’s “Transición democrática en Chile ¿Nuevo ciclo reivindicativo mapuche?”; 
Sergio Silva Jaramillo’s “Estado y empresas privadas en la realidad mapuche”; and 
Pablo-Raúl Arreola’s “Reorganization of Chile’s Frontier Administration and the Origins 
of the Mapuche Revolt of 1865”. For works from other fields, see: Diane Haughney’s 
Neoliberal Economics, Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in 
Chile; Patricia Richard’s Race and the Chilean Miracle: Neoliberalism, Democracy, and 
Indigenous Rights; Lucía Guerra-Cunningham’s La Ciudad Ajena: Subjetividades de 
origen Mapuche en el espacio urbano; Gerardo Azócar, Rodrigo Sanhueza, Mauricio 
Aguayo, Hugo Romero and María D. Muñoz’s “Conflicts for Control of Mapuche-
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Pehuenche land and natural resources in the Bíobío highlands, Chile”; Anna Maria 
Kowalczyk’s “Indigenous Peoples and Modernity: Mapuche Mobilizations in Chile”; and 
Guillaume Boccara’s “The Mapuche People in Post-Dictatorship Chile”. I will further 
mention specific texts from this list in following notes, as they are immediately relevant. 
 
12 Specifically concerning Mapuche presence in what is now Argentina, I would 
refer the reader to Adrian Moyano, ibid.  
 
13 Regarding the various epic poems about the “War of Arauco” and their stylistic 
relations to Greek and Roman epics, as well as their importance for the burgeoning 
Chilean nation, see María Gabriela Huidobro Salazar’s El imaginario de la Guerra de 
Arauco: mundo épico y tradición clásica. 
 
14 In fact, as Carlos Ruíz Rodríguez notes in his contribution to Rebelión en 
Wallmapu: Resistencia en el pueblo-nación Mapuche, the very term winka used to refer 
to colonizers and their descendents finds its origins in “we ingka”, or “new Inca”. So 
even the concept of a foreign, centralized power with which they had at least strained 
relations, was not itself foreign to them.  
 
15 Here I refer to Guerra-Cunningham, ibid., Boccara, ibid., and Luis Cárcamo-
Huechante’s brief note “The Long History of Indigenous Textual Cultures: A Response”.  
 
16 See in particular Pablo-Raúl Arreola, ibid. 
 
17 It is worth noting that Gabriel Salazar, in his La enervante levedad histórica de 
la clase política civil (Chile, 1900-1973), avers that the sought-after consolidation of the 
bourgeoisie as a political class never saw fruition in Chile, which he maintains has been 
dominated by an oligarchic form of government since its inception. This observation, 
should we choose to uphold it, would lend sense to the ongoing processes of primitive 
accumulation and territorial conflict that have characterized relations between the 
Mapuche and Chile ever since independence. One can also refer to his Historia de la 
acumulación capitalista en Chile (Apuntes de clase) for further elaboration of this point. 
Regarding primitive accumulation, all major thought of it bears strong resemblance to the 
Chilean situation vis a vis the Mapuche: from Rosa Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of 
Capital; David Harvey’s work, summarized in “The ‘New’ Imperialism: Accumulation 
by Dispossession”; and Marx’s strikingly similar portrait of Scotland at the end of 
Capital, Volume 1. Here I mention them only in passing- not to say that any one can 
completely contain the nature of these processes, but rather to indicate that at various 
points, and in various ways, the relation(s) that obtains between the Mapuche and the 
State are strongly marked by post-independence capital projects. Regrettably, I cannot 
further analyze these processes here.  
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18 This point- on the varying relations between the Mapuche and the Chilean left 
and right- is somewhat contentious amongst historians. It is the source of a debate and of 
mutual recriminations between Pablo Marimán and José Bengoa, wherein the former 
claims that the Mapuche allied with whomsoever it seemed most advantageous at any 
given moment, and Bengoa relies on archival work to stake a claim to a strong tendency 
within the broader Mapuche to ally themselves with the Left (while not denying the 
plurality of positions within the Mapuche, which include the opposite assertion). Alina 
Rodenkirchen’s chapter in Violencias colonials en Wajmapu does an excellent job of 
complicating any univocal position in this debate and presents a Mapuche perspective on 
the Pinochet dictatorship. Florencia Mallon’s Courage Tastes of Blood also teases out the 
complexities of the Left/Mapuche relation, escaping somewhat from the polemic of the 
other two. Joanna Crow (2007) explicates well the Allende government’s policies 
towards and attempts to include the Mapuche. While I will maintain an ambivalent 
position, merely signaling the debate, I would like to underline its existence- it reinforces 
that any attempt at establishing a single historical framework for any relations between 
the Mapuche and the Chileans is apt to be fraught.  
 
19 Patricia Richards’s Race and the Chilean Miracle: Neoliberalism, Democracy, 
and Indigenous Rights does an excellent job of archiving and categorizing the various 
manifestations of this racism throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and into 
the present. However, the reliance on testimonies from and observations of the Chilean 
perpetrators of this systemic pattern, while illustrative of its pervasiveness, only further 
reinforces the directionality inherent in the framing of the studies I am broadly referring 
to throughout this chapter. We must find a way to formulate, or reformulate, these studies 
such that they begin from beside the Mapuche and grow outward not simply in their 
conception, but even in their execution. This is not to impugn Richards, who I don’t 
doubt would agree with this, but rather to comment how even a study of her rigor and 
framing is restricted by its author’s social and professional positionality.  
 
20 Much of these observations, particularly concerning multiculturalism’s attempts 
at (re-)appropriating the Mapuche figure, are due to Joanna Crow’s article “Mapuche 
Poetry in Post-Dictatorship Chile: Confronting the Dilemmas of Neoliberal 
Multiculturalism”, which I will comment more fully below.  
 
21 This is a principle take away from Diane Haughney’s Neoliberal Economics, 
Democratic Transition, and Mapuche Demands for Rights in Chile, which does an 
excellent job in detailing the slipshod and hasty attempts at writing or emending 
legislation which refers to the Mapuche. 
 
22 For an excellent explication of this logging and other extractivist policies, see 
Gerardo Azócar, et al. ibid. 
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23 In fact, these events appear in the vast majority, if not all, of the previously 
noted works, as well as being a constant, explicit theme in the poetry and advocacy of 
Mapuche poets and public figures. 
 
24 Haughney, ibid., provides an excellent exploration of the law and politics 
entangled in this issue. 
 
25 Alongside the already cited references, I have included bibliographical 
information for a short piece by Pairican in the works cited. 
 
26 In this sense, it tracks similar effects of Mapuche radio shows that Luis 
Cárcamo-Huechante (2010) documents. 
 
27 For the explicit explanation of the werkv, see pages 95-6 in the cited edition. 
Chihuailaf, in his role as werken, presents an interesting reversal of the ideational 
pilgrimage that Gareth Williams (1996) analyzes regarding testimonios. That is, instead 
of facilitating our going to the other to find ourselves, this text is such that that other, 
Chihuailaf, comes to us to teach us to stay where we are and work on ourselves, rather 
than seeking ourselves in our imagination of the other. 
 
28 In this sense, it is worth noting here the similarities that this conceptualization 
presents with Spinoza’s elaboration of Nature/God in his Ethics. There may be here a 
productive point of contact with my work in the previous chapter- but it would need 
fuller elaboration that I cannot offer here. 
 
29 Concerning these assertions, see pages 92-4 of the cited edition. 
 
30 Carmen Gloria Godoy R., in her article “En El Bosque De La Memoria: 
Identidad Mapuche y Escritura En Dos Obras De Elicura Chihuailaf”, explores and 
explicates at greater length Chihuailaf’s navigation of the singular/collective tension that 
I briefly signal here, using similar referents to my own to demonstrate how he maintains 
authority to speak of Mapuche experiences while not pretending to have the final word on 
them. 
 
31 Rojas explores this in his text La lengua escorada: La traducción como 
estrategia de resistencia en cuatro poetas mapuche. 
 
32 For a sampling of these sorts of readings, including many by the more 
prominent critics, see Crítica Situada: El Estado Actual Del Arte y La Poesía Mapuche, 
which somewhat ironically includes a text by Chihuailaf that is miscited by at least two 
contributors, particularly concerning issues of identity. The article by Joanna Crow I am 
referring to is “Mapuche Poetry in Post-Dictatorship Chile: Confronting the Dilemmas of 
Neoliberal Multiculturalism” and will reappear later in more detail. 
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33 Crow, ibid., draws this terminology of the “indio permitido” from Charles Hale. 
 
34 While it should go without mentioning, the obvious theoretical referent here is 
Derrida’s Of Grammatology, which centers this debate within a framework that marks it 
as entirely colonial, from as early as its introduction. For an example of this usage in 
criticism of Mapuche poetry, see Hugo Carrasco’s “Poesía Mapuche Actual: De La 
Apropiación Hacia La Innovación Cultural”. 
 
35 Assertions around prose and interviews as a metalanguage that explicates the 
poetry come principally from the Carrascos, and can be found in the contribution to La 
crítica situada… by Ivan Carrasco, “Metalenguas de poetas mapuches etnoculturales” 
and Juan Manuel Fierro’s contribution “Un proceso de metalectura: entrevistas a Elicura 
Chihuailaf”.  
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